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KURZFASSUNG 
Diese Arbeit untersucht automatische Landungen von Flugzeugen, basierend auf Navigationssignalen 
von globalen Satellitennavigationssystemen (GNSS), welche durch ein bodengestütztes Augmentie-
rungssystem (GBAS) korrigiert werden. Durch die Betrachtung von verfügbaren Informationen, in 
Verbindung mit einer realistischeren Modellierung werden Verbesserungsvorschläge für GBAS ge-
macht, welche das Potential haben die Verfügbarkeit des Dienstes zu erhöhen.  
Zunächst werden hierfür das Instrumentenlandesystem (ILS) als derzeitiges Standard-System für die 
Führung von Luftfahrzeugen im Landeanflug und das GBAS als künftiges Führungssystem beschrie-
ben und auf die Genauigkeit der Anflugführung im Flugversuch hin verglichen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, 
dass GBAS ein deutlich weniger störanfälligeres, weniger verrauschtes und präziseres Führungssignal 
zur Verfügung stellt, als dasjenige des ILS.   
Als nächstes wird die Ableitung von Anforderungen an ein Landesystem für Flugzeuge diskutiert. Die 
erlaubte Gesamtunsicherheit im Hinblick auf den Aufsetzpunkt des Flugzeugs ist dabei aufzuteilen auf 
einen Anteil des Autopiloten und einen Anteil des Navigationssystems. Dieser Prozess wird kritisch 
begutachtet und Verbesserungen vorgeschlagen, wo es möglich ist konservative Annahmen durch in 
Echtzeit verfügbare Informationen zu ersetzen. So können die Anforderungen an die GBAS Monitore 
reduziert und damit die Verfügbarkeit des Dienstes erhöht werden.  
Als nächstes folgt eine Untersuchung der Verteilung der Aufsetzpunkte bei automatischen Landungen. 
Diese Untersuchungen werden exemplarisch anhand eines Simulationsmodells durchgeführt. Die Er-
gebnisse zeigen, dass eine Modellierung des Aufsetzverhaltens als Normalverteilung nicht gut geeig-
net ist. Entweder ist eine konservative  Abschätzung vorzunehmen, um das Risiko außerhalb des er-
laubten Bereiches auf der Bahn aufzusetzen nicht zu unterschätzen. Alternativ wird die Modellierung 
mittels einer Johnson-Verteilung untersucht, welche eine deutlich realistischere und weniger konserva-
tive Beschreibung des Aufsetzverhaltens zulässt.  
Schließlich wird noch der Einfluss des Navigationssystems auf den Gesamtfehler untersucht. Die 
größten potentiellen Fehler in differentieller Navigation können durch ionosphärische Störungen ent-
stehen. Dieses Phänomen wird deshalb näher beschrieben und im Anschluss ein verbessertes Monito-
ring im Bodensystem entwickelt. Dieses basiert auf einem zusätzlichen Empfänger für das Monitoring 
und berücksichtigt die aktuelle Satellitengeometrie. Schließlich wird für zukünftige Zweifrequenz-
Dienste noch ein Monitoring im Bordsystem entwickelt und diskutiert. Dieses verwendet Informatio-
nen, sowohl über die aktuelle Satellitenkonstellation, als auch über die Leistungsfähigkeit des Autopi-
loten und benötigt deshalb deutlich weniger konservative Annahmen als ein gegenwärtiges GBAS. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this work, automatic landings of aircraft based on signals from Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
(GNSS), augmented by a Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS), are investigated. By taking 
into account available knowledge that is currently not used and a more realistic modelling of the auto-
land performance several suggestions for improving GBAS are made. 
After a short discussion of the Instrument Landing System (ILS) and GBAS a motivation for the use 
of GBAS is given by comparing the performance of both guidance systems in flight trials. The results 
show that GBAS is much less susceptible to disturbances and provides more precise and smoother 
guidance.  
The next chapter continues with a description and a discussion of the derivation of navigation re-
quirements for GBAS from the definition of a safe landing. The total error budged has to be split be-
tween the autopilot and the navigation system. A critical review of the derivation process proposes 
adjustments by taking into account available knowledge about the satellite geometry in order to reduce 
the monitoring requirements and thus increase system availability.  
This discussion is followed by an investigation of the autoland performance based on one example 
autopilot implementation. The results show that the currently used way to model the touchdown per-
formance by a Gaussian distribution is not well suited. Either very conservative inflation is necessary 
or the tail probability of landing outside the required touchdown zone may be significantly underesti-
mated. It is therefore suggested to model the touchdown performance by a Johnson distribution, better 
fitting to the obtained results.  
Finally, the contribution of the navigation system to the total system error is discussed. As the main 
concern in differential navigation techniques, such as GBAS, results from ionospheric disturbances 
these phenomena are discussed more in detail. For the GBAS ground system an improved ionospheric 
monitor is proposed, based on adding an additional reference receiver for monitoring purposes. Fur-
thermore, an ionospheric monitor for future dual-frequency GBAS modes is developed. Such a moni-
tor is necessary if positioning is to be done based on single frequency modes, which seems to be a very 
likely way forward. Shifting this monitoring task to the airborne system has the advantage that all 
knowledge about current navigation performance and autopilot performance for that specific aircraft 
type can be exploited, facilitating the ionospheric monitoring task significantly.  
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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE WORK 
Fast and reliable air transport of passengers and cargo has become essential for society as well as the 
economy. Different studies come to the conclusion that it is to be expected that air traffic will continue 
to grow at a rate of about 2-5% per year depending on the geographic region and economic develop-
ment in that area [1], [2]. This is a challenging development in terms of airport and airspace capacity. 
Air traffic control sectors over central and north-western Europe in the area Frankfurt – Amsterdam – 
London are extremely busy and are operating near or at their capacity limit during most of the time 
already today. When low visibility conditions prevail, the capacity of airports is reduced due to in-
creased spacing of arriving aircraft on the approach and during taxi operations on ground. The SESAR 
program in Europe and the NextGen program in the US are development programs for ATM solutions 
that ensure that the increase in air traffic can be handled and all safety targets are met. One key enabler 
in this context is the use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as the United States’ 
(US) GPS constellation, as primary means of navigation. Compared to conventional navigation aids, a 
significantly increased navigation performance in terms of accuracy and integrity can be achieved 
using GNSS. This better performance is exploited by the performance based navigation (PBN) concept 
which allows for a more efficient use of the airspace. For different phases of flight different levels of 
performance are required. The most stringent performance requirements are in effect for guidance of 
aircraft on precision approaches and automatic landings. Currently, this task is accomplished mostly 
by the Instrument Landing System (ILS). However, it can only provide straight-in guidance, requires 
operational mitigation of signal distortions by significant spacing of the aircraft aligned on the ap-
proach and can only provide approaches at one predefined glide slope angle to one fixed aiming point 
on the runway. When using GNSS for precision approach guidance, some sort of augmentation of the 
signals is required to meet the performance requirements. For precision approaches with different visi-
bility minima in the last phase of flight, Space Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) like the US 
American Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) or the European Geostationary Navigation Over-
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lay Service (EGNOS) are certified for use down to decision heights of 200 ft or 250 ft, respectively. 
Currently also certified for CAT-I operations (called GBAS Approach Service Type (GAST) C) and 
commercially available is the Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS). A ground station with 
reference receivers at the airport provides locally relevant corrections and integrity parameters, togeth-
er with a definition of the approach path to arriving aircraft. Since its first approval and commercial 
use in 2012 it has been developed to also support CAT-II/III operations and is the system of choice to 
replace the ILS in the future. Standards for the CAT-II/III capable service type (GAST D in GBAS 
terminology) were developed and agreed upon by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) at the end of 2016 and will be in effect from 2018 on [3]. While the system is currently only 
used for ILS-lookalike approaches extensive standardization effort is ongoing to be able to fully ex-
ploit the benefits of GBAS. Some of the potential benefits include increased and variable glide slope 
angles for noise abatement, multiple glide slope angles for wake vortex mitigation and thus less spac-
ing of aircraft on the approach, multiple runway aiming points to minimize runway occupancy and taxi 
times and optimize separation to ultimately increase capacity of a runway, definition of curved ap-
proaches with vertical guidance and potentially in the future also support of automated taxi operations 
and precision departure guidance. All these benefits become possible because of the flexible way of 
defining reference paths for aircraft by waypoints, straight and curved segments and vertical profiles, 
while the ILS is physically limited to providing only one straight approach path for all aircraft.  
1.2 CURRENT STATE OF THE ART 
As state of the art of GBAS the service types C and D are considered [3], [4]. The service types were 
designed to support CAT-I approaches (GAST C) and CAT-III operations including automatic land-
ings without visibility requirements (GAST D) [5], [6]. The differential GNSS corrections provided to 
arriving aircraft by the ground station enable significantly improved guidance [7], [8]. The calculated 
deviations include much less signal distortions than ILS, provide greater accuracy and, contrary to 
conventional navigation aids, also onboard integrity in the form of error bounds associated with the 
current position estimate. When considering automatic landings, the performance of the navigation 
system is a key parameter, however, also the performance of the autopilot is crucial. The high-level 
safety requirements are defined on aircraft level and thus include both subsystems and their interaction 
[9], [10]. Thus, the total error budget has to be allocated between navigation system and autopilot. On 
the autopilot side the performance is described by a nominal touchdown point and the standard devia-
tion of a Gaussian distribution accounting for the uncertainty caused e.g. by wind, aircraft weight and 
balance and other influences [11], [12]. The nominal touchdown point and autopilot performance of 
course differ between aircraft types and the current wind and loading conditions for each specific ap-
proach. In the process of deriving navigation requirements, a “standard” autopilot performance is used 
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that should ideally cover all aircraft using GBAS [13]. It is obvious that in the derivation process the 
autopilot performance has to be conservatively assumed. Thus, the navigation requirements are more 
stringent than necessary for most aircraft and approach conditions but, on the other hand, may not 
necessarily cover all situations.  
In GAST C the ground station is responsible to bound the error at the output of the airborne receiver. 
In addition to conservative assumptions about the autopilot performance, conservative navigation sys-
tem error bounding has to be performed, in order to meet the stringent integrity requirements. For 
GAST D the philosophy was changed in a way that the monitoring for ionospheric disturbances is 
shared between the ground and the airborne systems. Thus, the conservatism could be somewhat re-
duced but more sensitive monitoring algorithms were included in GBAS in order to protect users from 
potentially large positioning errors due to ionospheric gradients. The sensitive monitoring for iono-
spheric gradients within the ground station is challenging due to strong limitations on the spacing be-
tween reference antennas and thus the footprint of the GBAS installation on an airport where usually 
the space is very limited. Furthermore, it requires an extremely stable phase center of the reference 
antennas and can also be impacted by tropospheric disturbances. While GAST D is now also standard-
ized, it is expected that the availability of the system will not be high enough to meet operational re-
quirements in all regions of the world. Ionospheric issues lead to a degraded performance where iono-
spheric activity is high and significant (mainly in equatorial and polar regions). Thus, the current ver-
sion of GAST D may still see some changes and improvements in the future. 
In order to overcome many of the challenges of current single frequency and single constellation 
GBAS, the system is being further developed to include also signals from other GNSS constellations 
and a second frequency. The latest generation of GPS satellites (the Block II F satellites), as well as all 
functional Galileo satellites, already offer additional signals in the L5 frequency band that can be used 
for aviation purposes. Dual frequency methods allow for detection of ionospheric gradients or forming 
of an ionosphere free combination of the navigation signals. Using more than one constellation makes 
the system less vulnerable against loss of signals due to ionospheric scintillations and associated loss 
of lock of the satellite signals that occur very frequently in equatorial regions. However, the develop-
ment of these methods has only started recently and to date no processing method with a correspond-
ing integrity concept has been developed. Despite the obvious benefits new challenges, technical (e.g. 
increased measurement noise in the ionosphere free combination), regulatory (e.g. development of 
new antenna and receiver standards) and political (approval of the use of different GNSS constella-
tions are national responsibility and thus may be different in each country) issues still have to be re-
solved before the next generation of multi constellation and dual frequency GBAS can become opera-
tional.  
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1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THIS WORK 
This work should be seen in the context of supporting the development and promoting the implemen-
tation of GBAS as primary guidance system for precision approaches and landings.  
The general objective is to advance the system on a technical level but always with the constraint to 
keep it certifiable with minimal additional effort and to maintain compatibility with existing hardware 
with as little modifications as possible. This shall be achieved by a tighter integration of the navigation 
and autoland system, taking into account available knowledge about sensors and systems in real-time 
instead of relying on conservative assumptions. For this purpose, a critical review of the underlying 
assumptions made during the requirement definition process is carried out. This process shall identify 
potential improvements in the allocation of the allowable error budget considering the available 
knowledge about the navigation system and the autopilot, where applicable. The identified improve-
ments are then applied to existing GBAS architectures to evaluate potential benefits in existing sys-
tems with only slight modifications.  
Finally, the general concept is also discussed in the light of the development of future GBAS genera-
tions that are developed to include dual frequency and multi constellation techniques. As there is cur-
rently no concept fully developed how future GBAS architectures should work and be implemented, 
there is great potential to define new ways of error budget allocation. These can take into account the 
interaction between the GBAS navigation sensor and the autopilot in order to achieve a landing system 
that is robust against disturbances and capable of providing availability of service at a level that is 
currently provided by the ILS.  
This work is not considering any operational approval aspects of new procedures or potential changes 
and optimizations that could be done in the autopilot in order to exploit the much-improved guidance 
performance. These topics are left for future work to experts in the respective areas.  
1.4 OUTLINE AND OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS 
In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, the thesis is organized into four main chapters after 
this introduction, followed by a summary with conclusions and an outlook on potential future work in 
the area.   
The following Chapter 2 gives an overview of approach classifications and current approach guidance 
systems and their functionalities. After a short discussion of the ILS it provides a description of the 
GBAS service, the ground and airborne subsystems and the integrity assurance. In order to compare 
the nominal performance of the two systems flight test data were collected and evaluated. The evalua-
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tion of the in-flight performance of ILS and GBAS is presented showing clearly the significantly im-
proved nominal guidance performance of the GNSS-based system.  
The contribution contained in this section is the first in-flight comparison of actual ILS and GBAS 
performance during approaches carried out with an Airbus A320 as example for a representative com-
mercial aircraft presented in [7]. 
Chapter 3 details the process of deriving requirements for the navigation system and highlights the 
trade-off between navigation system error (NSE) and flight technical error (FTE), i.e. the autopilot 
performance. Based on airworthiness requirements, and more specifically, the definition of a safe land-
ing, the total system performance requirements are presented. Next, the resulting requirements for the 
autopilot performance, and finally the derived requirements for the navigation system are discussed.  
The contribution in this section is a critical review of the requirement derivation process for GBAS-
based automatic landings and the identification of possible relaxations of the monitoring requirements 
from the state of the art methodology. Potential relaxations are suggested by taking into account actual 
conditions and known parameters instead of worst-case parameters. These suggestions are then used in 
Chapter 5 as basis of a new GBAS ground monitor that is developed and described there.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the autopilot performance. After a short general description of the autopilot func-
tionalities an exemplary study of the influence of different effects on the touchdown performance is 
presented. The model of the Airbus A320 autoland system was used to simulate landings under differ-
ent wind conditions, as well as the impact of aircraft weight and balance on the nominal touchdown 
point and the dispersion of touchdown points.  
The contribution of this chapter is the analysis of the touchdown performance and the suggestion to 
apply the Gaussian overbounding method or the use of a Johnson distribution to model the results. 
This is deemed necessary in order to not underestimate the risk of landing outside the touchdown box 
described in Chapter 3, due to the non-Gaussian and non-symmetric distribution of the touchdown 
points. It is further suggested and illustrated at the example of aircraft landing weight and center of 
gravity location to use available knowledge when assessing the touchdown performance in order to 
obtain a less varying distribution for the touchdown points and be able to use this margin. Finally, the 
trade-off between NSE and FTE performance is performed and discussed based on the results. 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the NSE of GBAS and is the largest part of this thesis. It starts with a discus-
sion of nominal and non-nominal errors and then analyzes in more detail the impact of the ionosphere 
and its disturbances on GBAS. Ionospheric issues have the potential to cause large positioning errors 
and are a major concern for the differential architecture of GBAS. Most of the monitoring and error 
bounding in the current GBAS service types C and D is dedicated to the mitigation of this potential 
threat.  
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The chapter then presents two further contributions of this thesis: The first one is the development of a 
monitoring architecture for a GAST D ground station to safely detect and mitigate the threat posed to 
GBAS by ionospheric gradients. It is based on an additional reference receiver that is placed as far as 
possible from the original GBAS but for safety reasons still within the airport. The concept shows the 
potential of applying the relaxations identified in chapter 2 and was presented in [14].  
The second contribution in this chapter is the development of a monitor for dual frequency GBAS that 
operate in single frequency positioning mode (a highly likely candidate for future GBAS architec-
tures).  It uses dual frequency measurements to detect difference in the ionospheric delay between the 
ground station and the aircraft on one or more satellites. In contrast to all current service types, it is 
suggested to perform this monitoring on board the aircraft so that the knowledge about current naviga-
tion system performance and autopilot performance can be fully leveraged. In that way, the conserva-
tism in the error bounding process can be reduced to a minimum and system availability greatly in-
creased. The monitor was presented in [15].  
Chapter 6 contains the conclusions of this thesis. They summarize again the contributions of each 
chapter and discuss their significance in the GBAS context. Finally, suggestions for further research in 
this area are given.  
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2 APPROACH CLASSIFICATIONS AND GUIDANCE SYSTEMS 
This chapter gives a summary of approach classifications depending on different weather conditions 
and services offered, as well as an overview of current state-of-the-art approach guidance systems. 
The Instrument Landing System (ILS) is the current standard technology for precision approach guid-
ance. First Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS) have been deployed and now also offer ap-
proach guidance under conditions up to CAT-I. Systems capable of providing CAT-II/III guidance are 
standardized and will become operational in the near future. ILS is relying on two ground transmitters 
defining a straight approach track for each runway end while GBAS generates corrections to GNSS 
signals which are broadcast via a VHF data link. It is thus possible to define not only straight ap-
proach tracks, as currently with ILS, but also curved and segmented steep approaches. After a short 
description of the ILS a review of the GBAS subsystems is presented together with their functions, 
GBAS based positioning as well as the integrity concept. Next, the way of calculating guidance infor-
mation (i.e. deviations from the desired track) for the approach is shown. The chapter then concludes 
with a comparison of the nominal performance of GBAS and ILS as observed in flight trials. It can be 
observed that GBAS performance is significantly better than that of the ILS in terms of noise and ab-
solute errors in the guidance signal.  
 
Contribution: In-flight comparison of ILS and GBAS approach performance (Results in Chapter 2.3) 
 
Publications:  
• M. Felux, T. Dautermann and H. Becker, "GBAS landing system - percision approach 
guidance after ILS," Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, vol. 85, no. 5, pp. 382-
388, 2013. [7] 
• M. Felux, T. Dautermann and H. Becker, "GBAS Approach Guidance Performance - A 
Comparison to ILS," in Proc. ION ITM, Newport Beach, CA, USA, 2013. [16] 
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Under low-visibility conditions an approach guidance system together with an appropriate approach 
procedure is necessary for aircraft to safely approach and land at an airport. The procedure provides a 
flight path with sufficient obstacle clearance on the approach and on the missed approach track as 
specified in the ICAO Doc8186 [17]. Depending on ground and airborne equipment, runway category, 
crew and operator certification, different levels of service can be provided. These reach from visual via 
non-precision approaches to approaches with vertical guidance and finally precision approaches. Table 
2-1 summarizes the classifications for the different approach operations, approach runways and system 
performance procedures. It summarizes the changes that were agreed upon in 2012 by the Internation-
al Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to the ICAO Annex 6 “Operation of Aircraft” [18], Annex 10 
“Aeronautical Telecommunications” [4] and Annex 14 “Aerodromes” [19]. Approach operations are 
classified as Type A and Type B for Decision Heights above 250 ft or below that value, respectively. 
Type A approaches can be based on 2D guidance (i.e. lateral guidance only) or 3D guidance (addition-
al vertical guidance available), while Type B operations require 3D guidance. Type B operations are 
then subdivided into three categories (CAT) I / II / III, depending on the minimum decision height or 
altitude (MDH/A) and minimum visibility conditions. Runways are classified according to which type 
of operation they support and system performance is classified into non-precision approach, approach 
with vertical guidance and precision approach. Systems foreseen to support Type B operations are ILS, 
MLS, SBAS and GBAS.  
While at the moment ILS is by far the most used guidance system for final approaches, GNSS based 
navigation is being implemented and an ever increasing number of SBAS and GBAS approaches are 
being defined and published. For SBAS the US Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) supports 
CAT-I precision approaches, while the European Geostationary Overlay Service (EGNOS) supports 
APV operations with a DH/A of 250 ft. For approaches in visibility conditions lower that the ones 
mentioned and for autoland operations, local augmentation in the form of a GBAS is necessary to 
meet the time to alarm requirements and protect the user from rare ionospheric disturbances which 
have the potential to cause GNSS positioning errors large enough to prevent safe operations of aircraft 
during landing. In the following chapters ILS and GBAS are explained in more detail and a compari-
son of both systems is presented.  
This work mainly focuses on Type B operations, and especially on CAT-II/III autoland operations 
based on GBAS as approach guidance system. In GBAS terminology different GBAS approach ser-
vice types (GAST) are defined, which again correspond to different levels of service. The service type 
supporting Type A and B operations to the CAT I minima according to Table 2-1 is GAST C, while the 
service type supporting Type A and B operations including CAT II/III is termed GAST D. The latter 
one is the GBAS approach service type focused on within this work. 
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Domain Document Aspect 
Approach 
Operations Annex 6 
Classification 
Type A Type B 
>250ft CAT-I 
(>200ft) 
CAT-II 
(>100ft) 
CAT-III 
(<100ft) 
Method 2D 3D 
Minima MDA/H DH/A 
Approach 
Runways Annex 14 
MDA/H 
VMC 
Non-instrument 
runway 
 
MDA/H >250ft 
Visibility > 1000m 
Non-precision 
approach runway 
 
DA/H >200ft 
Visibility > 800m 
or RVR > 550 m 
Precision approach  
Runway, Category I 
 
DA/H  > 100ft 
RVR ≥ 300m  
Precision approach Runway,  
Category II 
 
DA/H ≥ 0ft 
RVR ≥ 0m 
Precision approach Runway, Category III 
System Per-
formance 
Procedures 
Annex 10 
NPA NDB, Lctr., 
VOR, LOC, 
GNSS 
 
APV 
 
GNSS, 
Baro, 
SBAS 
PA ILS, MLS, SBAS, GBAS 
Table 2-1 Summary of approach classification according to [20]. 
2.1 THE INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM  
The Instrument Landing System (ILS) is currently the only widely used precision approach guidance 
system. It has been in use since the 1940s and can provide precision approach guidance for manual or 
automatic approaches and landings. Two separate antenna arrays form the core of an ILS ground sta-
tion: the localizer is placed behind the end of the runway to which approach service is provided. It is 
used for horizontal guidance during the approach and rollout on the runway; the glide slope transmitter 
is placed typically about 60 m next to the runway abeam the touchdown point for vertical guidance. 
Both systems form two narrow beams with different modulations slightly to the left and right and 
above and below the desired approach track (90Hz for the left and upper one, 150Hz for the right and 
lower one) onto a carrier signal (110MHz for the localizer and 330MHz for the glide slope). When the 
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aircraft is aligned with the extended runway centerline and the glide path, both signals are received 
equally strong and the difference in depth of modulation (DDM) of the two respective signals is zero. 
Whenever the aircraft deviates from the approach track the DDM becomes non-zero indicating a devi-
ation to the pilot (and outputting it to the autopilot if connected).   
By design and technical realization of the system there is no way of providing other than straight-in 
approach tracks. Furthermore, it is quite common that preceding aircraft create signal distortions to 
other trailing aircraft due to multipath and signal shadowing effects of the signals from the ground. 
Further out on the approach this does not cause problems. However, when operating near the ground 
such distortions could potentially endanger the safety of aircraft. In an incident in 2011 a B777 made a 
runway excursion upon performing an automatic landing at Munich Airport. It was most likely caused 
by such signal distortions from a departing aircraft from the same runway when the landing aircraft 
was shortly before touchdown [21]. In visibility conditions below the CAT-I minima spacing between 
aircraft is thus increased to ensure undistorted signal quality for operations near the ground. These 
operational measures, however, reduce airport capacity and lead to a significant amount of delay and 
flight cancellations at large airports which operate near their capacity limits.  
In its long history in service several incidents and also fatal accidents were attributed to ILS or more 
precisely the characteristics of the beams emitted from the localizer and glide slope antennas. In addi-
tion to the desired narrow guidance beams defining the actual desired approach track there are side 
lobes which can be captured by the autopilot and have led to several incidents or accidents [22], [23], 
[24]. 
Despite these issues which are mitigated (if no other human or technical factors prevail) by operational 
and procedural measures the system has proven to be extremely reliable and is operated by almost all 
major and a very large number of regional airports to support precision approach guidance. It is only 
in the next decades when satellite navigation with its different kinds of augmentation systems will be 
able to fulfill the task to provide precision guidance under all weather conditions with the same availa-
bility that the existence and further use of ILS might be put in question. For precision approaches to 
CAT-I (or with slightly higher minima) there are ground and space based augmentation systems 
(GBAS, SBAS) with suitable procedures at an ever increasing number of airfields available. Especial-
ly for regional airports, CAT-I capability is often sufficient to meet their needs. An SBAS procedure 
does not require any additional ground infrastructure and is thus an economically very attractive solu-
tion for such airports. However, at large airports a solution for CAT-II/III weather conditions is often 
necessary. The development of standards for a CAT-II/III capable GBAS has been finished and first 
stations will become operational in the near future. However, due to challenges with ionospheric dis-
turbances it is expected that initially the availability will not reach the same level that is provided by 
the ILS.  
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2.2 THE GROUND BASED AUGMENTATION SYSTEM 
The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is a landing system designed for aircraft, which 
augments satellite navigation signals by broadcasting differential corrections, integrity parameters and 
approach reference coordinates to provide precision approach and rollout guidance.  
Due to the weakness of signals from the navigation satellites that are correlated from below the noise 
floor and the resulting vulnerability to distortions in the atmosphere (especially in the ionosphere), 
interference, multipath and several other error sources the accuracy and especially integrity of 
standalone GNSS is not sufficient for safety of life applications, such as precision approach guidance. 
The approach to augmenting GNSS signals is based on a differential architecture in order to achieve 
performance suitable for aviation. A schematic overview of GBAS is given in Figure 1. Typically four 
reference receivers are placed at precisely surveyed locations and protected sites at an airport. This 
allows monitoring of the navigation signals from the satellites and calculation of locally relevant cor-
rections which cancel all errors common to the ground station and airborne user. In the onboard re-
ceiver of arriving aircraft the corrections from the ground system are applied to the measured pseudor-
anges of the GNSS receiver and a position solution is calculated based on the corrected measurements. 
In order to ensure integrity, so-called protection levels which are conservative bounds on the position 
error are calculated. They are compared to so-called alert limits which are threshold values for the 
protection levels. As long as the navigation error bound stays below the alert limit the operation is 
considered to be safe. If the protection level exceeds the alert limit the GBAS service is set to unavail-
able since the safety cannot be guaranteed anymore. In addition to comparing protection levels to alert 
limits further low-level monitoring for specific failure modes may be necessary depending on the ac-
tive service type and is included in the respective service type standards. Finally, the ground station 
also transmits coordinates describing the desired approach track. Based on the augmented position 
solution deviations from the desired approach track are calculated and displayed to the pilot as ILS 
lookalike deviations and are used as input for the autopilot. Currently, only the definition of ILS-
lookalike “straight-in” approaches is used but there are provisions to also include further specifications 
of so-called terminal area paths (TAPs) that allow the definition of straight and curved segments to 
define advanced approach procedures. A current GBAS can support up to 49 different approach tracks. 
In the following sections the process of estimating a position, the different GBAS subsystems and their 
tasks as well as assurance of integrity are described more in detail.  
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Figure 1 Schematic overview of GBAS elements 
2.2.1 GNSS position estimation and potential influences 
The GNSS position estimate is based the principle of multilateration. GNSS satellites broadcast their 
orbit parameters which enables a user to calculate the satellite positions at any given time. By measur-
ing the distance between the satellites and the receiver a user position can be estimated. The range to a 
satellite, however, cannot be measured easily and directly. What can be measured is the signal travel 
time from the satellite to the receiver. Multiplied with the speed of light this travel time gives an esti-
mate of the distance. Since the clock in the GNSS receiver and the GNSS constellation is not synchro-
nized, this does not corresponds to the true range but contains a large error mainly due to the clock 
offset of the receiver clock but also due to other influences. The pseudorange nρ between satellite n
and the user is modelled as  
 n usr SV rx SV n n TGD nx x c t c t T I bρ η= − + ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ ∆ + + + +
   (1) 
where x  are the three dimensional position vectors of the user and the satellite, respectively, in an 
earth-centered, earth-fixed (ECEF) coordinate frame. c is the speed of light in vacuum, rxt∆  is the 
clock offset of the user receiver, SVt∆ the satellite clock offset to system time, nT and nI the delay in-
duced by the troposphere and ionosphere on the path between user and satellite n , TGDb the time group 
delay and nη  the measurement noise and multipath influence. Since only the geometric distance be-
tween user and satellite is desired, the other influencing terms have to be addressed in a way which is 
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appropriate for the application. The receiver clock offset is the same for each pseudorange measure-
ment. It can thus be estimated as a fourth unknown (in addition to the 3 dimensional position). The 
satellite clock offset is well modelled and can be removed by applying a correction based on parame-
ters transmitted in the navigation message of each satellite to a level that is sufficient for GBAS posi-
tioning. The tropospheric delay either has to be modelled or corrected differentially. The ionospheric 
delay can be modelled or differentially corrected as well. However, due to significant variations mod-
elling is usually not sufficient for the GBAS application. The ionospheric delay is furthermore a fre-
quency dependent term that can be estimated if pseudorange measurements on two different frequen-
cies to the same satellite are available. Dual frequency GBAS are currently in the early stages of de-
velopment. The time group delay is a satellite specific parameter which is pre-calibrated in the qualifi-
cation process before the launch of each satellite and also transmitted as part of the navigation mes-
sage. The measurement noise and multipath are addressed by placing the antenna in a low-multipath 
environment, using high quality receivers and components and using code-carrier smoothing that will 
be described later in Section 2.2.2.2. The residual noise and multipath components are modelled statis-
tically but they cannot be removed completely from the measurements or be corrected differentially.    
2.2.2 GBAS Ground System 
The GBAS Ground System consists of typically four reference receiver at an airport to which ap-
proach service is provided. The required performance of a station is determined by the GBAS Ap-
proach Service Types (GAST) the station provides. The GAST is a matched set of requirements for the 
ground and airborne systems enabling different approach minima. Approaches under CAT-I (or better) 
conditions using only single frequency L1 C/A code measurements from the GPS constellation are 
supported by GAST C while CAT-II/III operations using the same signals are supported by GAST D. 
Future service types will likely also the possibility to use signals from another frequency and other 
GNSS constellations, such as the European Galileo, the Russian Glonass or the Chinesse Beidou and 
provide increased robustness and availability. This section describes briefly the necessary siting 
measures for these references as well as the process of generating the correction a GBAS transmits to 
arriving aircraft. Furthermore, the derivation of the transmitted integrity parameters for different ser-
vice types is discussed. The differences between the service types are pointed out in the description 
where applicable.  
2.2.2.1 Reference Stations 
To protect the measurements at the references from potential error sources appropriate siting of the 
antennas is crucial. The FAA issued a GBAS siting order (FAA Order 6884.1) [25] for ensuring suffi-
cient protection of the GNSS signals against external influences. The content of this section is summa-
rizing the most important of these requirements. One of the main potential influences to the quality of 
the provided corrections is multipath from ground reflections [26]. Ground multipath can cause low 
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frequency effects on the pseudorange measurements which can hardly be mitigated through carrier 
smoothing. For GBAS, specially developed Multipath Limiting Antennas (MLA) are thus used which 
have an antenna pattern with an extremely sharp cutoff at an elevation of 5° which is the minimum 
elevation for which a satellite may be used in GBAS. The antenna is furthermore surrounded with 
graded gravel to scatter potential reflections. Figure 2 shows a GBAS reference antenna of an opera-
tional GBAS with the appropriate siting measures at Zürich Airport. In addition to ground reflections, 
multipath may also be caused by other structures such as buildings or equipment shelters or by vehi-
cles on service roads passing by the antennas. Reflections from steady reflectors are addressed by se-
lective masking out certain azimuth/elevation combinations, while the effect of transient objects is 
handled by operationally restricting access to the so-called Local Objects Consideration Area (LOCA). 
On the signal processing side a monitor for statistically relevant changes in the code minus carrier 
measurements as estimator for multipath is monitored in form of a cumulative sum monitor [27].   
 
Figure 2 GBAS reference antenna at Zürich Airport (LSZH) [28] 
To ensure that despite all previous measures no correlated multipath effects affect more than one refer-
ence location the minimum separation of the reference antennas is set to 100m (Section 5.2 b.(5) of 
[25]). By crosschecking the potential corrections from the different reference receivers, individually 
affected references can be determined and excluded or de-weighted appropriately. 
The problem of radio frequency interference (RFI) has become an unexpected challenge in an opera-
tional environment as well. At Newark Airport in New Jersey, which was planned to be the first station 
to enter service, the four reference receivers were placed close to the I-95, a highway with 15 lanes 
and thus lots of traffic. Soon after beginning data evaluation it was found that GPS jammers (so-called 
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personal privacy devices, PPD) are used in vehicles passing by the airport which regularly affected the 
ground stations and interrupted GBAS service [29], [30]. Several operational measures like lowering 
the installation height of the reference antennas, introducing an additional mesh in the airport perime-
ter fence, building a protection wall between the highway and the airport as well as a software change 
in the ground facility were necessary to mitigate this problem. The location of the reference antenna 
for a second GBAS in the US at Houston Airport was thus selected far away from any public roads in 
between two parallel runways [31]. 
Finally, the geometry and separation of the GBAS reference antennas has an impact on the monitoring 
performance for satellite orbit errors and especially on the monitoring for ionospheric gradients as will 
be further described in Section 5.4 . The monitoring algorithm for ionospheric gradients in the ground 
system requires very specific spacings between the reference antennas so that the footprint of the 
GBAS at an airport is quite determined [32], [33]. 
Together with other restrictions concerning obstacle clearance areas around runways and taxiways 
according to [19], siting of a GBAS ground station is a difficult task which is crucial for later perfor-
mance and consequently the availability of the service at a given airport. 
2.2.2.2 GBAS Corrections 
One of the main tasks of GBAS ground station is generating corrections for the navigation signals. 
Future systems will have to be extended to generate corrections and integrity parameters for each fre-
quency and constellation. The way of generating the corrections is assumed to remain unchanged. 
Note that here the frequency dependency is thus not explicitly stated for better readability. Generating 
corrections is feasible because the reference antennas are located at precisely known and surveyed 
positions. In a first step the raw pseudorange measurements nρ from satellite n are smoothed with 
corresponding carrier phase measurements nφ  using a Hatch filter [34]. The code measurement per-
mits determination of the pseudorange (actual range plus ranging error due to receiver clock offset and 
propagation disturbances) but it contains (mainly elevation dependent) noise and multipath errors in 
the order of meters. The carrier phase onto which the navigation code is modulated can be tracked 
very precisely with noise and multipath only in the order of millimeters. The phase measurement, 
however, is ambiguous, i.e. ranging is not possible (at least not for the techniques used in the GBAS 
context). Combining both measurements in a smoothing filter can eliminate a great part of the noise on 
the measurement. The smoothed pseudorange ˆnρ at epoch n is described as (according to section 
3.7.1.2.8.3.3 of [35] and section 3.2.1.2.8.5.1 of [36]] 
 1 1ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( )2n n n n n
λρ aρ a ρ φ φ
π− −
 = + − + − 
 
 (2) 
where λ is the wavelength of the carrier phase (0.1905 m for GPS L1 and Galileo E1, 0.255 m for 
GPS L5 and Galileo E5a) and 0.5sa τ= ÷ is the filter weighting constant depending on the filter time 
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constantτ . The time constant is depending on the active service type of the station. For GAST C it is 
100 s while in GAST D two sets of corrections are provided in parallel, one based on 100 s and the 
other on 30 s smoothing. This is part of the mitigation strategy for ionospheric anomalies and enables 
the airborne user to detect disturbances by comparing position solutions based on two different filters. 
This method is described in more detail in Section 2.2.3. Future service types are still under develop-
ment, however, due to backwards compatibility issues and the need to reuse existing signals also in 
new service types the smoothing time constants used will probably be restricted to the same time con-
stants [37]. 
In a next step a preliminary pseudorange correction , ( , )prelPRC i jτ is calculated for each smoothing time 
constant τ and each satellite i in view and above the minimum elevation angle (5°) at each receiver j . 
This is done according to Section 3.7.1.2.8.3.1 of [35] or Section 3.2.1.2.8.5.4 of [36] and described as 
 , , , ,ˆ( , )prel i j i j sv iPRC i j r c tτ ρ= − − ∆  (3) 
with ,i jr the known geometrical range between the antenna position of reference receiver j and the 
position of satellite i , ,ˆi jρ the corresponding smoothed measured pseudorange and ,SV ic t⋅ ∆ the relativ-
istic satellite clock correction term. Note that those preliminary corrections still contain the receiver 
clock error from each reference receiver. To remove this contribution the average of all corrections 
from each receiver is removed per constellation and per frequency. This process is called “smoothed 
clock adjust” and the resulting corrections , ( , )scaPRC i jτ are described as 
 , , ,
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
N
sca prel i prel
i
PRC i j PRC i j k PRC i jτ τ τ
=
= − ⋅∑  (4) 
where N is the number of satellites and ik  are weighting factors. While in ED-114A [35] (according 
to Section 3.7.1.2.8.3.5) a meaningful elevation dependent weighting is permitted, requiring only that 
1ik =∑ , [36] (in Section 3.2.1.2.8.5.6) specifies them to be all equal. The process is illustrated in 
Figure 3. A different weighting of the individual measurements will result in a different location of the 
weighted average, and thus also in different PRCs. As a common offset in pseudorange measurements 
or in PRCs that are applied to pseudorange measurements does not affect the position solution but only 
the receiver clock estimate, there is no effect on the user side when the ground station applies different 
weighting methods (see Appendix II). 
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Figure 3 Generation of pseudorange corrections 
Finally, a single correction , ( )txPRC iτ for each satellite and each smoothing time constant to be broad-
cast is obtained by averaging the smoothed clock adjusted corrections from all receivers j  for each 
satellite i  
 , ,
1( ) ( , )
( )tx scaj
PRC i PRC i j
M iτ τ
= ∑  (5) 
with ( )M i the number of receivers tracking satellite i .  
Together with the pseudorange corrections, the ground station also provides range rate corrections 
(RRC) which are obtained by dividing the difference between current and previous PRC by the update 
rate (0.5 s). This is done to enable the airborne system to extrapolate from the last received message to 
the next because the airborne update rate is specified to be at least 5 Hz [38] and thus faster than the 
update rate of the GBAS message from the ground.  
PRC and RRC for each satellite obtained with a 100s smoothing time constant, together with a 
timestamp and checksum parameters are contained and transmitted in the Type 1 GBAS message [39]. 
The PRCs and RRCs based on 30s smoothing used in GAST D are transmitted in the Type 11 message 
which was added after the original message definition where only one smoothing time constant was 
foreseen. All future corrections for additional frequencies and constellations have to be accommodated 
in new message types still to be defined. 
2.2.2.3 Integrity Parameters 
In order to enable arriving aircraft to bound their residual position errors for the GBAS corrected 
measurements, the ground station transmits several integrity parameters relating to different error 
sources. The following subsections describe these parameters, their role and their application. 
2.2.2.3.1 P-values 
The P-values are the ephemeris decorrelation parameters transmitted in the Type 1 message. They are 
applied to bound the effect of a potential ephemeris error that has a different effect on a user at a cer-
tain distance from the ground station. They “shall characterize the impact of residual ephemeris errors 
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due to spatial decorrelation” [36] for all corrections broadcast in the Type 1 message. The P-value is 
defined as the minimum detectable error (MDE) of the ephemeris monitor implemented in the GBAS 
ground station divided by the range between the GBAS reference point and the satellite.  The MDE 
depends on the type of ephemeris monitor implemented and for many implementations also on the 
baseline length and orientation between the receivers. Another algorithm is based on checking the 
difference between the last validated ephemeris (up to 24h old) and the current ephemeris of a satellite 
and monitor the change [40]. For current implementations of GBAS this monitoring is considered 
sufficient, however the P-values obtained in this way may be too large to expand the current service 
volume for future operations like continuous descent operations where also sufficient reliability has to 
be ensured at larger distances from the airport. 
2.2.2.3.2 B-values 
The B-values are an “estimate of the error contribution from” [36] each reference receiver to the cor-
rections provided to the aircraft. They are computed for each satellite i and reference receiver j  as  
 
,100 ,100
1( , ) ( ) ( , )
( ) 1
i
tx sca
k S
k j
B i j PRC i PRC i k
M i ∈
≠
= −
− ∑
 (6) 
where ( )M i  denotes the number of reference receivers which were used to generate the correction for 
satellite i  and iS  is the set of reference receivers tracking satellite i . Before a correction for a specif-
ic satellite is calculated the corresponding B-values are compared to a monitoring threshold to identify 
potentially faulty measurements from one reference receiver and exclude the corresponding data from 
the calculation of corrections.  
2.2.2.3.3 Sigma PR Ground 
,pr gndσ  is the standard deviation of a zero-mean normal distribution associated with the residual un-
certainty in the GBAS corrections. It “shall account for all equipment and environmental effects, in-
cluding the received signal power, the local interference environment, and any transient error in 
smoothing filter output, relative to steady-state, caused by ionospheric divergence” [36]. The estimate 
of  ,pr gndσ  for a ground station can be obtained by either observing code minus carrier measurements 
or by a B-value assessment. The later method is usually the preferred one since in the code minus car-
rier observations the ionospheric error has to be estimated to separate it from the noise and multipath 
effect. For the ionospheric estimate dual frequency measurements are necessary which are typically 
not available in GAST C and GAST D ground stations. The estimate takes into account at least one 
day of recorded measurement data from B-values associated with validated corrections. For each ref-
erence receiver only one sample every 200 seconds is used to ensure that the data is uncorrelated. The 
remaining B-values are then sorted according to the elevation of the corresponding satellite into bins. 
For each such bin the mean and standard deviation Bσ  are calculated. The mean is expected to be 
close to zero and the root mean square (RMS) for each reference receiver j is then calculated as 
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 _ , ,
1( 1)pr gnd j B j
NRMS M
N
σ += −  (7) 
where M is the number of reference receivers and N  is the average number of satellites which were 
tracked at the epoch the B-value was evaluated. This process yields one curve for each reference re-
ceiver. The broadcast ,pr gndσ for each elevation bin is taken as the maximum value of the individual 
estimates and is transmitted in the Type 1 message. Due to different signals on the different frequen-
cies and constellations it will be necessary do define this parameter for each signal and possibly also 
for each constellation individually. 
2.2.2.3.4 Tropospheric parameters 
For enabling the aircraft to calculate a differential tropospheric correction and bound the residual trop-
ospheric error there are three parameters provided by the ground station as part of the Type 2 message. 
The first one is the refractivity index RN  of the atmosphere at the GBAS location. It consists of a dry 
and a wet component and can be calculated based on locally measured weather data (temperature, air 
pressure and humidity) [41]. As the variations of RN  are small it can be assessed and used as a yearly 
average [42]. To account for the uncertainty introduced by considering such a long time span a refrac-
tivity uncertainty nσ  is calculated by assessing a daily value and compare it to the yearly average. This 
uncertainty is then expressed as a standard deviation of a normal distribution and provided to the air-
craft for inclusion in the error bounding process in the on-board system [41]. A third parameter which 
is provided by the ground station is the tropospheric scale height 0h . It is also calculated based on the 
earth surface height at the GBAS location and based on the dry and wet components of the refractivity 
index RN  [41]. 
2.2.2.3.5 Sigma Vertical Iono Gradient 
The parameter providing information about the residual uncertainty associated with nominal iono-
spheric impact in vertical direction is described by the value vigσ  which is transmitted in the Type 2 
message. It is a parameter which is contained in the ionospheric threat model of the region where the 
GBAS is located. Every national regulator has to ensure that a valid and representative threat model 
for the ionospheric impact is developed. This is usually done by evaluating data collected over one 
solar cycle from a network of reference receivers in a representative region. Ionospheric threat models 
have been determined e.g. for the contiguous United States (CONUS) [43], Germany [44], South Ko-
rea [45]. Based on the elevation of a satellite the vertical uncertainty is then mapped into a slant uncer-
tainty corresponding to an overbound of the expected error on the pseudorange measurement. 
2.2.2.4 Approach reference coordinates 
In addition to corrections and integrity parameters, the GBAS ground station also provides necessary 
reference coordinates to enable the aircraft to compute ILS like deviations from a reference trajectory 
by defining the final approach segment (FAS). Provisions also foresee the transmission of Terminal 
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Area Paths (TAP) defining approach tracks based on straight and curved radius to fix segments for 
future advanced approach procedures. The provision of all these reference coordinates via the GBAS 
message has the advantage that no database of reference coordinates has to be present and be continu-
ously updated on board the aircraft.  
The FAS data block is part of the Type 4 GBAS message and the calculation of deviations based on 
the provided reference points is described in Appendix C of [38]. The main reference point on the 
ground is the Landing Threshold Point (LTP). It is located in the middle of the runway threshold and is 
the origin of a local-level tangent coordinate system defined by unit vectors pointing in runway direc-
tion rwu
 , in vertical direction vertu
 ,  and a vector latu
  which is perpendicular to the previous two. The 
calculation of lateral deviations is based on the definition of a vertical plane containing the GBAS 
Landing System (GLS) Azimuth Reference Point (GARP), the LTP and the Threshold Crossing Point 
TCP, which is located vertically above the LTP. The approach geometry for the lateral deviations is 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 GBAS reference points for lateral deviation calculations, both rectilinear (d_lat) and angular ( lata ) 
In a first step the rectilinear deviation latd  from the localizer plane is calculated in meters and in a sec-
ond step transformed into an angular ILS look-alike deviation lata .  
 
 ( )lat lat GRP GARPd u r r= −
     (8) 
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The r -vectors denote the vectors from the center of the earth to the respective coordinates in an 
ECEF coordinate system.  
The vertical deviations are directly calculated in an angular sense ( verta ) and can then be transformed 
into rectilinear deviations vertd  in meters if needed. The inputs into the autopilot, however, are again 
ILS-like angular deviations.  
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 (10) 
   
In this formula GPA denotes the glide path angle which is also transmitted in the type 4 GBAS mes-
sage. The vertical deviations are calculated in this way as deviations from a cone with its tip at the 
GBAS Elevation Reference Point (GERP) as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 GBAS reference points for vertical deviation calculations, angular ( verta ) and rectilinear (d_vert) 
As can be seen from the illustration, the defined approach track becomes either a conic section for the 
case when the GERP is located next to the runway or a straight line if it is located on the runway cen-
terline.  
2.2.3 GBAS Airborne System 
In this section the data processing in the airborne GBAS system is described. At the aircraft the integ-
rity of the navigation solution is assessed and compared to the relevant constraints. If an alert is trig-
gered an appropriate warning for the pilot and/or an appropriate action from the autopilot such as 
downgrade to a service type with lower integrity requirements that can still be ensured or the initiation 
of a go-around has to be performed.  
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2.2.3.1 Airborne Processing 
In this section the general processing in the airborne system is described. GBAS avionics typically 
consist of a multi-mode receiver (MMR) capable of receiving the GBAS messages from the ground 
system that are transmitted via a VHF data broadcast (VDB), as well as the GNSS ranging signals 
from the satellites. While the general process of determining a position is the same in every service 
type, there are several differences which data from the ground station is used depending on the active 
service type. The differences in processing are compared at the end of this section. The next section 
describes the different monitors that are required for the integrity assurance.  
The aircraft starts processing the raw pseudorange and carrier phase measurements in the same 
smoothing filter [34] with the same smoothing time constant as used in generation of the corrections in 
the ground system described in Equation (2). Using the same filter with the same time constant en-
sures that no significant differential errors due to filter mismatch between the process of generating the 
corrections and the airborne processing can arise. The corrections are then applied to the smoothed 
pseudoranges ˆnρ . This process is described in Section 2.3.8.2 of [38]. The smoothed and corrected 
pseudoranges nρ are obtained as 
 ˆ ( )n n zcount svTC PRC RRC t t tρ ρ= + + + − + ∆  (11) 
where ˆnρ  is the smoothed pseudorange, TC is the tropospheric differential correction, PRC and RRC
are the pseudorange and range rate corrections from the Type 1 and in case of GAST D also the Type 
11 message, t  is the current time, zcountt  is the time of applicability of the corrections transmitted in the 
Type 1 GBAS message and SVt∆  is the relativistic satellite clock correction term including the relativ-
istic correction. The differential tropospheric correction accounts for the different tropospheric impact 
at the ground station and the airborne user and is thus a function of the height difference between the 
aircraft and the GBAS reference point and satellite elevation angle [41]. It is specified in Section 
2.3.8.3 of [38] as 
 0
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−∆−
= −
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 
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 (12) 
where RN  and 0h  are the refractivity index and the tropospheric scale height transmitted in the Type 2 
GBAS message, θ  is the elevation angle of the satellite calculated from the satellite ephemeris data 
and the last position estimate of the aircraft and h∆  the height difference between the last calculated 
position solution and the GBAS reference point. The satellite clock correction term is calculated based 
on parameters transmitted in the navigation message of the satellites as specified in Section 
20.3.3.3.3.1 of the GPS Interface Specifications [46]. 
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2.2.3.2 Position determination  
The pseudorange measurements iρ  still contain the receiver clock offset rxc t⋅ and a residual error iε  in 
addition to the geometric range. It can be denoted as the norm of the difference of the 3-dimensional 
position vectors ix of the satellite i and the user position ux

in an earth centered earth fixed (ECEF) 
coordinate system and the receiver clock offset and additional errors as 
 ii u rx ix x c tρ ε= − + ⋅ +
   (13) 
The well-known standard way of GNSS-based position estimating (described e.g. in Chapter 6 of [47]) 
is based on determining the position and receiver clock bias iteratively by starting with an initial posi-
tion 0x
  (typically the position of the previous epoch or the center of the earth as initialization if no 
prior knowledge is available). Based on the initial position 0x
 and an initial clock offset estimate 0t  
(initial value typically used is 0) the pseudorange described in Equation (13) can be expressed by a 
Taylor expansion using the geometrical distance 0( )est xρ
  between that position and the satellite (omit-
ting higher order terms (h.o.t.)) as  
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In the navigation problem 0
0
x
t
ρ
 
∇  
 

corresponds to the nx4 dimensional geometry matrix G , contain-
ing as rows the negative line of sight unit vectors between the position estimate and the satellites and a 
1 in the fourth column for the clock offset.  
This can be rewritten using matrix notation and 0
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This equation is typically solved for ∆x using the least-squares method. When there is prior 
knowledge about the expected ranging errors available (as it is the case in GBAS) an additional 
weighting can be used. The weighting matrix W can then be defined to be an nxn dimensional diago-
nal matrix containing the inverse of the expected uncertainty associated with each pseudorange meas-
urement as entries. These uncertainties will be described in detail in the next section. The weighted 
least squares solution is then obtained by  
 ∆ = ⋅ ∆x S ρ  (16) 
with  
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1T T−=   S G WG G W  (17) 
The increment ∆x  is then added to the previous position and user clock estimate to obtain a new im-
proved position and clock estimate. The process is repeated until the increment is small enough to 
remain below a predefined threshold. This method usually converges after very few iterations. The 
residual position error for smoothed and GBAS corrected pseudorange measurements is typically in 
the range of decimeters only [48], [49]. The projection factors relating the GNSS measurements from 
satellite i to the position domain in approach coordinates (centered at the aircraft position with the x-
axis along the approach path, the y-axis in the lateral direction of the approach track and a perpendicu-
lar z-axis) play an important role in the integrity assurance process and are given as  
 , 3, 1, tan( )vert i i is s s GPA= + ⋅  (18) 
where ,k is  are the entries of the S -matrix of row k  and column i  and GPA is the glide path angle of 
the approach (typically 3°, in the requirement derivation 2.5° are assumed to be conservative). 
The just described method is only applicable to single constellation positioning. In case of using a 
second GNSS constellation the G -matrix becomes an nx5 dimensional matrix, containing not only the 
geometry part and a column with “1” for the clock offset but two columns with either “1 0” or “0 1” 
per row to identify the constellation the satellites belongs to. This is necessary as different constella-
tions use their individual time references such that the receiver clock offset to each constellation has to 
be determined individually. Note that the smoothed pseudorange ˆnρ  can be from either navigation 
frequency in the single frequency positioning case or a linear combination of pseudoranges from two 
frequencies, e.g. in order to remove the ionospheric delay. Further details on dual frequency and multi 
constellation positioning can be found e.g. in [50] and [51]. 
2.2.3.3 Integrity Assurance 
By using differential GNSS methods, precision approach guidance can be accomplished with high 
accuracy. The performance benefits of GBAS compared to a standard ILS are shown in the next sec-
tion. For safety of life applications, such as navigation for automatic landings, not only accuracy is 
important, but especially the integrity, i.e. the trust one can put into the calculated position solution. In 
GBAS integrity is assured by calculating Protection Levels (PLs) in the lateral and vertical domain 
(LPL, VPL). These values are conservative bounds of the actual positioning error that can be calculat-
ed based on standardized models for different error contributions. Three different protection levels are 
calculated: one for the fault-free case, one for a single fault case in the ground system and an ephemer-
is protection level. The maximum of all three is then used in assessing the integrity by comparing the 
PL to the respective Alert Limit (AL) for a given position on the approach. These ALs ensure that an 
operation can be conducted safely if the PLs remain smaller than the ALs. The values for the ALs are 
given in tables 2-14 and 2-15 in DO-253C [38] and are reproduced for convenience in the Appendix I 
together with a summary of the GBAS performance requirements for the different existing service 
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types specified in the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) for GBAS [4]. They 
have a maximum value at distances larger than 7500 m from the runway threshold (in the vertical case 
the distance can vary depending on the glide path angle) and then decrease linearly until they reach a 
constant minimum value at 873 m from the runway. The calculation of the lateral and vertical PLs is 
completely analog ensuring protection in the vertical and lateral domain, respectively. For readability 
purposes only the vertical calculations as described in DO-253C are shown here. They do hold only 
for the single frequency GPS case as this is the currently only validated and operational service. Future 
GBAS service types including a second frequency and other constellations will have to provide a simi-
lar concept. It may be expected that in principle the methodology will remain the same: Modelling and 
overbounding the expected residual ranging errors per satellite and then projecting them into the posi-
tion solution. The signals on the second frequencies and from different constellations have different 
performance in terms of noise and multipath [51], [52] or ionospheric effects [53]. However, work on 
future GBAS services using two frequencies and multiple constellations is still in the early stages at 
the time of writing and will be ongoing for several more years to ensure sufficient protection for all 
potential failure modes. 
The PLs for the service types C and D are defined in [38] and are reproduced and described in the 
following. For the fault free case (denoted by a subscript H0) they are based on the satellite geometry 
seen by the user and as given by the weighted pseudoinverse of the satellite geometry matrix S , with 
the ,vert is  as previously defined in Equation (18) and the residual uncertainties iσ  associated with each 
corrected pseudorange measurement and are expressed as 
 2 20 ,
1
N
H ffmd vert i i v
i
VPL K Ds
=
= ⋅ σ +∑  (19) 
The ffmdK multiplier is the fault-free missed detection multiplier given by the tolerable integrity risk as 
inflation factor for a Gaussian distributed random variable. The parameter vD is the vertical position 
difference between the two position solutions based on 30s and 100s smoothed pseudoranges (see 
Equation (2)) in GAST D and zero in GAST C. This parameter is important in accounting for the dif-
ferences between the different smoothing time constants for the two service types C and D. While the 
GAST C integrity concept and parameters were defined to bound the errors for 100 seconds smooth-
ing, the vD term accounts for the differences resulting from the shorter smoothing time constant (30 
seconds) used in GAST D and the somewhat larger residual errors and uncertainties in the smoothed 
pseudorange measurements.  The variances of the standard deviations associated with the residual 
uncertainties are calculated as 
 2 2 2 2 2, , , , , ,i pr gnd i pr air i tropo i iono iσ σ σ σ σ= + + +  (20) 
The individual variances are calculated based on the integrity parameters transmitted from the ground 
station as described in the previous section. The contribution from the ground station , ,pr gnd iσ depends 
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on the active service type. The appropriate value is taken directly from the GBAS message. The 
, ,pr air iσ  describe the uncertainty introduced by the airframe multipath and airborne receiver noise, and 
depend on the airborne equipment classification. The tropospheric uncertainty is described as 
 0
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 +
 (21) 
with the refractivity uncertainty nσ , the tropospheric scale height 0h , the elevation angle of the satel-
lite θ  and the height difference between the aircraft and the GBAS reference point h∆ . The first three 
parameters are transmitted by the ground station, while the last one is calculated based on the current 
position of the aircraft. The ionospheric uncertainty is described as 
 ( 2 )iono pp vig air airF x vσ σ τ= ⋅ ⋅ +  (22) 
with the vertical-to-slant obliquity factor ppF , the standard deviation of the residual ionospheric uncer-
tainty due to spatial decorrelation vigσ the slant distance between the aircraft and the GBAS reference 
point airx , the smoothing time constant τ  and the horizontal speed of the aircraft airv .  
In addition to the PLs for the fault free case, PLs accounting for a single faulted reference receiver in 
the ground subsystem are calculated. They are calculated for each ground reference receiver j  as 
 ,1, , 1j vertH j vert HmdVPL B K σ= +  (23) 
with the missed detection multiplier mdK  determined by the associated integrity risk and the following 
parameters: 
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are the B-values (see Section 2.2.2.3.2) from the Type 1 GBAS message projected into the position 
domain and 
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and ( )M i the number of reference receivers 
used for the generation of the corrections. The 0HVPL  is defined as the maximum over the 0,H jVPL . 
The third type of protection levels is bounding GBAS positioning errors due to ephemeris errors. They 
are given for the vertical case as  
 max( ( ))eph eph vVPL VPL i D= +  (26) 
The vD  are the same as before and the individual PLs ( )ephVPL i  for each satellite i  are defined as  
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with the service type dependent ephemeris decorrelation parameter kP transmitted in Type 1 GBAS 
message. The missed detection multiplier 
,md ephK   is chosen according to the allocated integrity budged 
for the ephemeris fault and all other parameters are the same as previously defined.  
All protection levels are compared against the alert limit at the current position and the service is set 
unavailable if they are exceeded. As it was already mentioned where appropriate, some of the parame-
ters depend on the active service type used for the approach. The reason for that is a slightly different 
task allocation between the airborne and the ground system in the two service types which is further 
explained in the following.  
2.2.3.3.1 GAST-C 
In the case of GAST C it is the sole responsibility of the ground station to bound the error at the output 
of the airborne receiver. This is achieved by a geometry screening on the ground where potential sub-
sets of usable satellites are evaluated to determine the worst geometry which may be used in an air-
borne receiver at any decision point i.e. the point on the approach where the decision height is reached. 
Then the largest vertical error introduced by an ionospheric front (the largest potential error source in 
GBAS, further described in Chapter 5.3) is determined and compared to an error limit for which the 
operation is still considered safe [5]. If geometries exist which could generate a larger error, the 
ground station has to artificially inflate one or more of the broadcast integrity parameters (typically 
vigσ and/or gndσ are the parameters that are inflated) to increase the protection levels beyond the alert 
limit and thus to make these geometries unavailable to the user [54], [43]. This strategy assumes that 
the worst case ionospheric disturbance that was ever observed in the region where GBAS service is 
provided is always present. This is an extremely conservative assumption but is used to ensure integri-
ty. However, a price has to be paid for that conservatism in form of a significant impact on the availa-
bility of the system in regions where large gradients have been observed. For mid-latitude regions like 
Europe or the US the impact on availability is small, however, in equatorial countries, such as Brazil, 
the largest observed gradients were so significant that assuming the presence of the worst case gradient 
reduces the availability to levels that are far below operational needs.   
2.2.3.3.2 GAST-D 
For GAST D the integrity concept is somewhat different. More stringent requirements have to be met 
for automatic landings with an integrity budget two orders of magnitude smaller than for CAT-I ap-
proaches. The rationale for that is that no credit can be taken for the flight crew detecting an abnormal 
situation by visual reference in CAT-II/III weather conditions. Reusing the GAST C architecture with 
even tighter required error bounds cannot support this service with reasonable availability. Hence, a 
different strategy has been adopted which shares the responsibility of detecting and mitigating the 
ionospheric threat between the ground and the airborne system. For this purpose the protection level 
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concept has been modified and further monitors have been included in both, the ground and airborne 
systems. These monitors were designed to ensure that GBAS navigation can protect a user from all 
known fault modes with the required probability. An in-depth discussion about the requirement fol-
lows in Section 3.1 and the known fault modes are described in Section 3.3.2. The most significant 
changes from GAST C to GAST D are: 
The geometry screening process is now also performed at the airborne receiver in such a way, that the 
largest projection factor from the S-matrix and the sum of the largest two projection factors are limited 
[55]. This measure limits the largest impact a single ranging error on one pseudorange measurement 
can have on the position solution. The actual limit is a function of the autopilot performance and is 
determined in the airworthiness approval for each aircraft type individually. For GAST-D it is general-
ly assumed that the projection factors are limited to , 4vert is ≤ or even smaller values if necessary. It is 
the task of the aircraft manufacturer to show that the aircraft can meet the autoland requirements that 
are later described in Section 3.1, with the geometry screening implemented.  
The Code Carrier Divergence (CCD) monitor and the Dual Solution Ionospheric Gradient Monitoring 
Algorithm (DSIGMA) were added to the GAST D architecture. Both can detect a temporal ionospher-
ic gradient which affects one or more satellites seen by the aircraft. The CCD monitor acts on each 
pseudorange and associated carrier phase measurement. A fast change in the ionospheric condition is 
detectable since the ionosphere is a dispersive medium and affects the code and the carrier in different 
ways. Flying through a region affected by an ionospheric gradient in such a way that there is a tem-
poral change in the experienced ionospheric delay can be detected by this monitor [51]. The pseudor-
ange DSIGMA algorithm compares two different smoothed and corrected pseudoranges: one deter-
mined by a smoothing time constant of 30 s and with 100 s smoothed and corrected pseudoranges. A 
fast change in the experienced ionospheric conditions that is not reflected by the corrections from the 
ground system would built up faster in the 30 s smoothed solution than in the 100 s smoothed solution 
and the two pseudoranges would drift apart which is detected by the pseudorange DSIGMA [56]. 
From the pseudoranges with the two different smoothing time constants two different position solu-
tions are calculated. The vertical and lateral position difference of those solutions are named vD  and 
lD , respectively, and are used in the protection level calculations. In the protection level calculations 
(previously described by Equations (19), (23) and (26) the iσ  are determined based on the assumption 
of 100 s smoothing. The position solution used in GAST D is, however, the one based on 30 s smooth-
ing. The measured pseudoranges and received corrections therefore contain more residual errors intro-
duced by noise and multipath. The vD  and lD  terms therefore are added in order to account for the 
slightly too optimistic assumption of the residual errors in iσ . 
The calculation of the Protection Levels differs from that in GAST C by applying different integrity 
parameters. Since the responsibility for detection of ionospheric disturbances is now partially shifted 
from the ground to the airborne system, the ground station does not inflate the broadcast values any-
2.2. THE GROUND BASED AUGMENTATION SYSTEM 
29 
more to protect the user. The onboard CCD and DSIGMA are now responsible for detection of iono-
spheric disturbances on the board side. Hence, smaller values for the integrity parameters can be used 
for calculation of the protection levels which leads to an increased availability. This method reduces 
the conservatism of assuming that an ionospheric front is present at any time by adding additional 
monitoring effort. In GAST D the 30 s smoothed position solution will be used to develop guidance on 
the approach in order to reduce filter initialization time and achieve faster (re-)inclusion of satellites. 
This also leads to a slightly increased availability and better performance of the system.  
The airborne system can only detect temporal ionospheric gradients. An anomaly which appears sta-
tionary to the aircraft (i.e. the ionospheric pierce points as seen from the aircraft would travel in the 
same direction and the same speed as the front) would not be detectable with the aforementioned mon-
itors. This requires the ground subsystem to monitor for absolute ionospheric gradients. This is a chal-
lenging task that will be described in detail in Section 5.4.1 of this work. Section 5.4.2 then presents 
an alternative new way how this problem can be addressed. 
When used in concert all monitors provide the required integrity to make use of the improved guid-
ance performance of GBAS. The integrity concepts as they have been developed for GAST C and D 
ensure integrity but cannot provide a sufficient level of availability of the GBAS service in all regions 
of the world. Future service types are currently being developed in order to cope with this problem. 
2.2.3.3.3 Future service types 
Future GBAS service types, including multi frequency and multi constellation techniques, will have 
their own specific sets of monitoring schemes to address the specific threats arising for a specific way 
of processing the signals. Modelling of the expectable performance in terms of noise and multipath 
behavior of different signals is currently ongoing [57]. In addition to the previously known and con-
sidered fault modes new ones can also arise and will have to be handled appropriately. In the case of 
using more than one frequency a way of accounting for satellite specific inter-frequency biases has to 
be determined for example [58]. At this time there is no decision made as to which potential future 
service types there could be. This is subject to significant trade-off studies between performance, 
complexity and benefits of different methods that are to be performed in the coming years.  
 A single frequency positioning, dual frequency monitoring and multi constellation based GBAS archi-
tecture is one special case and a likely candidate for a future service type. A monitoring for ionospher-
ic gradients would be a necessary part of the integrity scheme. Such a monitor is therefore developed 
and presented as part of this work later in Section 5.5.  
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2.3 COMPARISON OF GBAS AND ILS GUIDANCE 
In this section GBAS guidance is compared to the currently used guidance based on ILS. Satellite 
navigation allows a lot more flexibility than navigation based on conventional navigation aids and is 
much more precise at the same time. After having described GBAS based positioning and integrity 
assurance, this section discusses advantages of GBAS from an operational perspective and shows a 
performance comparison to ILS in flight trials.  
2.3.1 Potential 
The broadcast FAS data in the Type 4 message contain the coordinates of the runway threshold and 
information about the glide path angle. Those parameters can be used to define approach trajectories to 
displaced thresholds on the same runway by simply defining two sets of reference coordinates. A dis-
placed threshold bears the potential to increase runway capacity due to reduced sequential spacing of 
aircraft for wake turbulence. An increased glide path angle can be used for the whole approach to in-
crease the height at which populated areas under the final approach track are overflown. Advanced 
final approach tracks, such as segmented steep approaches can be implemented where the final ap-
proach segment is intercepted from above instead of below. This can be achieved by broadcasting the 
same set of reference coordinates with two different glide path angles for different parts of the ap-
proach and also bears the potential to increase the height of aircraft over certain parts of the final ap-
proach. It is also foreseen that GBAS can broadcast Terminal Area Paths (TAPs) which consist of 
straight and curved (radius to fix) segments which allow a simple definition of curved approaches. All 
these measures can be used for a reduction of noise on the ground in the vicinity of an airport.  
Other than ILS, GBAS is not sensitive to signal reflections of preceding aircraft on the approach or to 
aircraft close to the runway. Potential signal reflections and distortions from other aircraft require in-
creased spacing of aircraft on the final approach and larger clearance areas in the vicinity of the run-
way during low visibility operations. This reduces the capacity of airports and often leads to large 
delays and flight cancellations. Due to navigation based on corrected satellite signals, those operation-
al constraints are not necessary anymore and can be used to increase the capacity of an airport also in 
low visibility conditions.  
2.3.2 Performance in flight trials 
The error characteristics of GBAS are very different from those of ILS. Typically, GBAS errors are 
small and bias like over one approach and contain very little noise due to the code-carrier smoothing 
described in Equation (2). In this section, a comparison between GBAS and ILS performance on the 
final approach is shown. The results are derived from flights conducted in a flight trial with an Airbus 
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A320. Four approaches to runway 26 at Braunschweig are analyzed. They were conducted in Decem-
ber 2011 within a DLR internal project. The results shown here constitute one original contribution of 
this thesis. They were originally published in [16] and expanded in [7] and are reproduced here in the 
remainder of this section. The figure numbers, equation numbers and references were changed from 
the original to conform to the notation in this work.  
“To analyze the results, we computed a dual frequency carrier phase reference solution using Novatel 
GrafNav. GrafNav is a surveying software, which employs a positioning technique based on highly 
precise carrier phase measurements and kinematic ambiguity resolution. The accuracy of the carrier 
phase reference trajectory is typically in the range of few centimeters, however less robust than GBAS 
navigation. For this reason, some reference data points were excluded where quality checks failed and 
not enough trust could be put in the correctness of the reference point. We used the truth reference to 
compute the error of the two navigation systems by subtracting the deviations that were actually ob-
served by the ILS and GBAS during the flights from the ones that should be indicated based on the true 
position. Angular information was used for guidance and the indication on the flight instruments. 
Hence, an angular error would be directly visible for the pilot. However, from a scientific point of view 
the absolute error in meters throughout an approach was of greater interest. It bears the potential for 
improved aircraft guidance and control as well as procedural advantages in parallel approach tracks 
due to the independence of guidance quality from the distance to the runway. To compute the position 
error in meters for the ILS, we transferred the angular glideslope and localizer deviations into a local 
coordinate system based on the distances to the two ILS transmitters.  
In Figure 6 through Figure 8 the data calculated from the GBAS position solution are shown in red, 
while the ILS measurements are depicted in blue. The published glide path angle for runway 26 in 
Braunschweig is 3.5°. During data evaluation we found an offset in the angular vertical deviations of 
the ILS which could be removed when using a 3.45° GPA instead. We consulted the obtained results 
with Flight Calibration Services in Braunschweig who found the results plausible and within the range 
of expectation. This deviation of 0.05° is still in accordance with the FAA Order [59] about determina-
tion of the ILS glide path angle and ICAO Annex 10, Chapter 3.1.5.1.1. Figure 6 and Figure 7 have a 
grey maker to show results if calculation had been based on the published GPA of 3.5   instead of the 
3.45  . On the localizer display in the cockpit a full-scale deflection of the indicator is equivalent to a 
deviation of ±2.5° or more from the centerline, the glide slope indication is significantly more sensitive 
and already shows a full-scale deflection at ±0.5°.  
A clustering behavior of the data points can be observed in Figure 6 for both systems, but at a larger 
scale in the GBAS data. This is showing the strong temporal correlation of errors in GBAS. The angu-
lar deviation error for the ILS glideslope and localizer scatters around the means µLOC=0.005° and 
µGS=-0.004° with standard deviations of σLOC=0.02° and σGS=0.02°, respectively. These values are 
smaller by an order of magnitude for GBAS with standard deviations of σGBAS,lat=0.001° and 
σGBAS,vert=0.004° and mean values of µGBAS,lat=0.001° and µGBAS,vert=0.003°. While the GBAS errors are 
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clustered very well around the origin and remain below 0.015° vertically and 0.01° laterally, ILS er-
rors spread up to +0.04°/-0.1° vertically and ±0.08° laterally. Possible sources of these errors include 
aircraft on the ground as well as on the approach, buildings and airport installations as well as sea-
sonal variations [60]. To our experimental pilots the deviations looked normal throughout the ap-
proaches.    
 
Figure 6 Comparison of the angular deviation errors of the two guidance systems ILS and GLS with respect to a 
post processed carrier phase truth reference. The plot shows the data from four approaches. GBAS is much more 
accurate and shows less noise than ILS. The grey data points show the results if the published 3.5° GPA is used 
instead of the 3.45° as we determined. 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the absolute errors of the glide slope and the localizer in meters. The 
origin of the coordinate system was located at the LTP; therefore negative x-values occurred before 
overflying the threshold. The analog VHF signals of the glide slope transmitter showed rather large 
deviations reaching up to almost 8 m but decrease towards values in the range of 1-2 m as the aircraft 
approaches the airport.  
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Figure 7 Distance dependence of the glide slope deviation errors. The plot shows the data from four approaches. 
Each marker type denotes a different approach. The grey data points show the results if the published 3.5° GPA 
is used instead of 3.45° as we determined. A different marker type for the data points was used for each of the 
approaches. 
 
Figure 8 Distance dependence of the localizer deviation errors. The plot shows data from four approaches. 
Neither signal shows strong distance dependence but the ILS signal is much noisier and also shows a sinusoidal 
oscillation. Each marker type denotes adifferent approach. 
Error characteristics of the GBAS are different from the ILS in that they appear bias-like over the time 
of an approach with a very low noise level. The absolute value of the errors stays below 0.75 m at all 
times. The offset of the boxed markers for the GBAS case in Figure 7 occurs due to a constellation 
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change with respect to the other three approaches shown here. During those three approaches the 
same satellites were available and used for guidance. The ILS glide slope mean error µGS =-0.4 m and 
GBAS mean error of µGBAS,vert=0.25 m observed during the four approaches are small and do not show 
a significant bias in the calculations for GBAS and the ILS measurements. The same holds for the ILS 
localizer error with a mean of µLOC=-0.75 m and µGBAS,lat=0.12 m, respectively. The situation looks 
different, however, when investigating the standard deviations of the errors. While the observed GBAS 
standard deviations vertically σGBAS,vert=0.4 m and laterally σGBAS,lat=0.1 m are very small, the corre-
sponding values for the ILS σGS=1.9 m and σLOC=2.9 m  are several times larger. 
In Figure 8 we can see that during the approach depicted by the boxed markers, an undulation ap-
pears in the signal at a distance from 8500 to 5500 meters from the threshold. This was possibly 
caused by construction vehicles working on an extension of the runway during the approach. At the 
same time, GBAS does not show any signs of signal deformation. All GBAS monitors were active dur-
ing the flight and performed to expectation. No alerts were triggered and the system was fully availa-
ble at all times.“ [7]. 
 
The comparison of ILS and GBAS performance during the approaches shows a significantly better 
performance of the GLS in terms of noise, absolute errors and guidance signal stability. The GBAS 
standards for CAT II/III services as they are now agreed upon and are discussed in detail in the follow-
ing chapter, provide an availability of GBAS service which will likely not meet the availability of 
current ILS installations. This results from partially overly conservative assumptions. The following 
chapters show the process of the derivation of the requirements and suggest certain changes in order to 
leverage the improved performance of GNSS based guidance which was discussed in this chapter.
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3 REQUIREMENTS  
In this chapter the relevant requirements for automatic landings are summarized from the different 
applicable standards. Most of them originate from the definition of a safe landing as described in the 
European certification specifications for all weather operations and the FAA advisory circular AC-120 
28B. It has to be shown that the aircraft can land in a dedicated area on the runway with a given, very 
high probability under nominal conditions as well as in certain limit and fault cases.  
This total error budget on aircraft level is then allocated between the flight technical error, relating to 
autopilot performance in automatic landings, and the navigation system error, relating to GBAS in the 
context of this discussion. On the navigation side, this budget is then further allocated between the 
ground and the airborne GBAS sub-systems resulting in specific low-level requirements for specific 
failure modes. The requirement derivation and allocation between the different systems is described in 
this chapter.  
The last section is a critical review of the derivation process and suggests possible changes to the pro-
cess where appropriate. This can yield relaxed monitoring requirements and has the potential to ena-
ble a better allocation of the total error budget between the relevant systems and components. The 
concepts described here are used for deriving ground and airborne GBAS monitoring architectures 
that are described in Chapter 5.  
Contributions:  
The derivation process for the relevant GBAS ground monitoring requirements is critically reviewed 
and suggestions are made for changes in order to relax the requirements without compromising safety. 
The relaxations are based on the proposal to use available knowledge where possible instead of mak-
ing conservative assumptions. 
 
Publications:  
• M. Felux, J. Lee and F. Holzapfel, "GBAS ground monitoring requirements from an 
airworthiness perspective," GPS Solutions, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 393-401, 7 2014. [14] 
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The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) develops and publishes globally harmonized 
international Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) which usually form the basis of the 
legally binding national regulations. In terms of GBAS and this work, the most relevant part of the 
ICAO SARPs is Annex 10 to the Chicago Convention which relates to Aeronautical Telecommunica-
tions, and more specific Volume 1 which covers radio navigation aids [4]. The currently published 
version includes the standards for CAT-I GBAS (or GAST C), the standards for GAST D (CAT-II/III 
GBAS) are agreed upon and will take effect in 2018 [3]. 
The development of those GBAS standards was originally based on showing that GBAS performance 
is not worse than ILS performance and is thus suitable for approach and landing guidance. This was 
successful for the CAT-I case, however, extending this strategy for the CAT-II/III was not feasible [6]. 
In that case, system performance would be restricted too much, resulting in unacceptably low availa-
bility of the system. Instead, the adopted strategy to derive the requirements is based on ensuring a 
safe landing. The definition of a safe landing and the relevant parameters are defined at aircraft level 
and are further described in Section 3.1.  
From that definition which is an airworthiness requirement, the total error budget is allocated to differ-
ent subsystems as shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 Requirement and principal error budget allocation reproduced from [13] 
The performance requirements at aircraft level are allocated between the flight technical error (FTE) 
and the navigation system error (NSE).  
The NSE contribution is then split into the contribution from GBAS and other aircraft navigation sen-
sors, such as the radar altimeter which is initiating and guiding the flare manoeuver and the inertial 
sensors which are necessary for continuity in case of an unpredicted GBAS outage. Within GBAS, the 
budget is further allocated between the GBAS ground station at the airport, satellite characteristics and 
the airborne GBAS subsystem. The individual parts are all described in the next sections. 
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In the derivation of NSE requirements the FTE performance is considered to be fixed and equal for all 
aircraft. For many aircraft in many situations this leads to very conservative assumptions while the 
actual performance would be much better. One of the main goals of this work is thus to reduce con-
servatism in the derivation of requirements by using available information, such as type of aircraft or 
approximate mass and location of the center of gravity when landing.  
3.1 AIRWORTHINESS AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS  
The relevant requirement documents defining high-level performance requirements on aircraft level 
are the Certification Specifications for All Weather Operations (CS-AWO), Book 1 in CS-AWO 131 
for Europe [9] and the Advisory Circular AC 120-28D, Appendix 3 for the United States [10]. Both 
documents describe the nominal case and the influencing parameters which need to be considered. CS-
AWO contains requirement also for a so-called limit case scenario and AC 120-28D (Section 6.4.1) 
contains specifications for the case of a malfunction. All those cases are further described in this sec-
tion.   
The definition of a safe landing mainly requires the aircraft to touch down in a box at the runway with 
a very high probability. The longitudinal touchdown point (i.e. along the runway in flight direction) 
must not be less than 60 m (200 ft) behind the threshold and not beyond 823 m (2700 ft) behind the 
threshold. Note, that 200 ft actually equals 60.96 m, so that slightly different results occur if using a 
limit of 200 ft or of 60 m behind the threshold. Throughout this work, the 200 ft limit is used as it is 
the slightly more constraining conditions. In the limit and fault case the land long limit is increased to 
914 m according to CS-AWO and 1000 m according to AC 120-28D (3000 ft) behind the threshold. 
The difference between 914 m and 1000 m is quite significant and may result in different monitoring 
limits. In the classical derivation, the land short case is usually the limiting condition. Thus, the differ-
ence in the specified land long limits may not have an effect. However, when using an improved mod-
elling (as will be described later in Section 4.4 of this work), the differences may be significant.  
Throughout this work, again the more constraining value of 914 m is used. The lateral limit is given as 
21 m (70 ft) from the runway center line (which means 1.5 m (5 ft) from the edge of the runway) for 
the outboard landing gear. This requirement is based on an assumption of a 45 m (150 ft) wide runway 
and “may be appropriately increased if operation is limited to wider runways” [10]. The area where the 
aircraft should land (the “touchdown box”) is illustrated in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 Illustration of the touchdown box 
The definition of a safe landing also comprises limitations on the maximum sink rate which must not 
exceed the structural load limit of the airframe, the maximum bank angle which must be such that no 
part of the aircraft (e.g. engine or wings) touches the ground and the lateral velocity or slip angle 
which must not exceed the limitations of the aircraft. 
Compliance with this requirement has to be shown for each aircraft in a combination of simulations 
and flight trials. Appendix 3 of AC 120-28D and CS-AWO 131 and 132 state the variables which have 
to be taken into account for these simulations.  
Influencing Parameter 
(a) Configurations of the airplane (e.g. flap/slat settings) 
(b) Center of gravity 
(c) Landing gross weight 
(d) Conditions of headwind, tailwind, turbulence and windshear [..] 
(e) Characteristics of applicable navigation systems and aid, variations in flight path definitions [..] 
(f) Airport conditions (elevation, runway slope, runway condition) 
(g) Approach airspeed and variations in approach airspeed 
(h) System tolerances 
Table 3-1 Contributing factors to landing performance reproduced from [9] and [10]  
Variables (a)-(f) are common to both documents. Parameter (h) is specific to CS-AWO and parameter 
(g) specific to AC 120-28D.  
Appendix 4 of AC 120-28D and Book 2 AMC AWO 131 of CS-AWO include the wind conditions to 
be considered in simulations. These will be further discussed in Section 4.4.1 of this work where the 
autoland simulations and the wind effect are described and discussed in detail.  
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3.1.1 Nominal Case 
The nominal case is defined as the situation where all influencing parameters from Table 3-1 vary 
according to their expected distributions. Conditions which are changing significantly during one ap-
proach, and thus have a large influence on the variation of the touchdown point, are mainly wind and 
the characteristics of the navigation system. The total probability of an unsuccessful landing, i.e. that 
the aircraft lands outside of the touchdown box (200 ft – 2700 ft behind the runway threshold in longi-
tudinal direction), or does not meet any other condition for a safe landing has to be smaller then 10-6.  
3.1.2 Limit Case 
The limit case is defined as the situation where one of the parameters from Table 3-1 is “held at its 
most adverse value, while the other parameters vary according to their” [9] nominal distributions. Ex-
ceeding the touch down limits must be “improbable”, i.e. smaller than 10-5 according to the definitions 
of AMC-25.1309 in [61].  It is not specified further what exactly is meant by “most adverse” value. 
The main focus within Chapter 5 of this work is put on the navigation system, i.e. item (e) from Table 
3-1. The way the requirement is interpreted within this work is that a bias in the position domain exists 
as a result of an error condition. No monitoring limits are exceeded but one specific monitoring limit is 
reached. The limit condition requires that the probability of an unsuccessful landing, given an error 
exists, is smaller than 10-5. In terms of the landing box requirement this means that the probability of 
landing less than 200 ft behind the runway threshold and the probability of landing further than 3000 ft 
behind the threshold both have to be smaller than 10-5. Note that the land long limit is extended by 
300 ft from the nominal case and the tolerable risk of landing outside the box is increased by a factor 
of 10. 
3.1.3 Malfunction Case 
In the malfunction case, described in Section 6.4.1 of AC 120-28D Appendix 3, a single malfunction 
in a fail operational automatic landing system may not lead to an unsuccessful landing. Unsuccessful 
in this case means not landing within the touchdown box which for the malfunction case starts at 200 
ft behind the threshold and ends at 3000 ft behind the threshold, i.e. it is again prolonged by 300 ft 
compared to the nominal case. The limitations for the lateral dimensions of the box, as well as the 
requirements concerning structural load limits and bank angle at touchdown remain unchanged from 
the nominal case. A fundamental difference to the nominal case is the requirement that the aircraft 
must be able to land within the box with certainty and not anymore with a given very high probability 
(e.g. 1-10-6 as for the nominal case). Of course, when assuming that the along-track error at touchdown 
can be described by a Gaussian distribution this condition can never be fulfilled as there is always 
some residual risk to land outside the box. Therefore, the malfunction analysis “may be considered 
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under nominal environmental conditions” [10]. This statement is not clarified any further as to what 
can be considered “nominal”. In [62] it was shown that fixing the parameters at the 95th percentile is 
sufficient. In the process of deriving the requirements within this work, the same assumption is used. 
These performance requirements for the nominal, limit and malfunction case all relate to the total sys-
tem error (TSE), i.e. to performance at aircraft level. Now the total error budget has to be allocated 
between the different contributing subsystems. 
3.2 AIRCRAFT FTE REQUIREMENTS  
One portion of the TSE budget has to be attributed to the performance of the autopilot. The corre-
sponding error is called flight technical error (FTE) and, in this context of touchdown performance in 
airworthiness assessments, is given in form of a standard deviation of a Gaussian distribution which 
describes the along-track dispersion of the touchdown point relative to a nominal touchdown point 
(NTDP). It is commonly assumed that the FTE and navigation system error (NSE) are both Gaussian 
distributed and statistically independent. For the FTE, the Gaussian assumption could not be con-
firmed within this work as will be shown later in Section 4.4. It is, however, shown that a Gaussian 
overbound can be used to describe the FTE, such that the contribution of the autopilot to the total 
probability of landing outside the touchdown box is not underestimated. Due to the error characteris-
tics of GNSS-based navigation, modelling the NSE (or its overbound) by a zero mean Gaussian distri-
bution appears to be a valid assumption. Assuming now that a description of the NSE and FTE by two 
Gaussian distributed random variables is appropriate, the variance of the TSE is then given as 
 2 2 2TSE NSE FTEσ σ σ= +  (28) 
This equation shows that there is a trade-off between the NSE and FTE performance of the aircraft. 
The better the FTE performance, the more NSE could be tolerated and vice versa. From an airworthi-
ness perspective the condition which has to be fulfilled is the touchdown requirement (TSE require-
ment) in the three different cases detailed in Section 3.1. The resulting required FTE performance in 
all cases is described in the following sections. In this section the most stringent FTE requirements are 
determined by using a largest permissible NSE. It results from the largest nominal vertical error which 
is given by the VAL according to Equation (19) as 
 vert
ffmd
VAL
K
σ =  (29) 
A larger vertσ  would result in a VPL larger than VAL and would thus make GBAS navigation unavaila-
ble. For the limit and malfunction case additional undetected errors are assumed in addition to the 
nominal vertical NSE. The total vertical error is then transformed into an along track error by a divi-
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sion by the tangent of the glide path angle. This assumption is justified by the fact that in an automatic 
landing the flare is initiated at a certain height above ground which is measured by the radar altimeter. 
The radar altitude is independent of the GBAS calculated altitude above the runway and thus a vertical 
bias in the GBAS navigation solution would result in an along track error due to early or late initiation 
of the flare. Note that for satellite geometry reasons the vertical performance in GNSS based naviga-
tion is generally worse than lateral performance. At the same time the performance requirements for 
vertical errors are much more stringent than for lateral performance. Hence, discussions here are lim-
ited to the vertical case since lateral performance requirements are assumed to be met whenever the 
vertical conditions are fulfilled. 
3.2.1 Nominal case FTE constraints 
In the nominal case the probability of landing less than 200 ft behind the runway threshold and the 
probability of landing more than 2700 ft behind the threshold must be less than 10-6 for both cases 
individually. Formulating these conditions in a probabilistic way yields the following conditions for an 
unsuccessful landing (UL) and thus for the standard deviation of the along-track TSE dispersion for 
the land-short case: 
 200TSEk NTDP ftσ⋅ ≤ −  (30) 
and similarly for the land long case: 
 2700TSEk ft NTDPσ⋅ < −  (31) 
The k -factor in both equations is the same. It results from the probability ULp of not landing inside the 
touchdown box and is thus given as  
 
1 1 6( ) (10 ) 4.75ULk Q p Q
− − −= = =  (32) 
with 
2
21( )
2
x t
Q x e dt
π −∞
= ∫ . Using the condition from Equation (28) for TSEσ , and solving Equations (30) 
and (31) for FTEσ  the condition for the land short case can be formulated as  
 
2
2 3.28200
tan( )FTE ffmd
ftVALNTDP ft m
k K GPA
σ
 ⋅−   ≤ −   ⋅   
 
 (33) 
and for the land long case as 
 
2
2 3.282700
tan( )FTE ffmd
ftVALft NTDP m
k K GPA
σ
 ⋅−   ≤ −   ⋅   
 
 (34) 
From Equations (33) and (34) it is obvious, that the aircraft performance needs to meet certain mini-
mum performance characteristics which depend on the size of the VAL. The larger VAL becomes the 
less stringent the requirement on the FTE of the aircraft becomes. For that reason the VAL for the Fi-
nal Approach Segment is limited to a maximum of 10 m but can also be decreased for an individual 
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approach where necessary. Figure 11 shows the resulting constraint region assuming a VAL of 10 me-
ters, a Kffmd of 5.847 (corresponding to a four reference receiver GBAS with the associated integrity 
risk as per table 2-16 in [38] and a glide path angle of 2.5° which is the minimal and thus worst case 
GPA for precision approaches. The area below the green curve shows allowable combinations of 
NTDP and FTEσ in the nominal case.  
 
Figure 11 Constraint region for FTE under nominal NSE conditions. 
3.2.2 Limit case FTE constraints 
A similar condition exists for the limit case. In the limit case one parameter is kept at its most adverse 
value while all other influencing parameters vary according to their nominal distributions. The total 
probability of an unsuccessful landing is the product of the probability that a landing is unsuccessful, 
given a certain vertical error vE  due to the limit case condition which is not detected | , ( )vUL E md vP E , 
multiplied with the probability of that error being undetected ( )md vP E . An unsuccessful landing would 
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again be considered to occur when the touchdown takes place outside of the touchdown box, i.e. less 
than 200 ft or more than 3000 ft behind the runway threshold for the limit case.  
In a similar way as in Equations (33) and (34) for the nominal case the requirement on FTEσ for the 
limit case can be expressed as  
 
2
1
3.28
200 3.28tan( )
tan( )
v
FTE
ffmd
ftE mNTDP ft ftVALGPA m
k K GPA
σ
⋅
− −  ⋅ ≤ −  ⋅ 
 
 (35) 
for the land short case and as  
 
2
1
3.28
3000 .3.28tan( )
tan( )
v
FTE
ffmd
ftE mft NTDP ftVALGPA m
k K GPA
σ
⋅
− −  ⋅ ≤ −  ⋅ 
 
 (36) 
for the land long case. In this formulation an additional vertical error vE  is assumed as a result from a 
limit case condition. The k1-factor results from the touchdown requirements which have to be fulfilled 
with a probability of 10-5 for the limit case such that  
 1 1 51 ( ) (10 ) 4.26ULk Q p Q− − −= = = . (37) 
The resulting constraint region for the FTE assuming a limit case NSE of 3.3 m (worst case error as 
described later in Section 3.3.2.2) is shown by the light blue line in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 Constraint region for FTE under nominal and limit case NSE conditions 
Note that the limit case constraint has a somewhat steeper slope and is centered slightly further behind 
the runway threshold. This is due to the larger land long limit (3000 ft instead of 2700 ft) compared to 
the nominal case.  
3.2.3 Malfunction case FTE constraints  
In the malfunction case, fixed values for FTE and NSE are assumed since it has to be shown that the 
aircraft lands inside the touchdown box with complete certainty. Taking the variables as stochastically 
varying, this condition could not be fulfilled. They are taken at the 95th percentile to represent a con-
servative nominal situation [62] and thus the k-factor for fixing the value becomes 
 ( )12 (1 0.95) 1.96 2k Q− −= =  (38) 
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again with 
2
21( )
2
x t
Q x e dt
π −∞
= ∫ . When fixing NSE and FTE at their 95th percentiles the land short con-
dition for the FTE becomes 
 
2
2
( ) 3.28
200
tan( )
NSE v
FTE
ftk E mNTDP ft
GPA
k
σ
σ
⋅ + ⋅
− −
≤  (39) 
with /NSE ffmdVAL Kσ = , and similarly for the land long case  
 
2
2
( ) 3.28
3000
tan( )
NSE v
FTE
ftk E mft NTDP
GPA
k
σ
σ
⋅ + ⋅
− −
≤  (40) 
Note that both equations depend again on the size of the VAL, as well as on the size of a vertical error 
vE which results from the malfunction condition. The size of vE depends on the performance of the 
ground monitors, the expected threats to the system and their magnitudes. In the GAST D SARPS a 
largest value for the vertical error vE  in the position domain is defined implicitly by limiting the error 
in the pseudorange domain and requiring airborne geometry screening. A more detailed discussion on 
how to fix vE  at a certain value and how large this value may be is the content of Chapter 4. A fixed 
boundary for vE  and VAL in Equation (40) then results in a limitation for the permissible FTEσ . Fol-
lowing the requirements with VAL=10 m and a largest possible vE  of 6.44 m (the derivation and dis-
cussion of this value follows in Section 3.3.2.3) the malfunction case constraint is indicated by the red 
curve in Figure 13. It has again a steeper slope than the nominal and limit case curve and is centered at 
the same point as the limit case curve (land long limit is the same for limit and malfunction case). For 
airworthiness approval it has to be shown that a navigation system can support autoland operations for 
all three cases. The total constraint region is thus the lowest limit of all cases for every combination of 
NTDP and FTEσ  and is indicated by the dashed black curve in Figure 13. The land short condition for 
of FTEσ  is dominated by the malfunction case for a one sigma touchdown performance of up to 184 ft 
(56.1 m). For larger FTEσ -values up to 246 ft (75.0 m) the limit case condition is the most constrain-
ing one. The land long condition is dominated by the constraint on the nominal behavior. For FTEσ -
values between 125 ft (38.1 m) and 246 ft (75.0 m) it is the limiting case, while for smaller values the 
malfunction limit again drives the required performance.  
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Figure 13 Constraint region for the standard deviation of FTE for nominal, limit and malfunction case NSE. The 
total resulting constraint region is indicated by the dashed back line. 
Depending on the actual aircraft installations, aircraft dimensions and weight, autopilot laws and glide 
path angle and of course type of aircraft the nominal touchdown point can vary substantially. An ex-
ample for the variation of NTDPs and FTE values (blue asterisks) is shown in Figure 14 which is re-
produced from a Boeing report on a research program concerning several aspects of GBAS [63]. 
400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600
Nominal touchdown point behind RWY THR[ft]
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
FT
E
 [f
t]
Nominal case
Malfunction case
Limit case
FTE evelope
 Aircraft FTE Requirements 
47 
 
Figure 14 Touchdown performance of Boeing airplanes compared to different alert limits and constraint regions 
for nominal, limit and malfunction case extracted from [63]. 
Note that the actual size of the constraint region is somewhat different in Figure 13 and Figure 14. 
This results from the fact that different values have been agreed on by the international community 
than those used in this report on influencing factors, such as the allocated integrity risk to the Alert 
Limits or on the derivation of the largest errors in the limit and malfunction case. It furthermore shows 
the resulting constraints of NTDP/FTE performance depending on different values for the VAL. The 
tightest constraint on the FTE performance results from the least stringent requirement on the alert 
limit. For the 10 m VAL case (turquoise constraint region) the previously described joint constraint 
coming from the different requirements for the nominal, limit and malfunction case is clearly visible 
from the different slopes of the boundaries.   
It can also be seen from Figure 14 that the most constraining NTDP (closest to the beginning of the 
touchdown area) of the aircraft considered here is about 1290 ft behind the runway threshold. This 
value is used in the derivation of the NSE requirements described in the next section. However, there 
is also a large variation of the NTDPs among the different types of aircraft. Taking only the most con-
servative value thus places an unnecessarily tight burden on all other aircraft.  
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3.3 AIRCRAFT NSE REQUIREMENTS  
After the FTE, the other significant contribution to the TSE results from the imperfections of the navi-
gation system. The navigation system error (NSE) requirements apply to the actual output of the navi-
gation system, irrespective of the sensors which are used to develop a position solution. During differ-
ent phases of flight, typically different navigation sensors are used. The baseline in the SESAR and 
NextGen programs in Europe and the US is centered around the assumption that navigation is based 
more and more on satellite signals. GBAS is designed as a landing system providing guidance on the 
approach and during landing and rollout.  There are, however, certain cases where conventional navi-
gation sensors are still being used. The principle of operation of ILS and its performance were already 
shown in Sections 2.1 and 2.3. Other relevant sensors are discussed briefly in Section 3.3.1, before the 
derivation of requirements for GBAS NSE is shown in more detail in Section 3.3.2.  
3.3.1 Other Aircraft NAV Sensors 
Apart from GBAS there are the radar altimeter and the aircraft’s inertial navigation system which are 
used in autoland operations, even when guidance is based primarily on GBAS. Their tasks in the auto-
land architecture are described here for completeness, however, they will not be considered in more 
detail in the further evaluations of this work. 
3.3.1.1 Radar Altimeter 
The radar altimeter is installed at the bottom of the fuselage and measures the height of the aircraft 
above ground by emitting a signal and measuring the transit time of the returning signal which is re-
flected by the ground. This information is typically only output at altitudes below 2500 ft above 
ground. The main task of the radar altimeter is initiating the flare during landing. At a predefined 
height above ground (typically between 30 and 100 ft indicated altitude) vertical guidance is switched 
from GBAS or ILS to the radar altimeter. The ILS glide slope information becomes unreliable at such 
low heights above ground due to the location of the glide slope antenna next to the runway. Thus, the 
control of the flare is done autonomously on board based on the radar altimeter measurements. When 
changing the primary means of approach guidance from ILS to GBAS one of the main concerns for 
potential users are associated costs. In order to keep them as low as possible, the least amount of 
change to the autopilot modes and operations is desired. For that reason the radar altimeter is assumed 
to fulfill the same tasks as currently with ILS even though GBAS guidance does not become less reli-
able near the ground.  
The minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for the radar altimeter are specified in [64]. 
Below an indicated height above ground of 100 ft (30.48 m) the accuracy of the output must be within 
+-3 ft (0.91 m) and between 100 ft (30.48 m) and 500 ft (152.4 m) indicated height within +-3% of the 
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indicated value. Those values refer to the accuracy of the sensor, i.e. 95% of these measurements must 
be within this requirement. In an autoland context other contributing factors can also potentially im-
pact the measured height above ground. The first return of a signal depends on the beam width of the 
radar altimeter and the evenness of the terrain overflown [65].  Furthermore, an attitude dependent 
lever-arm bias for the different locations of the ILS/GNSS antenna and the radar altimeter installation 
can introduce further uncertainties in the measurements.  
3.3.1.2 Inertial Navigation System 
The Inertial Navigation System (INS) is based on measuring accelerations of the aircraft in three per-
pendicular directions and turn rates about the corresponding axes. Based on an initial state of the air-
craft (position, attitude, velocity, turn rates) the sensor information is integrated and position updates 
are computed. This system has very good properties for short-term navigation but due to the integra-
tion process sensor noise and all other errors are integrated and thus increase with time. Typically, the 
information from the INS is fused into an integrated position solution with information from other 
sensors, such as GNSS, VOR, DME and ILS. For GLS the INS information is used for continuity rea-
sons and the requirements of a fail-operational landing system. At a certain stage of the approach the 
aircraft can and will continue an automatic landing even if the signals from the approach guidance 
system is lost. Boeing certifies their aircraft for a 200 ft alert height, while Airbus uses a 100 ft alert 
height [66]. The fusion and integration methods with INS are, however, also beyond the scope of this 
work and only mentioned here for reference.    
3.3.2 GBAS NSE Requirements   
The budget allocation tree shown previously in Figure 9 indicates that, apart from the conventional 
navigation sensors, an allocation is made for navigation system errors introduced by the GBAS. In the 
process of the requirement derivation for the GLS, no sensor fusion is considered. This assumption is 
conservative on one side, since the integration with other sensors has the potential to detect errors in 
GBAS. On the other hand all other sensors are also prone to errors with different fault modes depend-
ing on their sensors and signal processing schemes. From an airworthiness perspective, they are treat-
ed as separate faults and thus are not considered together with GLS. The error budget attributed to 
GBAS covers any influence from the space segment of the GNSS, the GBAS ground subsystem at the 
airport and the airborne installation at the aircraft. As for the FTE considerations in Section 3.2 similar 
performance requirements in the nominal, limit and malfunction case are derived for the GBAS NSE 
and thus all monitoring algorithms within the system. These are discussed in the following sections. As 
the necessary performance results are again derived from the definition of a successful landing as de-
scribed in Section 3.1, a trade-off between NSE and FTE performance is required. In order to derive 
specific low-level NSE limitations the derivation process is largely based on a fixed FTE performance 
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assumption. This approach is useful for the derivation of requirements for the GBAS ground station 
since sufficient protection has to be provided for all aircraft. 
3.3.2.1 Nominal case NSE requirements 
The nominal case for GBAS is rather simple and straight forward. If all influencing parameters vary 
according to their expected distributions the protection level concept conservatively models all error 
sources and can bound the resulting position error with a sufficiently high probability. The protection 
levels are based on modelling the residual uncertainty resulting from the ground system, the airborne 
installation and ionospheric and tropospheric effects. The root-sum square of these contributors for 
each satellite represents the total uncertainty associated with an individual pseudorange measurement. 
These uncertainties are then projected into the position domain and inflated to bound errors with a 
sufficiently low residual integrity risk. This process was previously described in Section 2.2.3.3. The 
touchdown performance for the nominal condition has to satisfy the conditions  
 200TSENTDP k ftσ− ⋅ ≥  (41) 
and 
 2700TSENTDP k ftσ+ ⋅ ≤  (42) 
again with NTDP  being the nominal touchdown point, k the multiplier associated with the allocated 
integrity risk and 2 2TSE NSE FTEσ σ σ= + the standard deviation of the touchdown dispersion which con-
sists of an FTE (mean at NTDP, and standard deviation FTEσ ) and an NSE (zero mean, standard devia-
tion NSEσ ) contribution. For the nominal case the probability of landing outside of the box must be 
smaller than 10-6 which results in 
 1 6(10 ) 4.75k Q− −= =  (43) 
with the inverse Q-function as previously described in the FTE discussion. The largest nominal verti-
cal NSE standard deviation ,NSE vσ  is given by the VPL which is limited to a maximum of 10 m. Thus it 
is limited to , 10 1.72NSE v ffmdm K mσ ≤ = . The along-track dispersion FTEσ  of the touchdown point due to 
a certain vertical NSE performance is then given by a projection according to the glide path angle 
GPA  as  
 ,
tan( )
NSE v
NSE GPA
σ
σ =  (44) 
Assuming a worst FTE performance of 180FTE ftσ =  and a minimum glide path angle 2.5GPA = ° , the 
most conservative value for the NSE is 129.3NSE ftσ = and thus the worst TSE is given by 
221.6TSE ftσ = . Assuming a touchdown point of 1290 ft behind the runway threshold with the worst 
NSEσ  and 4.75k =  the conditions (41) and (42) are still fulfilled. The protection level concept which 
bounds the nominal case error is thus sufficient to ensure that the touchdown requirements are met in 
that case. 
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3.3.2.2 Limit case NSE requirements  
The limit case considerations assume that one influencing parameter is kept at its most adverse value 
while the others vary in a nominal way. This requirement interpreted in a GBAS context defines a 
general monitoring necessity with a threshold set low enough to enable a safe landing when one cause 
(e.g. an ionospheric condition) creates a certain error. It is essential that each of the monitors in GBAS 
has to satisfy this condition. Following the notation of [13], the fact that the aircraft may not land out-
side of the landing box with a probability higher than 10-5 in a limit case condition can be described as  
 5| | _( ) ( ) ( ) 10UL fault v md v UL fault undetected vP E P E P E
−= ⋅ ≤  (45) 
where |UL faultP is the probability of an unsuccessful landing (i.e. touching down outside the box) given a 
limit case error, mdP is the probability of missed detection of a generic monitor, | _ detUL fault un ectedP  is the 
probability of an unsuccessful landing given a limit case fault occurs and is not detected and vE  is a 
vertical position error, resulting from the limit case error. The probability of landing outside the box 
(for the land short case) given and undetected fault that results in a vertical error vE  is represented by 
the blue curve inFigure 15 and can be described (for the land short case) by  
 _undetect d _ff| e ( ) 200tan( )
v
UL fault v TSE
E
P E P NTDP k ft
GPA
 
= − ⋅σ − ≤ 
 
 (46) 
The two factors of Equation (45) have complementary characteristics. This situation is illustrated in 
Figure 15. While the probability that a monitor does not detect a certain error VE  (first factor) decreas-
es with increasing values of VE (red curve), the probability of landing outside the touchdown box (sec-
ond factor)  increases with increasing VE  (blue curve). Vertical errors smaller than 3.3 m are not criti-
cal since the probability of landing outside of the box remains below 10-5. However, with increasing 
size of the vertical error a monitor has to detect with increasing probability (or decreasing probability 
of missed detection as shown in the figure). The product of the values of the blue and the red curve has 
to be smaller or equal to 10-5 in order to fulfill the limit case requirement.  
 
Figure 15 Limit case requirement for the probability of missed detection for a generic GBAS monitor. 
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The condition for a limit case error as shown in Figure 15 is a limit on the position error. For the 
GBAS it is, however, useful to define conditions in the pseudorange domain. As it was described in 
chapter 2.2.3.1, the relation between the pseudorange domain and the position domain is given by the 
weighted pseudoinverse of the geometry matrix, S . Any error on a single satellite cannot lead to a 
larger position error than the corresponding factor for the specific satellite in the S -matrix. Limiting 
the size of the largest projection factors vert,maxs  and lat,maxs  into the vertical and the lateral position do-
main thus limits the largest limit case errors. Assuming a limit for the projection factor vert,maxs  and a 
largest vertical position error v,maxE  for which the aircraft still lands in the box thus defines a limit on 
the largest pseudorange error r,maxE  of a single satellite which is given as 
 ,
v,max
r max
vert,max
E
E
s
=  (47) 
The largest vertical position error results from the touchdown requirement and an assumption about 
the FTE performance. The same equations as for the FTE requirements in Section 3.2.2 apply (
1290NTDP ft= , 2.5GPA = ° ) and can now be solved for v,maxE . Together with Equation (47) it can 
then be solved for r,maxE to obtain the desired limit on an individual pseudorange error. The red curve 
shown in Figure 15 was plotted based on the assumptions of 150FTE ftσ =  and 4vert.maxs = . The way 
the requirements are written also accommodates larger values for FTEσ  when the projection factor 
vert.maxs  is limited accordingly. A combination 2vert.maxs = and 180FTE ftσ =  would for example still 
fulfill the monitoring condition. In such a case it is the responsibility of the airframe manufacturer to 
set the geometry screening parameters (i.e. the limit on vert.maxs ) low enough to ensure that the limit 
case requirement holds.  
For an easier parameterization of the monitoring condition resulting from the limit case considerations, 
a slightly more constraining piecewise linear approximation of the resulting missed detection require-
ments was defined (given in Table B-76 A of [4]). It is shown in black in Figure 16 together with the 
required monitoring performance (shown in red) as resulting from the touchdown requirements.  
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Figure 16 Limit case requirement (red) and approximation as standardized (black). 
3.3.2.3 Fault case requirements  
Finally, also for the NSE a malfunction condition exists. In that case it has to be shown again that the 
aircraft can land in the box with complete certainty in case of a single undetected malfunction which 
occurs with a probability greater than 10-9. The probability of the occurrence of an undetected fault 
condition is the product of the probabilities that some conditions exists which produces the fault con-
dition and that this condition is not detected by the GBAS. In the requirement derivation process the 
FTE and NSE performance are again assumed to be fixed at their 95th percentiles because if they were 
considered as varying parameters with a Gaussian distribution, this condition could never be fulfilled. 
Additionally a vertical error is assumed as result from the fault condition. This can be formulated for 
the land short case as  
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and similarly for the land long case as 
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 (49) 
again with NTDP the nominal touchdown point, ( )12 (1 0.95) 1.96 2k Q− −= = corresponding to the k-
factor for the 95th percentile of the Gaussian distribution ,NSE vertσ the standard deviation of the nominal 
vertical NSE distribution, FTEσ the along-track touchdown dispersion due to the flight technical error, 
GPA the glide path angle of the approach and vE  a vertical error which results from the fault case 
condition.  
Equations (48) and (49) can now be solved for vE  when fixing all other parameters. From Equation 
(47) it is then possible to derive a fault case monitoring requirement. When taking the assumptions as 
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before ( 1290NTDP ft= , 2.5GPA = ° , , / 1.72NSE vert ffmdVAL K mσ = = , 4vert,maxs = ) but with an in-
creased 180FTE ftσ =  (as compared to 150FTE ftσ =  which was used in the limit case) the pseudor-
ange monitoring condition becomes  
 6.4m 1.6m
4
v
r,i,max
vert,max
E
E
s
= = =  (50) 
No justification is given why different FTE performances are assumed in the different cases. Note that 
so far no credit is taken for any prior probability of the occurrence of a fault. In [13] a value of 
67.5 10faultP
−= ⋅ is given for a prior probability of fault. It results from a satellite fault rate for the GPS 
satellites of 10-4 per hour, an exposure time of 15 seconds (time from the CAT-I minimum to touch-
down) and a maximum number of visible satellites of 18. The requirement to monitor for pseudorange 
errors larger than 1.6 m appears in the draft SARP in Section 3.6.7.3.3.3 [3].The resulting fault case 
monitoring condition assuming a prior fault probability of 67.5 10faultP −= ⋅  is shown in red in Figure 17.  
 
 
Figure 17 Monitoring requirement in the pseudorange domain for the fault case (red) together with the approxi-
mated limit case requirement from the previous section (blue) and the combined requirement indicated by the 
dashed black line. 
The black dashed curve shows the overall monitoring requirement combining the limit and fault case 
requirements. For smaller errors the limit case is the more constraining case, but as the pseudorange 
errors exceed 1.6 m the fault case becomes the more constraining monitoring condition until the limit 
case requirement again dominates for errors larger than 2.25 m. 
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3.4 DISCUSSION OF REQUIREMENTS AND POSSIBLE RELAXATIONS 
The previous sections gave a summary of the derivation of the currently proposed requirements and 
the rationale on how they were derived. A number of assumptions were taken in order to be conserva-
tive and cover all possible cases. However, at certain points those assumptions are unnecessarily con-
servative which results in requirements which are sometimes hard to fulfill and thus reduce the availa-
bility of the GBAS service. 
In this section some adjustments are proposed in the assumptions made to derive several values. These 
suggestions are a further contribution made in this thesis, contributing to the goal of using available 
knowledge in order to reduce unnecessary conservatism and improve the usability of GBAS. All pro-
posed changes do never compromise any safety targets but result from a view on actual conditions and 
capabilities of the systems rather than worst case assumptions.  
3.4.1 Glide Path Angle 
One key assumption is that a vertical NSE on the approach translates into an along-track error at 
touchdown. The assumption is justified by the switch from vertical GLS guidance to guidance by the 
radar altimeter at a defined radar altitude. For the derivation of the requirements a 2.5° GPA was as-
sumed. While this value is the minimum for precision approaches [17], there is no need to assume that 
minimum value for all approaches. The by far most commonly used GPA is the value of 3°. Of the few 
airports using a lower GPA, many are combined civil/military airfields which require the lower GPA 
for military aircraft. However, if the airspace above the approach track permits, there is no operational 
reason to stay with the shallow glide path. At many airports effort is put to increase the glideslope 
angle even above 3° to increase the height of overflight over populated areas (e.g. Frankfurt uses 3.2° 
for approaches in CAT-I conditions to their new runway 25R/07L). 
In any case and in contrast to ILS, the GPA is transmitted in the Type 4 GBAS message and is thus a 
known parameter which can be used when determining limits on the maximum tolerable NSE and/or 
FTE for a specific approach. In all derivations shown in the previous sections the GPA plays a central 
role in relating a vertical error into an along-track error on the runway. This is true for all three cases 
previously described.  
It is therefore suggested that the required monitor performance of a GBAS is derived based on the 
GPA which is used for the specific approach an aircraft is flying, instead of 2.5° as most conservative 
value. Most airports use a steeper GPA anyways and those that use a more shallow approach there is a 
possibility to trade required monitor performance (and thus in the end availability of the approach 
service) against the approach angle. An example of how monitoring can be relaxed based on the GPA 
is shown later in Section 5.4.2 of this thesis.  
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3.4.2 Relation between pseudorange and position domain 
A second case where the requirements are derived based on the most conservative assumption is the 
relation between a ranging error and the resulting position error. As shown in Section 2.2.3.1, the 
measured pseudoranges are projected into the position domain by the S -matrix which is the weighted 
pseudoinverse of the geometry matrix. The projection from all pseudoranges into the vertical domain 
is given by the previously discussed parameter verts . In order to limit the influence of a single satellite 
onto the overall position solution it is assumed that a maximum value is given by , 4vert maxs = . It is a 
sensible approach of limiting the influence since the ground has no means of knowing which subset of 
satellites and thus which s-values the airborne system is using.  
However, with a given set of satellites for which corrections are provided, there is a certain knowledge 
about which combinations of satellites can be used on board of an aircraft. Since only ranging infor-
mation can be used from satellites for which corrections are provided there is a limited number of sub-
sets which can be used. In all of those subsets the value of 4verts =  is very rarely obtained. Typically 
for the worst geometries it stays in the range of 3-3.5, because otherwise the alert limit would be ex-
ceeded. From all possible subset geometries the ground can thus limit the verts to a value typically lower 
than 4 by evaluating all possible subset geometries. Hence, an erroneous pseudorange measurement 
(and also the combination of 2 or more erroneous pseudorange measurements) has a worst case impact 
which is usually smaller than assumed in the requirement derivation and, just as important, it is known 
to the ground to a certain extend by the limited number of subset geometries which can be formed.  
It is therefore suggested to use the actual worst case vert,maxs  instead of assuming a fixed 4vert,maxs =  for the 
derivation of certain monitoring thresholds. An example of how monitoring can benefit from this ap-
proach is again shown in Section 5.4.2.  
3.4.3 FTE contribution and nominal touchdown point 
In Section 3.3 the derivation of requirements for the NSE contribution to the TSE was discussed. De-
spite the fact, that there is some freedom for the airframe manufacturers on limiting their geometry 
screening limits according to the FTE performance of the aircraft, it is generally assumed that the FTE 
is a single fixed number given as FTEσ . It is derived in the process of aircraft certification and is then 
kept fixed. However, in reality this parameter is changing with prevailing wind conditions and aircraft 
weight, center of gravity location and aircraft configuration. With knowledge at least of the weight and 
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center of gravity location (and knowledge about the uncertainties associated with this knowledge) it 
may be possible to use more realistic values for FTEσ  as well as for the NTDP . 
 
In the current GBAS architecture, the ground station is at least partially responsible for ensuring the 
integrity. As the ground station has to support all arriving aircraft a certain amount of conservatism and 
standardized assumptions are necessary. Future GBAS service types may, however, shift the responsi-
bility for threat mitigation more to the airborne system such that e.g. an improved FTE- performance 
can be leveraged in the navigation system and thus improve the availability of the GBAS service. This 
idea is further pursued and exploited in the development of an ionospheric monitoring algorithm for 
future dual-frequency GBAS and is discussed in detail in Section 5.5 of this thesis.
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4 FTE CONTRIBUTION - AUTOPILOT SYSTEMS FOR AUTO-
MATIC LANDINGS 
This section starts with a short description of the autopilot systems used for automatic approaches and 
landings and then shows an exemplary analysis of the touchdown performance of a given autopilot 
implementation with a limited set of influencing parameters. The navigation requirements for the 
GBAS Approach Service Type D were derived based on the definition and criteria of a safe landing (as 
previously described in Chapter 3). These are given in terms of total system error (TSE) that is then 
allocated between the navigation system error (NSE) and the flight technical error (FTE). The FTE in 
the GBAS context is only described as the standard deviation of a normal distribution describing the 
dispersion of the touchdown point on the runway in along-track direction relative to a nominal touch-
down point. Touchdown performance, however, depends on several influencing parameters. Assuming 
one single performance model for all aircraft and all flying conditions is a very crude and thus con-
servative way to describe the autopilot performance. It is, however, useful when deriving requirements 
for a GBAS ground station since the ground infrastructure has to support all different kinds of aircraft. 
In this section the results of autoland simulations are presented. The usual way of describing the FTE 
is fitting the touchdown data to a Gaussian distribution. The results can, however, not be expected to 
be Gaussian distributed and thus the risk of landing short or long may be underestimated. 
 
Contribution: It is suggested to model the touchdown distribution either by a Gaussian overbound or 
by a Johnson distribution instead of using a Gaussian fit. This is done to ensure that the risk of miss-
ing the touchdown box is not underestimated (Section 4.4.1.2). After a discussion of the implications it 
is shown that it is also possible to derive NSE requirements based on this kind of modelling (Section 
4.6), ensuring safety and bearing the potential to leverage any knowledge about the actual loading 
conditions of a certain aircraft (Section 4.5).  
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As it became apparent in the previous chapter about the derivation of GBAS navigation requirements, 
an allocation of the total system error budget (i.e. the requirement that the aircraft has to land inside 
the touchdown box) has to be performed between the budgets for the NSE and the FTE.  
This part of the thesis focuses on the determination of the FTE performance of a given aircraft and its 
proper modelling. It is beyond the scope of this work to improve the autopilot with respect to the char-
acteristics of a GBAS (e.g. by leveraging the much smoother guidance signal provided by GBAS as 
compared to ILS for optimizing the control laws in the autopilot during a GBAS approach) although 
optimizing the approach and flare laws in this respect may lead to improvements in terms of touch-
down performance and enable operational benefits. In the future with an improved data link more use-
ful data to optimize the flare (such as information about the terrain) may also be leveraged and alter 
the touchdown characteristics. The discussions here are, however, limited to analyzing an existing 
autopilot. This approach follows the philosophy of GBAS where initially, the interfaces of the GBAS 
avionics and the flight control system are identical to ILS requiring almost no change in the autopilot 
modes, display of deviations and pilot training. Potential future changes can, however, easily be adopt-
ed in the concept presented in this chapter and may be useful in the future.  
4.1 APPROACH PHASES AND AUTOPILOT MODES 
In this section the relevant autopilot modes for automatic landings are briefly described. Historically, 
first autopilots were developed to relieve the pilot from simple tasks like maintaining a certain altitude, 
track or aircraft attitude which would require constant attention. Further developments enabled the 
aircraft to automatically acquire a certain altitude or heading. As aircraft became more sophisticated 
and aircraft designs started to develop to constantly improve performance of aircraft also the autopilots 
gained importance in stabilizing aircraft designs e.g. by implementing yaw dampers in order to reduce 
the Dutch roll tendency, one of the Eigen motions of the aircraft. Modern autopilot and flight man-
agement systems accomplish an enormous variety from autonomously flying complete missions to 
interpreting pilot control inputs and providing optimized aircraft handling qualities and flight envelope 
protections. One of the most challenging tasks for the autopilot is the automatic approach and landing. 
A series of different autopilot modes are used during the different stages of an approach:  
First, the ILS or GBAS approach trajectory has to be intercepted typically at an angle of about 30° 
laterally (segment “A” of the approach track in Figure 18) and from a constant altitude from below the 
glide path (segment “B”). The autopilot is armed for the localizer and glideslope mode which automat-
ically acquires the final approach course and sink rate required to follow the final approach path. Next, 
the approach trajectory is tracked laterally and vertically (“C”) down to an altitude of about 45 m 
above ground where the ILS glide slope signal becomes unreliable. The approach mode is accomplish-
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ing the path tracking and minimized deviations from that path that occur due to external influences 
(mainly wind). In the case of an ILS approach, an intermediate segment (“D”) follows which guides 
the aircraft with a constant sink rate down to the flare height, which is typically around 15 m above 
ground. In that segment no ILS glide slope information is used, however GBAS guidance could be 
continuously used in the same way as during the approach since the signals do not become less relia-
ble with the aircraft approaching the ground. The next segment is the landing flare (“E”) where the 
sink rate is reduced to an acceptable value until touchdown, the pitch and roll attitude angles of the 
aircraft are adjusted to ensure a safe landing and the aircraft is aligned with the runway. After touch-
down the rollout guidance (“F”) has to keep the aircraft centered on the runway until the autopilot is 
disengaged or the aircraft comes to a stop or some sort of taxi guidance is provided. While the aircraft 
is flying, the airspeed has to be controlled precisely in addition to the tracking of the desired trajectory. 
As the control of the speed and the vertical profile are closely coupled, typically this task is accom-
plished by managing the total energy (i.e. potential and kinetic energy) of the aircraft. 
 
Figure 18 Phases of different autopilot modes. A: capture of lateral track, B: capture of glide path, C: tracking of 
approach trajectory, D: intermediate segment with constant sink rate without external guidance (ILS only), E: 
lading flare and decrab, F: rollout 
In the context of this work the phases C to E are of special interest and the autopilot modes used to fly 
these portions of the approach are described in a little more detail. For the other phases there is little to 
no difference to existing standard approaches and automatic landings in the context of total system 
performance at touchdown. 
4.2 CONTROLLER ARCHITECTURE 
This section gives an overview over the classical autoland system used in the Airbus A320 and also in 
the simulation model used later in this chapter. The classical control architecture comprises several 
hierarchical levels as shown in Figure 19. 
A typical realization (which includes the autopilot used in this work) contains a guidance mode on the 
outermost level. It is providing information about the position of the aircraft relative to the approach 
trajectory, both, laterally and vertically. For precision approaches this information is based on devia-
tions from the ILS (see Section 2.1), MLS or GBAS (see Section 2.2.2.4). Note that these deviations 
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contain the NSE of the approach guidance system used, as the deviations are determined based on the 
difference of the estimated position relative to the approach track. The ILS/MLS/GLS avionics are 
usually avionics purchased by the airframe manufacturers and are providing only angular deviations to 
the autopilot system. However, in the case of GBAS not only angular but also rectilinear deviations 
(i.e. the absolute lateral and vertical displacement from the approach track in meters) are calculated 
within the GBAS board equipment. However, the output mimics the ILS deviations such that the look 
and feel for the pilot and the guidance signals coming from GBAS provide the same type of infor-
mation as the ILS. The avionics typically do not interact in any other way with the aircraft or autopilot 
functions. From an integration point of view this is understandable when purchasing avionics from a 
supplier, however a tighter integration between autopilot and GBAS could lead to improvements in the 
future as will be discussed later in Section 4.5. Furthermore, depending on the weight and configura-
tion of the aircraft and prevailing conditions a target approach speed appV is calculated during the ap-
proach preparation and selected by the pilot.    
 
Figure 19 High-level classical autoland controller architecture 
The lateral and vertical angular deviations lata and verta  and target airspeed appV  serve as inputs to the 
path and speed tracking mode of the autopilot system. The path tracking is the lateral component and 
ensures that the aircraft stays on the lateral approach track. The upper dashed box in Figure 19 is the 
align function that is activated for the final phase of the approach just before touchdown. In that stage 
the autopilot aligns the aircraft with the runway direction in case the approach was flown with a cer-
tain side slip angle in order to correct for cross wind components. Furthermore it also ensures the air-
craft touches down without a significant bank angle in order to fulfill the criteria for a safe landing as 
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described in Section 3.1. The vertical mode is somewhat more complex since a change in the vertical 
speed in order to correct for deviations has a direct effect on the airspeed of the aircraft. These two 
components thus have to be controlled simultaneously. This is accomplished by controlling the total 
energy of the aircraft (i.e. the kinetic and potential energy) jointly in a Total Energy Control System 
(TECS). As for the lateral mode, there is also vertical mode for the final phase of flight just before 
touchdown, namely the flare mode. It is activated at a predefined radar altitude (i.e. height above 
ground) and reduces the sink rate and adjusts the attitude of the aircraft such that a safe landing is en-
sured. The exact implementation of the flare law plays a major role in the achievable touchdown per-
formance and thus is a central element for the trade-off between NSE and FTE. The outputs of the 
speed and path tracking modes are commanded aircraft attitude angles ( , ,c c cφ θ ψ ) and a commanded 
thrust or change of thrust CT∆ . These values serve as inputs for the innermost autopilot modes, the 
stability and control augmentation systems (SAS/CAS).  
In the SAS and CAS the commanded aircraft attitude angles and thrust are interpreted and the actual 
commands for the thrust setting Tδ  and the actuation of the control surfaces of the aircraft are calcu-
lated (aileron deflection cξ , elevator deflection Eη  and rudder deflection cζ ) and forwarded to the 
actuator systems.  
The performance of an autopilot depends on the exact implementation and selected parameters of all 
the controllers and modes and differs significantly between different aircraft types and even within 
different generations of the same aircraft model. It is obvious, that not all aircraft and autopilots will 
have the same level of performance. Furthermore, the performance depends on a number of different 
influences that will be discussed in the next section. In order to assess the FTE of a certain type of 
aircraft a statistical way of describing the performance is therefore appropriate. A number of Monte-
Carlo (MC) simulations are performed to assess the autopilot performance in a wide range of possible 
environments and configurations. The output of these simulations in the context of GBAS guidance is 
a statistical description of the touchdown performance in the along-track direction of the runway. This 
process is described in more detail in the following section.  
4.3 DETERMINATION OF AIRCRAFT’S FTE 
As described in the previous sections and chapters it is essential to characterize the touchdown per-
formance (generally described by a Gaussian distribution centered at a nominal touchdown point 
(NTDP) and with a corresponding along-track FTE standard deviation) of a certain aircraft type and 
autopilot. This information is necessary when evaluating the total performance of the aircraft (com-
bined NSE and FTE contribution) against the lading requirements given in [9]. In the current way of 
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deriving GBAS NSE requirements the nominal touchdown point is assumed to be fixed and the same 
for all aircraft. The same is assumed for the distribution of the FTE at touchdown. As there is a large 
variety of parameters that influence the FTE performance during the approach and at touchdown, 
Monte-Carlo simulations are performed in order to determine the aircraft performance. The following 
list summarizes the parameters that are taken into account for the simulations. Their range and distri-
butions is described at the example of the autoland simulations performed for the Boeing 757 and 767 
during their certification program according to [11]:  
Wind: Wind and turbulence conditions are simulated according to a standardized wind model (e.g. 
Dryden wind models [67]). As reference wind speeds and directions that serve as parameters of the 
wind simulation recorded winds at different airports are used.  
Weight of the aircraft: The gross weight of the aircraft is simulated by picking a random sample from 
a uniform distribution between the maximum landing weight and the empty weight of the aircraft.  
Moments of inertia and loading configuration:  The moments depend on the weight and loading 
condition of the aircraft and are chosen to have either a minimum, nominal or maximum value at the 
randomly selected weight and loading condition. 
Center of gravity:  The center of gravity location is chosen from a uniform distribution between the 
forward and aft aerodynamic limit. 
Airspeed: The initial airspeed is chosen from a uniform distribution with a lower limit of 1.3 sV⋅ and 
an upper limit of 1.3 10 ktssV⋅ + where sV  is the stall speed of the aircraft. 
ILS parameters: A variety of ILS parameters, such as the glide path angle, the ILS reference datum, 
localizer and glideslope alignment errors, beam noise etc. are simulated for the MC-simulations. 
Note that the ILS parameters are modelling the NSE of the aircraft, while the FTE is given by the au-
topilot performance in the given conditions. When performed as described in [11], the autoland simu-
lations can thus be directly evaluated against the touchdown requirements relating to the TSE. When 
deriving NSE requirements based on these simulations the resulting values are somewhat conservative 
as the TSE is simulated and not just the FTE contribution.  
Intercept angle: The intercept angle is the angle between initial aircraft heading and the runway di-
rection. It is chosen as random variable with a mean of 0° and a standard deviation of 30° and is lim-
ited to a maximum of 90°.  
Radar altitude error: The error of the radar altimeter is chosen from a Normal distribution that is not 
further specified in [11]. In the minimum operational performance requirements for radar altimeters 
(DO-155) the radar altimeter error is specified to remain below +-3 ft for 95% of the measurements 
below a height of 100 ft above ground (this is the area where the radar altimeter is used to trigger and 
guide the landing flare).  
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Capture distance: The capture distance is chosen from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 
5 NM and a maximum of 10 NM from the runway threshold.   
Altitude of the airport and slope of the runway: These two parameters are selected by picking a 
random sample from the database of actual airports with CAT II and CAT III runways. The slope (with 
the exemption of one single airport) varies between +0.8% and -0.8%.  
Other parameters, such as runway length and runway friction, are not directly impacting the dispersion 
of the touchdown points on the runway for automatic landings but are used for determining the rollout 
and braking behavior.  
By varying these parameters a distribution of the touchdown performance for a certain autopilot and 
aircraft can be derived. In order to establish confidence in the results to the required level as specified 
by [9], a large number of simulation runs has to be performed. The required number depends on the 
desired confidence into the derived results. In the following section the influence of the most signifi-
cant parameters is investigated in more detail.  
4.4 EXEMPLARY FTE ANALYSIS  
In this section the influence of wind, turbulence and the aircraft’s weight and balance on the touch-
down performance are investigated and discussed. This section should exemplify part of the FTE anal-
ysis that needs to be performed and discusses how to model the results. It is, however, beyond the 
scope of this work to perform a full characterization of an autoland system and all influencing effects 
such as runway shape, terrain and radar altimeter. As basis for the results an experimental autopilot for 
the Airbus A320 developed at the German Aerospace Center implemented as a Simulink simulation 
model was used. While it does not completely fulfill the autoland criteria (as shown later), it is useful 
to evaluate and discuss the effect of the variation of different parameters in the simulation and discuss 
the methodology of FTE modelling. For the autoland simulations a set of standard parameters are 
used. They are summarized in Table 4-1. Any variations from these standard vales are indicated by 
putting the corresponding values in italics. The standard mass of the aircraft is chosen at the maximum 
landing weight (MLW) that is 64.5 t. The location of the center of gravity (CG) is given in percent of 
the mean aerodynamic chord, i.e. the percentage of the reference length (i.e. the distance between the 
most forward and most aft position of the CG) behind a given reference point. For the A320 this refer-
ence point is located 16.31 m behind the tip of the nose and the reference length is 4.19 m. The initial 
speed (VTAS) indicates the true airspeed of the aircraft at the beginning of the simulation. The initial 
altitude indicates the height above the runway threshold at the beginning of the simulation. Wind di-
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rection and wind speed are the reference winds used as inputs for the simulation blocks of the Dryden 
wind models in Simulink simulating the steady wind, wind shear and turbulence components. 
 
Aircraft 
mass 
Aircraft  
CG 
VTAS Initial 
altitude 
Wind 
direction 
Wind 
speed 
Turbulence 
intensity 
64.5 t 22.2% 70 m/s 609.6 m 
(2000 ft) 
265° 0 m/s 10-1 
Table 4-1 Standard parameter set for autoland simulations 
All simulations are all taking place in Braunschweig in Northern Germany with a position of the run-
way threshold at 52.32°N and 10.56°E and at an elevation of 131.7 m above the WGS84 ellipsoid. The 
glide path angle (GPA) is chosen to be a standard angle of 3°. The aircraft is fully configured for land-
ing with the landing gear lowered and flaps set to position full. Figure 20 shows the high level archi-
tecture and the main components of the simulation model. It furthermore shows a general flow dia-
gram of the data that is exchanged between the blocks of the autoland simulation model.  
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Figure 20 Data flow diagram and main components of simulation model 
 
The core is the aircraft flight dynamics model shown on the right. Its output is the state vector of the 
aircraft out of which the three dimensional position is used further. In the upper loop the height above 
ground is used to generate the wind according to the Dryden model and feeding it back into the flight 
dynamics module. In the lower loop the GBAS module calculates vertical and lateral deviations from a 
reference trajectory and outputs these to the flight control law module. A standard ILS-lookalike tra-
4. FTE CONTRIBUTION - AUTOPILOT SYSTEMS FOR AUTOMATIC LANDINGS 
 
66 
jectory was used for the simulations. The functionality of the GBAS module is described in detail in 
Section 2.2.2.4. The deviations are interpreted in the flight control law module and the appropriate 
control surface deflections and thrust commands are fed back into the flight dynamics model. This 
represents the outer guidance loop of the controller architecture that was described in the previous 
section and illustrated in Figure 19.  
4.4.1 Wind influence 
Wind is a highly complex atmospheric phenomenon which is influenced by large scale phenomena, 
such as trade winds or low and high pressure areas, by local orographic conditions such as dominant 
wind directions due to mountains in the vicinity of an airport, but also by the surface features with 
different absorbing capabilities for the heat radiation of the sun. It is thus almost impossible to com-
pletely describe prevailing wind conditions. However, in order to simulate representative wind condi-
tions several standardized wind models were defined and are commonly used for simulation purposes. 
Concerning the autoland simulation case that is of interest in the context of this work, two alternative 
wind models are described in Book 2 of  the CS-AWO [9]. Another model is described in the military 
handbook “Flying Qualities of Piloted Airplanes” [67]. For this study the definitions from the military 
specification was chosen as is also used as reference for the simulation blocks in the Aerospace 
Blockset in Simulink used for this study.  
While slightly different in their representations, all those models contain three parts for the description 
of the wind: a mean wind component, a windshear component and a turbulence component.  
The mean wind represents the steady state wind conditions which are measured at the airport, typically 
at a height of 6 m above the ground. This value is also reported to the pilots during landing as a vector 
containing the speed of the wind and direction rounded to the nearest 10°.  
The windshear is modeled to represent the boundary layer effect, i.e. a decrease in the wind as the 
height above ground decreases. A change in the direction of the wind is not included in the simulation 
as the effect would mostly affect the cross-track touchdown errors but not so much the along-track 
errors at touchdown that are of special interest in this study. Note that the models only include nominal 
windshear effects. Severe windshear effects, as be observed in the vicinity or within convective storms 
(e.g. thunderstorms), are not considered. Most large commercial transport aircraft are equipped with a 
predictive windshear warning system. In addition, many of the large airports prone to frequent wind-
shear are equipped with ground based windshear alerting systems. Through those measures, most en-
counters of aircraft with those non-nominal windshear effects can be avoided and thus need not be 
considered in autoland simulations.  
The turbulence component describes a random variation of wind speed and direction. In the Dryden 
Wind Turbulence Model the turbulence is simulated by defining the spectral representations of white 
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noise passed through an appropriate forming filter. The longitudinal, lateral and vertical spectra are 
given as functions of the turbulence intensities, turbulence scale lengths and the airspeed of the aircraft 
flying through a frozen turbulence field with a given spatial frequency.  
4.4.1.1 Wind direction and wind speed 
 
In a first step the influence of the steady wind direction and wind speed shall be discussed without 
considering influence of turbulence. The standard parameters for the simulation were chosen and the 
wind direction varied between 5° and 355° in steps of 10°. This process was repeated for a steady 
wind speed of 1 m/s, 5 m/s and 10 m/s. All simulation parameters are again summarized in Table 4-2.  
 
Aircraft 
mass 
Aircraft  
CG 
VTAS Initial 
altitude 
Wind 
direction 
Wind 
speed 
Turbulence 
intensity 
64.5 t 22.2% 70 m/s 609.6 m 
(2000 ft) 
5°-355° 1 m/s 
5 m/s 
10 m/s 
off 
Table 4-2 Parameter set to evaluate impact of steady state wind direction and wind speed 
The following Figure 21 shows the touchdown points on the runway for different wind scenarios. The 
edges of the runway are shown in black, the touchdown box described in Section 3.1 is shown in red, 
the touchdown points are shown as black crosses for a steady wind at a reference height of 6 m above 
ground of 10 m/s, as magenta boxes for 5 m/s and cyan asterisks for 1 m/s. All scenarios use the Con-
tinuous Dryden Wind Turbulence Model and the Wind Shear Model to simulate the boundary layer 
effect.  Additionally, the red diamond shows the touchdown point for the ideal case without any wind.  
 
Figure 21 Touchdown points on runway for wind from 5° to 355° in steps of 10°. Black crosses show a steady 
wind of 10/s, magenta boxes 5m/s and cyan asterisks 1m/s. The red diamond shows the no wind scenario. 
It can be seen that in this case all touchdown points are located well within the touchdown box and 
thus all landings can be classified as successful. However, it is also apparent that there is a large spread 
of the touchdown points that increases with increasing steady wind speed. A more detailed view on the 
touchdown points is shown in Figure 22 and Figure 23. 
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Figure 22 Dispersion of the touchdown points on the runway with steady wind of 10 m/s, 5 m/s and 1 m/s from 
directions between 5° and 355° in steps of 10°. The limits of the x-axis correspond to the limits of the touchdown 
box. 
 
Figure 23 Touchdown point as function of the direction of the steady wind of 10 m/s, 5 m/s and 1 m/s for a run-
way heading of 265° 
For the scenario with a steady wind of 10 m/s the touchdown points vary between 181 m for a pure 
headwind and 586 m behind the LTP for a pure tailwind. It should be mentioned, however, that the 
case of a 10 m/s tailwind component is usually out of the autopilot specifications. In those cases the 
opposite runway direction would be used in order to land into the wind wherever possible. The distri-
bution of the touchdown points is not symmetric in the longitudinal direction around the nominal 
touchdown point but skewed towards the land-long side. The distance between the earliest and latest 
touchdown also decreases with the steady wind speed from a distance of about 210 m for a 5 m/s to 
about 56 m for the 1 m/s wind case. Even though this value considers also tailwind landings, a tail-
wind component of up to 1 m/s is very realistic and should be considered in a nominal scenario.  
The cross-track errors remain between about 1 m on one side and 1.8 m on the other side of the run-
way center line. The asymmetry results from the fact that all approaches simulated here were inter-
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cepting the extended runway centerline from the same side. Due to the design of the autopilot small 
deviations are not corrected in order to avoid oscillations caused by frequent changes of the sign of the 
residual lateral deviation. Thus a small steady state error remains in the simulated landings leading to 
the observable asymmetry of the touchdown points with respect to the runway centerline. 
In summary, the steady wind component has a large influence on where the autopilot will put the air-
craft onto the runway. From only these steady wind results, the approach to make an allocation be-
tween the NSE and FTE on an aircraft based on a nominal touchdown point, already shows significant 
deficits as the nominal touchdown point is greatly affected by the winds. Apart from the steady wind 
component, also turbulence of different intensities has a significant effect onto the touchdown behav-
ior. The effect is investigated more in detail in the next section.  
4.4.1.2 Turbulence intensity 
 
After just investigating the influence of the steady wind on the touchdown performance, the results in 
this section show the influence of turbulence in addition to the steady wind. To illustrate the effect, the 
same parameter set is chosen as before, now adding turbulence to the wind (see Table 4-3). The first 
set of simulations assumes wind speeds of 1 m/s, 2.5 m/s and 5 m/s with the turbulence intensity set to 
“low”, i.e. a probability of exceedance of the high altitude intensity of 10-2 in the Dryden Wind Turbu-
lence Model block in Simulink. For each of the three steady wind speeds 500 simulation runs were 
performed.  
Aircraft 
mass 
Aircraft  
CG 
VTAS Initial 
altitude 
Wind 
direction 
Wind 
speed 
Turbulence 
intensity 
64.5 t 22.2% 70 m/s 609.6 m 
(2000 ft) 
265° 1 m/s 
2.5 m/s 
5 m/s 
light (10-2) 
light (10-2) 
light (10-2) 
Table 4-3 Parameter set used in autoland simulations to evaluate impact of turbulence.  
The autopilot model used for the simulations was designed for a limited range of winds. Depending on 
the turbulence intensity, wind speeds above about 10 kts (=5.14 m/s) would cause landings outside of 
the touchdown zone. When also considering different turbulence intensities a number of unsuccessful 
landings can be observed for a steady wind component of 5 m/s. Thus, wind speeds larger than 5 m/s 
were not considered in this simulation. Figure 24 shows the results for 500 simulated landings with 
light turbulence.  
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Figure 24 Touchdown points for 500 landings with light turbulence and steady wind of 5 m/s, 2.5 m/s and 1 m/s 
The results for the same set of simulations using moderate and severe turbulence settings in the simu-
lation model yielded similar results in terms of mean and dispersion of the points. While for the 1 m/s 
and 2.5 m/s cases there is almost no change coming from the different turbulence settings, a slight and 
steady increase in the dispersion is visible for the 5 m/s case for turbulence intensities of 10-2 (light), 
10-3 (moderate) to 10-5 (severe). This increase in the dispersion of the points with increasing steady 
wind speed is expected, since the magnitudes of the wind changes in the turbulence is defined relative 
to the steady reference wind. For 1 m/s and 2.5 m/s all touchdowns were successful. For the 5 m/s case 
7 out of 500 landings occurred beyond the touchdown zone and 2 even beyond the end of the runway. 
For the purpose of this study, only the touchdown points within the touchdown zone are considered for 
the more detailed evaluations. The other points are neglected, acknowledging the fact, that the autopi-
lot design used in this study would not fully meet the autoland requirements discussed in Chapter 3.1. 
An operational justification for omitting the points outside of the touchdown box is the use of a warn-
ing system preventing long landings. If detected, such a runway overrun protection system would 
prompt a go-around.  
The mean of all touchdown points is generally located close to the case where only a steady wind 
without turbulence was simulated (depicted in Figure 21). The means for 5 m/s, 2.5 m/s and 1 m/s 
wind with light turbulence are located at 283.49 m (277.78 m without turbulence), 319.89 m 
(323.30 m without turbulence) and 347.25 m (352.82 m without turbulence) behind the LTP.  
Apart from the mean value, especially the dispersion of the touchdown points is of interest. While the 
mean value would relate to the nominal touchdown point, the dispersion drives the FTEσ . Special care 
has to be taken when evaluating the dispersion and describing it as standard deviation of a Gaussian 
distribution (as is being done when working with FTEσ ). Figure 25 shows a histogram of the distribu-
tion of the touchdown points behind the LTP for the same three steady wind scenarios as before and 
severe turbulence.  
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Figure 25 Histogram of the touchdown points behind the LTP for different steady wind scenarios and severe 
turbulence with 500 simulation runs for each case. The bins were selected at a width of 10 m. 
It is obvious from the histogram and confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov [68] and the Anderson-
Darling test for normality [69] at a 5% significance level that the distribution of data points is not 
Gaussian distributed. The resulting distribution is asymmetric and skewed. Especially for larger wind 
speeds, the land long side has significantly more points at large distances behind the core of the distri-
bution than landings that occurred close to the beginning of the runway. Figure 26 shows a quantile-
quantile plot of the distribution of the touchdown points for a steady wind of 5 m/s and severe turbu-
lence with the Gaussian fit curve (fitted to the data between 25th and 75th percentile). One data point 
where the aircraft touched down far behind the end of the runway is excluded from the data set and the 
graph as this “floating” of the aircraft is to be considered a weak point of the model rather than a case 
that would likely occur. As previously mentioned, also the data points of the landings that occurred 
outside the touchdown box are disregarded for the statistical analysis but shown here for illustration 
purposes. In this plot, samples from a Gaussian distribution would appear as a straight line. While the 
core of the data is very close to linear, it can be seen that the tails, especially on the land long side, 
appear non-linear in this way of plotting. This is a result from the non-Gaussian distribution of the data 
in the tails.  
In order to describe the distribution and not underestimate the risk of landing outside of the touchdown 
box two different methods are discussed. The first one is a process called overbounding. In this pro-
cess a Gaussian distribution is used to describe the touchdown dispersion in such a way that the mass 
in the tails of the overbounding distribution is larger than the mass of the sample. The blue solid line in 
Figure 26 shows a Gaussian overbound as determined in the following. The second method is model-
ling the touchdown points by a Johnson distribution that allows a better description of the obtained 
results.  
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Figure 26 Quantile-quantile plot for simulated touchdown points (5 m/s steady wind component with severe 
turbulence, magenta crosses) with Gaussian fit for data between the 25th and 75th percentile (red dash-dotted 
line). The blue solid line shows the Gaussian overbound as determined in the following.  
 
Gaussian Overbounding 
In order to describe the data by a Gaussian distribution an experimental overbound of the data is de-
rived based on an evaluation of the cumulative distribution function (CDF). The overbounds are de-
fined such that  
 
( ) ( ) 1.5
( ) ( ) 1.5
overbound overbound
overbound overbound
x x x NTDP
x x x NTDP
Φ ≥ Φ ∀ ≤ − ⋅σ
Φ ≤ Φ ∀ ≥ + ⋅σ
 (51) 
where ( )
x
f x dx
−∞
Φ = ∫  is the CDF of a random variable x with a Gaussian probability density function 
(PDF). In this way it is ensured that the mass in the tails of the Gaussian overbound is larger than that 
of the sample obtained by Monte-Carlo simulations. Note that the overbounding condition in Equation 
(51) is only chosen to hold in the tails of the distribution outside 1.5 overbound± σ , but not necessarily at the 
core. The measure of 1.5 overbound± σ  appears to be a reasonable choice for the data at hand, however, it is 
not a fixed quantity. It should rather give some flexibility to not having to choose overly large over-
bounding sigmas in order to accommodate data at the core of the distribution while the interest of en-
suring a safe landing is rather in the tails of the distribution. Also note that for choosing an overbound-
ing distribution the NTDP has to be chosen or determined. As can be seen in Figure 25, the NTDP 
depends on the head wind component, and, as will be shown later in Section 4.4.2, also on the aircraft 
mass and location of the center of gravity. In the context of this study the NTDP for the Gaussian 
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overbound was set to the touchdown point for the simulation scenario with the parameters given in 
Table 4-2, with no wind, shown by the red diamond in Figure 21 and Figure 22 at a distance of 
364.5 m behind the runway threshold. It should be noted that the choice of the NTDP, however, affects 
also the overbounding sigma so that for different choices of NTDP also different overbounds will be 
obtained.  
With the conditions from Equation (51) the resulting experimental overbounding standard deviation of 
the FTE in the 5 m/s and severe turbulence case was found to be 147.1 m (see also Figure 26). The 
CDF and 1-CDF plots for the obtained autoland results and the experimental overbound are depicted 
in Figure 27. The blue dashed line shows the CDF of the sample, the blue solid line shows 1-CDF of 
the sample. The red lines show the experimental overbound and are centered at the NTDP. The black 
line indicates the 1.5 overbound± σ  interval for which the overbounding condition (51) does not necessarily 
have to be fulfilled.  
 
Figure 27 Semi logarithmic CDF and 1-CDF plots for the sample data (blue for 5 m/s wind and severe turbu-
lence) and corresponding overbound (red) with NTDP at x=364.5 m determined by a landing without wind. 
It can be seen that due to the asymmetry of the results, the overbound is driven by data on one side of 
the distribution, the land-long case in this example. For the other simulated cases the overbounds and 
Gaussian fits were derived in the same way as described for the two cases and are summarized in Ta-
ble 4-4. Together with the sigmas, the median of the data set is listed in order to show an indication of 
the distance between the NTDP in the case without wind and the location of the core of the experi-
mental distribution. Furthermore, the p-value of the Anderson-Darling test for normality is given. The 
p-value is used in hypothesis testing and compared to a significance level of choice (typically 5% or 
1%) in order to decide if the sample data is from the assumed distribution. A p-value smaller than the 
significance level leads to a rejection of the H0-hypothesis that the sample data is drawn from a given 
(Gaussian) distribution. The results show for all overbounds p-values in the order of 10-6 indicating a 
significant deviation from the assumed normal distribution. That is, however, not surprising as the data 
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indicates a non-Gaussian distribution and the overbound is defined with the target to use a Gaussian 
distribution with more mass in the tails than the obtained sample. It is explicitly not aiming at provid-
ing a good fit to the data. Finally, the table also includes the calculated probabilities of landing outside 
the touchdown box (land short and land long case) assuming the NTDP at 364.53 m behind the thresh-
old and the touchdown dispersion described by the overbounding FTEσ . It can be seen that the critical 
case is always the land short case since the Gaussian distribution is symmetric and the NTDP is locat-
ed closer to the beginning of the touchdown zone.  
 
Wind 
Gaussi-
an fit 
FTEσ   
(m) 
Gaussian 
overbound 
FTEσ  
(m) 
Median 
(m) 
p-value 
of AD 
test for 
overb. 
Prob.of 
landing short 
(overbound) 
Prob. of land-
ing long 
(overbound) 
1 m/s, lgt turb. 16.0 27.4 347.1 1.200e-6 8.018e-29 (machine) 0 
1 m/s mod turb. 15.5 26.5 345.3 1.200e-6 1.119e-30 (machine) 0 
1 m/s sev turb 16.2 27.6 345.1 1.200e-6 1.959e-11 (machine) 0 
2.5 m/s lgt turb. 45.7 88.3 315.2 1.200e-6 2.935e-4 1.040e-7 
2.5 m/s mod turb. 44.5 85.5 316.5 1.200e-6 1.925e-4 4.112e-8 
2.5 m/s sev turb 44.5 70.9 315.7 1.200e-6 9.294e-6 5.021e-11 
5 m/s lgt turb. 106.8 144.4 265.1 1.222e-6 1.777e-2 7.493e-4 
5 m/s mod turb. 108.4 152.2 263.1 1.217e-6 2.306e-2 1.297e-3 
5 m/s sev turb. 110.8 147.1 267.4 1.222e-6 1.953e-2 9.145e-4 
Table 4-4 FTEσ evaluated for Gaussian fit and Gaussian overbounding for different wind and turbulence intensity 
together with the corresponding median of the simulated scenario, the resulting land short and land long proba-
bilities and the p-value of the Anderson-Darling test as goodness of fit measure.  
Johnson Distribution 
A different approach than Gaussian overbounding is modelling the touchdown performance by a dis-
tribution that fits better to the observed data. The Johnson distribution is a four-parametric distribution 
that is “often applied to FTE and TSE data” [70] because it allows a better description of the skewness 
and kurtosis of the obtained results than a Gaussian distribution. The distribution is obtained by a 
transformation of the normal distribution as    
 ( )z g yγ δ= +  (52) 
where xy ξ
λ
−
= , x is the random variable to be described, z is standard normal distributed random 
variable, ( )g y is an appropriate transformation function, and , ,  and γ δ ξ λ are the four parameters of the 
Johnson distribution. In [71] Johnson describes three different types of distributions that are derived 
from a transformation of the form of (52).  
- SL for the log-normal type (or semi bounded) obtained by putting ( ) ln( )g y y=  with the PDF 
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 ( )
21 ln( )
2( )  with 0 and thus 
2
y
SLf y e y xy
γ δδ
ξ
λ π
− +
= > >  (53) 
- SB for the bounded case that is also obtained by putting ( ) ln
1
yg y
y
 
=  − 
 with PDF  
 
2
1
ln( )
2 1( )  with 0 and thus 
12 (1 )
y
y
SB
yf y e x
yy y
γ δδ
ξ ξ λ
π
 
− + 
− = > < < +
−−
 (54) 
- SU for the unbounded case obtained by putting ( )1( ) sinhg y y−= with the resulting PDF  
 ( )
2
21 ln ( 1)
2
2
( )  with y  and 
2 ( 1)
y y
SUf y e x
y
γ δδ
π
 − + + + 
 = ∈ ∈
+
y y  (55) 
The simulated autoland data is analyzed by the Johnson Curve Toolbox for Matlab with the 
f_johnson_fit.m function that fits a Johnson distribution to observed data [72]. Based on a selected (or 
automatically chosen) fitting method (either based on moments or on quantiles) the appropriate type is 
chosen. Note that the SL and SB cases are, however, not defined for all values of x . That means that 
by using the SL or SB model not all values for the touchdown point are possible. This may not neces-
sarily be considered a suitable model, or if the probability for the undefined touchdown points is set to 
0 outside the ranges where it is defined, this may lead to an underestimation of the true risk of landing 
short or long. As for the Gaussian overbound, the CDF an 1-CDF for the observed data for the 5 m/s 
steady wind and severe turbulence case are analyzed and plotted. The fitting method based on quan-
tiles yields a closer match of the data than the moments based method for the analyzed dataset. The 
selected type is the unbounded distribution SU . Together with the CDF/1-CDF of the sample also the 
CDF and 1-CDF of the obtained Johnson distributions are shown in Figure 28. Compared to the results 
obtained by Gaussian overbounding in Figure 27, the Johnson distribution has a much better agree-
ment with the data. It should, however, also be noted that the Johnson fit does not ensure that the cu-
mulative probability of the fit is always larger than the sample data. In this example this is e.g. the case 
for the data between about 150 m and 210 m on the x-axis. In order to be conservative it is also possi-
ble to inflate the scale factor λ (for the SU case) such that the inflated Johnson fit safely bounds the 
tails of the sample data, if desired. 
4. FTE CONTRIBUTION - AUTOPILOT SYSTEMS FOR AUTOMATIC LANDINGS 
 
76 
 
Figure 28 Semi logarithmic CDF and 1-CDF plots for the sample data (blue for 5 m/s wind and severe turbu-
lence) and corresponding CDF and 1-CDF of fitted SU Johnson distribution (red). 
Table 4-5 summarizes the obtained results for modelling the obtained results by a Johnson distribution 
that bounds the tail risk. The four parameters are listed, together with the type of the distribution 
(bounded and unbounded) and the fitting method (moments or quantiles). The table furthermore lists 
the p-values for the Anderson-Darling test for the described Johnson distribution.  
Wind γ  δ  ξ  λ  
Johnson 
type and 
fit method 
p value of 
AD test 
Probability 
of landing 
short 
Probability 
of landing 
long 
1 m/s, lgt turb. 0.584 1.455 305.130 102.221 SB / Q 0.828 0 0 
1 m/s mod turb. 1.475 2.717 277.285 185.892 SB / M 0.645 0 0 
1 m/s sev turb -0.598 2.154 337.068 31.746 SB / Q 0.105 7.043e-12 6.255e-12 
2.5 m/s lgt turb. -0.495 1.297 297.529 48.238 SU / Q 0.607 2.618e-4 2.292e-4 
2.5 m/s mod turb. -0.687 1.692 291.066 81.307 SU / Q 0.499 1.211e-4 1.195e-4 
2.5 m/s sev turb -0.449 1.476 301.097 60.805 SU / Q 0.443 2.142e-4 8.769e-5 
5 m/s lgt turb. -0.871 1.190 200.841 81.481 SU / Q 0.044 7.578e-3 8.708e-3 
5 m/s mod turb. -0.839 1.241 202.556 89.780 SU /Q 0.045 8.760e-3 7.570e-3 
5 m/s sev turb. -0.742 1.094 210.737 70.016 SU /Q 0.023 8.503e-3 8.377e-3 
Table 4-5 Parameters for a Johnson distribution describing the touchdown dispersion in different wind and turbu-
lence cases, together with the type and fitting method, the p-value of the Anderson-Darling test as goodness of fit 
measure and the resulting land short and land long probabilities. 
It can be seen that the p-values are significantly larger than for the Gaussian overbound indicating a 
better fit of the Johnson distribution to the data. For the 1 m/s and 2.5 m/s wind cases the H0-
hypothesis cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level. Finally, the table also includes the resulting 
probabilities of landing short or landing long, based on the chosen Johnson distribution. Note that for 
the first two cases in the bounded case the probability is zero which is probably an optimistic assertion 
of the risk. However, comparing the Gaussian overbound values for the land short and long probabili-
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ties in those cases the risk is extremely small. In the 2.5 m/s case the land short risks are in a compara-
ble order of magnitude, while the land long risk is assessed to be larger by the Johnson distribution 
than the Gaussian overbound due to the location of the NTDP closer to the beginning of the touch-
down zone. This result indicates that when using the Johnson distribution as model for the FTE per-
formance, it is not sufficient to consider the land short case only because it cannot be safely assumed 
that this case is driving the probability of landing outside the box.    
4.4.1.3 Realistic wind cases 
In order to also investigate a set of realistic wind speeds and directions, automatic airport weather re-
ports (METAR) from Munich airport were used as input for the autoland simulations. METARs are 
generated every 30 minutes (more often if significant changes of the weather conditions occur) and 
contain information about the mean wind speed and direction. If the difference between the average 
wind speed and peaks wind speeds in gusts is significant (> 5 kts) gusts are reported additionally. The 
month of November of the year 2012 was used as input for the simulations that included 1437 weather 
reports. Turbulence intensity was simulated again by applying the Dryden wind models with 2∙10-1 the 
probability of exceedance of high altitude intensity if the wind speed was below 10 kts, 10-1 for wind 
speeds above 10 kts, 10-2 if gusts were reported and remained at or below 20 kts, 10-3 if gusts were 
reported between 21 and 30 kts and 10-4 for gusts above 30 kts. The maximum tailwind component 
considered was 4 kts. Otherwise it can be assumed the approach and landing direction would have 
been changed. In the cases with a larger tailwind the wind direction was changed by 180° which would 
be equivalent to changing the landing direction on the runway. For each approach a random sample 
from a uniform distribution for the aircraft mass and location of the center of gravity in the specified 
ranges were drawn. All parameters are again summarized in Table 4-6.  
 
Aircraft 
mass 
Aircraft  
CG 
VTAS Initial 
altitude 
Wind 
direction 
Wind 
speed 
Turbulence 
intensity 
50-64.5 t 
(uniform 
distr.) 
15-45% 
(uniform 
distr.) 
70 m/s 609.6 m 
(2000 ft) 
as  
described 
as 
reported 
as 
described 
Table 4-6 Parameter set used in autoland simulations to evaluate impact realistic wind scenarios.  
 
Figure 29 shows the obtained touchdown points on the runway. Out of the 1437 simulation runs eight 
touchdowns occurred at behind the runway (seven of them outside the plot limits) and 14 touchdowns 
occurred outside the landing box. However, that again is considered to be a weakness of the model and 
those points would trigger a warning and a go-around of the aircraft in case they happened in reality. 
Figure 30 shows a QQ-plot (Quantile-Quantile) for the distribution of the touchdown points on the 
runway. The core of the distribution again appears very close to linear, however, the tails are signifi-
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cantly non-linear in this representation hinting at non-Gaussian distributed data. This result is again 
confirmed by the Anderson-Darling and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at a 5% significance level.  
 
Figure 29 Touchdown points on runway and in relation to the touchdown box for recorded winds from Munich 
Airport in November 2012 with uniform distributed landing weight and center of gravity location between their 
respective maximum and minimum values. 
 
Figure 30 Quantile-quantile plot for simulated touchdown points (recorded winds from Munich Airport in No-
vember 2012 with uniform distributed landing weight and center of gravity location between their respective 
maximum and minimum values) with Gaussian fit for data between the 25th and 75th percentile. 
The non-Gaussian distribution of the touchdown points requires again either a Gaussian overbound or 
the fit of a Johnson distribution to the obtained results. Both methods were applied and the results are 
shown in Figure 31. The Johnson SU curve with moments fitting method (
0.1987, 1.5788, 351.6510, 130.5373γ δ ξ λ= − = = = ) again provides a better fit to the experimental data 
than the Gaussian overbound ( , .364.53 , 147.22FTE overbm mµ = σ = ). Especially for the land-short case the 
overbound results in a significant over-estimation of the risk of landing outside the touchdown box. 
On the land-long side both methods yield similar results for estimating the risk of landing long, how-
ever, the Johnson curve is more shape-preserving that the Gaussian model.  
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Figure 31 Simulated touchdown points with recorded winds from Munich airport modelled by inflated Johnson 
curve and Gaussian overbound. 
In summary of the discussion of the wind and turbulence influence, it was shown that wind and turbu-
lence intensity have a significant impact on the touchdown point of the aircraft. With a certain prevail-
ing steady wind direction and wind speed the nominal touchdown point varies substantially. For the 
given aircraft and autopilot model the variation of the touchdown point for a headwind and a tailwind 
scenario with a steady wind of 5 m/s were in the range of about 200 m. Considering also turbulence in 
addition to the steady wind causes the touchdown points to vary additionally about the respective 
nominal touchdown points. In the requirement derivation process this variation is described as stand-
ard deviation of a Gaussian distribution. It was, however, found that only the core of the resulting dis-
tribution of the touchdown points was close to Gaussian while for the tails the Gaussian distribution 
was not a good fit (visible in the QQ plots). Thus, an overbound was determined in order to not under-
estimate the tail probability that is of special interest in this kind of integrity evaluations. Furthermore, 
it was also found that the touchdown points are more spread out for the land long case than for the 
land short case (floating of the aircraft in the ground effect) and the overbound of FTEσ  is thus usually 
driven by the land-long case. For all cases it is challenging to define an NTDP. While based on simula-
tions an NTDP can be found by not simulating any wind influence, this may not in general be a good 
and valid assumption for a specific approach with a steady wind component.  
Finally, modelling the touchdown errors by a Johnson distribution yielded significantly better results 
in terms of goodness of fit. The shape of the distribution was matching the shape of the actual distribu-
tion better than a Gaussian distribution. It is therefore preferable to use a Johnson distribution to model 
the touchdown performance.   
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4.4.2 Aircraft mass and center of gravity location 
In addition to the wind, also the aircraft mass and location of the center of gravity (CG) have an influ-
ence on the touchdown performance. These parameters usually vary for each flight. In order to keep 
the aircraft in safe flying conditions and within the load limits during take-off, cruise flight and touch-
down, the range of permissible aircraft masses and corresponding location of the center of gravity is 
specified in the weight and balance sheet for each aircraft. An example for such a sheet from the man-
ual of the Airbus A320 is given in Figure 32. The weight and CG combinations indicated by the red 
box in Figure 32 are considered for the simulations of the touchdown performance. The landing 
weight was varied from 50 t to 64 t and the CG location between 15% and 45% of the mean aerody-
namic chord (MAC). For the Airbus A320 this corresponds to CG locations of 16.9 m and 18.1 m be-
hind the nose of the aircraft. No wind influence was considered, the approaches were again started 
below the glide path and with an initial lateral offset of 102 m. The simulation parameters are again 
summarized in Table 4-7 and the outcome shown in Figure 33. 
Aircraft 
mass 
Aircraft  
CG 
VTAS Initial 
altitude 
Wind 
direction 
Wind 
speed 
Turbulence 
intensity 
50-64 t 
(steps of 
1 t) 
15-45% 
(steps of 
5%) 
70 m/s 609.6 m 
(2000 ft) 
off off off 
Table 4-7 Parameter set used in autoland simulations to evaluate impact of center of gravity location and aircraft 
landing weight. 
The touchdown points show a significant dependency on the location of the weight and balance of the 
aircraft on the touchdown performance. The nominal touchdown point (without any wind influence) 
varied for the different combinations between 455.5 m (CG at 15% MAC and landing weight 64 t) and 
514.5 m (CG at 20% and landing weight 50 t) behind the runway threshold. In general it is observable 
that the touchdown point is closer to the threshold for more forward CG locations and higher landing 
weight, and moves further away from the threshold with decreasing weight and CG locations moving 
aft. As it used to be already difficult to define a meaningful NTDP for the different wind scenarios, the 
results in this simulation show that also the weight and balance of the aircraft impact the NTDP. 
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Figure 32 Weight and balance sheet for the Airbus A320 [73]. The area shown in red was used for simulation 
purposes.  
This once again points to the conclusion that it is problematic in the tradeoff between NSE and FTE to 
assume one fixed NTDP that should hold for all aircraft in all configurations and wind cases. Howev-
er, the landing weight of the aircraft and the location of the CG are quite well known quantities. It 
could thus be beneficial to leverage this knowledge inside the aircraft in order to use a more realistic 
value for the NTDP. This can be done either by following the standard method to assume an NTDP 
(now chosen once according to weight and balance of the aircraft on approach) with a Gaussian distri-
bution modelling the FTE. The other alternative is to use a better description of the actual touchdown 
performance, e.g. by modelling it as a Johnson distribution and derive the NSE requirements from 
these results. The potential benefit of using existing knowledge about landing weight and CG location 
when doing the Johnson distribution modelling is shown in the next section. A description how the 
tradeoff between NSE and FTE based on a Johnson distribution can be accomplished follows in Sec-
tion 4.6.  
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Figure 33 Touchdown point with no wind as function of aircraft mass and center of gravity location. 
4.5 EXEMPLARY LEVERAGING OF KNOWLEDGE BY RESTRICTING PARAMETERS 
One of the main paradigms followed in this work is to use available information to improve models, 
reduce conservatism and therefore gain in performance of the autoland system. The autoland simula-
tions in the last section were performed by varying a number of influencing parameters in order to 
obtain results that somehow cover the whole range of possible parameter combinations. However, the 
results may not be completely representative for a specific approach with a given set of aircraft param-
eters, such as weight and center of gravity location. Therefore, it is beneficial to actually take into ac-
count known parameters and obtain better and more realistic results. As example, the results from Sec-
tion 4.4.1.3 (realistic wind scenarios from Munich Airport) are reused and compared to a case where 
the same parameter set is used for simulations but the landing weight and CG location are fixed at a 
specific value, 64.5 t and 22.2% as example. Both simulation runs contained 1437 runs (corresponding 
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to the weather reports for the month of November 2012 downloaded from [74]) and the other parame-
ters used are again summarized in Table 4-8. The results are shown in Figure 34. 
 
Aircraft 
mass 
Aircraft  
CG 
VTAS Initial 
altitude 
Wind 
direction 
Wind 
speed 
Turbulence 
intensity 
64.5 t 
 
22.2% 70 m/s 609.6 m 
(2000 ft) 
as  
described 
as 
reported 
as 
described 
Table 4-8 Parameter set used in autoland simulations to evaluate impact of fixing parameters.  
 
Figure 34 Johnson curves (red and green) modelling the touchdown point distribution for the full range of pa-
rameters (blue) and the distribution for a specific loading condition of the aircraft (black).  
When restricting the number of parameters varying in the autoland simulations of course also the vari-
ation of the touchdown points is reduced. For this case of considering only the wind influence as ran-
dom influence but not the weight and CG location, the difference in assessing the land short probabil-
ity changes from 34.959 10−⋅  to 34.363 10−⋅ . For the land long case, the change from 31.884 10−⋅  to 
31.203 10−⋅  is somewhat larger than for the land short case. Less variation in the touchdown points can 
then be leveraged in the trade-off between NSE and FTE error budgets as will be described in the next 
section. Similar to the aircraft mass and center of gravity location, it is also possible to leverage any 
knowledge that might be available about the range of expected winds and other parameters not consid-
ered in this exemplary study (such as radar altimeter performance, runway slope, etc.).   
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4.6 APPLICATION TO NSE/FTE TRADE-OFF  
The results from the previous sections in this chapter show that the touchdown performance is subject 
to a variety of different influencing parameters. The obtained results for the simulated touchdown per-
formance cannot, in general, be expected to follow a Gaussian distribution. Therefore, two approaches 
to describe the obtained simulation results were discussed: Gaussian overbounding and modelling the 
results by a Johnson distribution.  
The former method has the advantage of simplicity. As described in Equation (28) in Section 3.2, the 
TSE is the root sum square of the NSE and FTE, assuming both can be properly described by a Gauss-
ian distribution. In that way, a trade-off between the two is easily possible. Fitting the touchdown data 
to a Gaussian distribution may result in underestimating the risk of landing outside of the touchdown 
box and should therefore be avoided. In order to maintain safety, a Gaussian overbound can be used 
that has more mass in the tails of the distribution than the sample obtained from the autoland simula-
tions. This method, however, introduces a lot of conservatism and does not yield optimal results.  
Furthermore, when evaluating the TSE against the landing box requirement, a mean value for the 
Gaussian distribution has to be defined, namely the NTDP. The NTDP is also variable depending on 
the weight and balance as well as external influences, such as steady winds.   
The other method discussed was to use a Johnson distribution to model the autoland performance, 
potentially also with inflating the distribution’s shape parameter to ensure that the tail probabilities are 
not underestimated. For the obtained data this method yielded a significantly better description of the 
touchdown performance than the Gaussian model. However, when assuming the FTE to be Johnson 
distributed while the NSE can reasonably be assumed to be Gaussian distributed, the tradeoff between 
NSE and TSE is not as simple as in the case of two Gaussian distributions. Modelling the joint proba-
bility of the sum of two random variables with different independent distributions f  and g the joint 
PDF can be described by the convolution of the two distributions as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )f g x f x y g y dy
∞
−∞
∗ = −∫  (56) 
For the case of touchdown performance evaluation let e.g. ( )f x  be the Gaussian distributed PDF of 
the NSE and ( )g x the PDF of the Johnson distributed FTE. Then the joint PDF p  for the touchdown 
point x  can be described as  
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 (57) 
for the case of a Johnson SU distribution and the NSE with zero mean. In the case of different distribu-
tions (as it is the case in this study) it is generally not possible to derive a simple analytic limiting con-
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dition for NSEσ as in the case of two Gaussian distributions (the assumption in the derivation of the 
requirements described in Chapter 3). However, this tradeoff can always be solved numerically, with 
special care for numerical stability and accuracy of the chosen integration method. The effort of this 
method is similar in terms of simulation effort. Additional simulations may have to be run when cer-
tain parameters are restricted (such as the landing weight and CG) such that in a later trade-off a more 
realistic model can be used. 
The land short condition for the nominal case (previously described in Chapter 3 based on the assump-
tion of Gaussian distributed NSE and FTE) can then be formulated as 
 
61
6( 61 ) ( ) 10
m
p x m p x dx −
−∞
< = ≤∫  (58) 
and similarly for the land long case  
 6
823
( 823 ) ( ) 10
m
p x m p x dx
∞
−> = ≤∫  (59) 
 
with ( )p x  from Equation (57) (or with a different PDF for a model other than the Johnson SU) and the 
land short limit at 200 ft (≈61 m) behind the runway threshold and the land long limit at 2700 ft 
(≈823 m) behind the threshold. Assuming the parameters from Section 4.4.1.3 with the realistic wind 
scenarios from Munich Airport (Johnson SU distributed FTE with
0.1987, 1.5788, 351.6510, 130.5373γ δ ξ λ= − = = = and a Gaussian distributed along-track NSE at touch-
down with 0NSEµ = and 
, 1.72 32.82
tan( ) tan(3 )
NSE vert
NSE
m m
GPA
σ
σ = = =
°
) the probability of landing short would be 
1.3e-3 and the probability of landing long is 3.5e-4. The PDF of the Gaussian NSE, the Johnson FTE 
and the convoluted TSE are shown in Figure 35.  
 
Figure 35 Probability density functions of NSE, FTE and TSE 
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Note again that for the autopilot and the simulated results at hand the required touchdown performance 
with a tolerable risk of landing outside of the box with a probability of not more than 10-6 could not be 
achieved.  
Apart from the nominal case, also the limit case (according to CS-AWO) condition has to be fulfilled. 
Deriving a limit case monitoring condition is also possible based on assuming a Johnson distributed 
FTE. As described in Section 3.1.2, in the limit case condition one influencing parameter is kept at its 
most adverse value while all other parameters vary according to their expected distributions. Thus, in 
addition to the nominal variations, an error due to the limit case has to be considered. While the land 
short limit remains at 200 ft the land long limit for the limit case is extended from 2700 ft to 3000 ft 
(≈914 m) and the probability of landing outside the box has to be smaller than 10-5. The land short and 
land long probabilities are varying according to their nominal distributions. Here again, the convolu-
tion of a Gaussian distribution (describing the NSE) and a Johnson distribution (describing the FTE) 
are used as described by Equation (57). The additional vertical position error vE  due to the limit case 
condition projects into the along-track domain by dividing the error by the tangent of the glide path 
angle. The land short and land long conditions can then be described as  
 
61
5( 61 ) ( ) 10
tan( )
m
vEp x m p x dx
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−
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and  
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914
( 914 ) ( ) 10
tan( )
v
m
E
p x m p x dx
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∞
−> = + ≤∫  (61) 
As previously described in Chapter 3, when assuming the NSE and FTE to be both normally distribut-
ed with known mean and standard deviation an easy limiting condition for the largest tolerable vertical 
position error vE , and thus (by assuming a largest allowable projection factor ,vert is  from the pseudor-
ange into the position domain) for the largest tolerable pseudorange error can be derived. When con-
sidering the actual touchdown performance of an aircraft with a more suitable model it becomes im-
possible to standardize such a simple limit as the shape of the TSE distribution, and thus also the re-
sulting shape of the limit on the pseudorange error is not known a priori. The limit imposed on the 
airborne GBAS monitors would rather have to be evaluated and be derived for each aircraft individual-
ly.  
Finally, also in the malfunction case modelling the FTE as Johnson distributed and the NSE is feasi-
ble. In the malfunction case the NSE and FTE are fixed at their 95th percentiles. The limit can then be 
described as  
 95%, 95%200 tan( )
v
landshort
E
ft NTDP FTE NSE
GPA
≤ − − −  (62) 
and 
 Application to NSE/FTE trade-off 
87 
 95%, 95% 3000tan( )
v
landlong
E
NTDP FTE NSE ft
GPA
+ + + ≤  (63) 
Note that due to the asymmetry of the FTE a different value for the land short and land long case 
needs to be used, while the same value for the 95th percentile of the NSE can be used due to the sym-
metry of the Gaussian distribution. From Equations (62) and (63) a limiting condition for the vertical 
error vE  and thus also the range error rE  can be derived as described for the limit case condition.  
 
The discussion in this chapter showed that assuming one nominal touchdown point and one Gaussian 
distributed performance model for describing the FTE at touchdown for all aircraft in all conditions 
can be a crude simplification of the actual encountered results. Fitting a Gaussian model to the touch-
down distribution is a commonly used approach [11], [75]. However, when deriving NSE require-
ments with tolerable risks on the order of 10-5 to 10-9 fitting of the FTE distribution only to a Gaussian 
distributed core and neglecting deviations from Normality and heavier tails can lead to a significant 
underestimation of the probability of landing outside the touchdown box and ultimately to NSE re-
quirements that do not in all cases ensure a safe landing.  
In this work two approaches to cope with this problem were discussed: the application of the Gaussian 
overbounding concept to derive a conservative FTEσ  that is large enough to safely bound the tail risk. 
In that way the concept of a simple derivation of requirements can be maintained at the price of having 
a very conservative description of the FTE performance. The other approach suggested the description 
of the FTE performance by a more suitable distribution, such as the Johnson SU distribution. In that 
way the actual FTE performance can be modelled much better than by a Gaussian distribution, requir-
ing significantly less conservatism in the trade-off between FTE and NSE performance. On the other 
hand, when considering an individual performance of a certain aircraft, and possibly also taking into 
account available knowledge about parameters, such as aircraft weight and balance, no standardization 
of a specific NSE performance is possible anymore. Instead, a probabilistic assessment has to be car-
ried out in order to derive the limitations necessary to ensure a safe landing in the nominal, limit and 
malfunction case. This would, however, enable the largest potential gains in performance that could 
then be leveraged e.g. to optimize touchdown and roll-out [76]. From a practical implementation per-
spective, it is likely that the approach of describing the touchdown performance as a Gaussian distribu-
tion will be maintained. For the remainder of this work, this concept is therefore applied. It should be 
noted, however, that with the considerations from this chapter, a change to better fitting models is al-
ways feasible. 
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5 NSE CONTRIBUTION AND IONOSPHERIC GRADIENT MON-
ITORING 
In this chapter, after a very brief discussion of the nominal NSE and its contributors, the issue of moni-
toring for ionospheric gradients in GBAS is discussed. The first part of this chapter discusses the ion-
ospheric monitor in the ground system that is required for GAST D. A new monitoring architecture for 
single frequency GBAS ground stations is developed and discussed. The monitoring is based on actual 
satellite geometry at the airport and, furthermore, on the use of the actual glide path angle of a given 
approach. This increases the monitoring threshold at most airports and thus improves system availa-
bility and continuity and fulfills the task of monitoring for ionospheric gradients in the ground system.  
In the second part an airborne monitor for a future dual-frequency GBAS is developed. This monitor is 
designed as airborne monitor so that it can leverage the actual FTE performance of a specific aircraft 
in specific conditions as described in the previous chapter. The monitor calculates pseudo-ionospheric 
delays from dual frequency GBAS corrections and compares them to a similar quantity calculated 
from dual frequency pseudorange measurements in the airborne system. The monitoring threshold is 
derived based on the FTE of the aircraft.   
Contributions:  
In this chapter an ionospheric gradient monitor for single frequency GAST D GBAS ground station is 
developed by adding an additional monitoring receiver. In contrast to existing algorithms and tech-
niques, the monitoring requirement is not fixed but takes into account the actual current satellite ge-
ometry. 
Furthermore, a dual frequency ionospheric monitor for future GBAS is developed that operates in the 
airborne system. Shifting the task of monitoring for ionospheric gradients to the airborne side enables 
an improved monitoring since no conservative assumptions about the airborne performance have to be 
made when deriving requirements for monitoring in a ground station.  
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In the previous two chapters the derivation process for GBAS navigation requirements and the FTE 
contribution as first main contributor to the TSE were described and discussed. In this chapter, a thor-
ough view is taken on the contribution of the NSE. The NSE is considered to consist of nominal errors 
(such as receiver noise and nominal multipath effects for example) and non-nominal errors (such as for 
example excessive ionospheric delay caused by a large ionospheric gradient). After a short general 
description of NSE contributors, a more detailed description of the ionospheric gradient problem fol-
lows. The rest of this chapter is then dedicated to mitigation strategies for the ionospheric threat, the 
most challenging part of the NSE bounding and integrity assurance in GBAS. The discussions extend 
from current single frequency systems to future dual frequency systems and are always aiming at us-
ing available knowledge about the nominal NSE (and FTE for the dual frequency monitor), in order to 
reduce the conservatism in the derivation of requirements. This bears the potential to mitigate availa-
bility issued faced by current GBAS due to generalized and usually very conservative assumptions.  
5.1 NOMINAL NSE  
A comprehensive list of what is considered as nominal NSE contributor is given in [13] and repro-
duced here for convenience: Nominal noise and multipath as well as radio frequency interference 
(RFI) below the specified interference mask in the ground and airborne subsystems are considered as 
contributors to the error budget. Furthermore nominal ionospheric and tropospheric effects are consid-
ered. Finally, also a budget exists for nominal ranging source errors including such things as nominal 
signal imperfections or (small) code-carrier divergence effects caused by the satellite hardware.  
In terms of integrity all these effects are accounted for in the protection level concept that was already 
described in Section 2.2.3.3. Nominal effects are easy to observe as they occur constantly. Therefore it 
is pretty straight forward to collect large amounts of data and build reliable models characterizing 
these effects. The situation becomes significantly more challenging when talking about non-nominal 
errors. 
5.2 NON-NOMINAL NSE  
Non-nominal error sources as described in [13] are considered to be single or multiple reference re-
ceiver hardware failures, a failure of the VDB, a failure of the processor architecture in the ground 
station, complex hardware and software failures, correlated multipath affecting multiple reference 
receivers, excessive code-carrier divergence, excessive acceleration of a satellite, erroneous GNSS 
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navigation data as provided by the satellite, a low power condition of a satellite signal, multiple rang-
ing source faults and finally non-nominal ionospheric gradients. 
In terms of integrity there is a variety of mitigation strategies for the different error sources. They con-
sist of monitoring for specific conditions in the airborne and ground subsystems, siting restrictions for 
reference antennas, non-nominal protection level calculations, or are sufficiently unlikely to occur or 
are not endangering the safe landing of the aircraft (see limit and malfunction case performance 
demonstration in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3). The most challenging threat to GBAS, however, remains 
the threat of ionospheric gradients. Its properties, as well as detection and mitigation strategies are 
described in the remainder of this section.  
5.3 IONOSPHERIC THREAT MODELS AND NECESSITY FOR AN IONOSPHERIC 
GRADIENT MONITOR 
The ionosphere is typically the largest single source of errors in single frequency GNSS navigation. 
Despite the fact that in a differential GNSS architecture, such as a GBAS, the largest portion of the 
error is removed by applying the generated corrections, a residual threat resulting from potential spa-
tial decorrelation of the ionospheric influence has to be considered. This is especially important when 
considering integrity aspects of the system. The ionosphere is an atmospheric layer that begins at an 
altitude of about 80 km above the surface of the earth and extends to an altitude of about 1000 km. It 
contains different layers with varying plasma densities. The ionization of the particles in the iono-
sphere is strongly influenced by the radiation from the sun and the interdependencies with the earth’s 
magnetic field. Thus, strong variations in the concentration of charged particles occur on a daily basis 
between day and night time. Furthermore, the periodic change of the number of sun spots results in a 
regular pattern, the so-called solar cycles. These cycles have a periodicity of about 11 years with vary-
ing intensity and are numbered starting from the beginning of detailed observations in the year 1755. 
The current cycle, since the year 2008 is thus number 24. The most significant gradients in the electron 
concentration of the ionosphere in a GBAS context were observed at the falling edge of cycle 23.  
From these past observations it has been seen that the occurrence of strong ionospheric activity affects 
single frequency GNSS users and can cause potentially large positioning errors. A differential GNSS 
architecture like GBAS can only mitigate the part of the ionosphere which is common to a user and an 
aircraft approaching a GBAS station. From a safety point of view the potential spatial decorrelation of 
the ionospheric impact between the aircraft and ground station is important to characterize and bound. 
Under quiet conditions the decorrelation is small but in extreme situations gradients could become a 
potential danger for aircraft during approach and landing. In order to assess the nominal as well as 
potential worst-case impact on an airborne user, error characteristics need to be evaluated and then 
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assessed in the GBAS context. For that reason, each country operating a GBAS is required to define 
its own ionospheric threat model. This model contains a worst case gradient which may be experi-
enced within the region of applicability but also the nominal ionospheric decorrelation for the location 
in quiet conditions. The nominal decorrelation is considered in the protection level in form of the vigσ
parameter (see Equation (22) in Section 2.2.2.3.5). The worst-case gradient is considered for integrity 
purposes and is the largest gradient from which the GBAS has to protect a user. In a GAST C station 
integrity parameters (usually vigσ  and/or gndσ ) are artificially inflated in order to increase the VPL of a 
user. The inflation is performed such that the user VPL becomes larger than the VAL for satellite ge-
ometries that could result in unacceptably large position errors [54]. In GAST D no parameter inflation 
is performed, however, a significant monitoring effort is necessary to detect severe ionospheric dis-
turbances and take appropriate action in case of detection. According to the final version SARPS the 
ionospheric gradient monitoring capability at an installation is determined for each approach. The 
ground station then broadcasts parameters for a linear error model that describes the largest residual 
error as a function of the distance of the corresponding runway threshold to the GBAS reference point. 
A larger distance would result in potentially larger residual errors. The distance between the ground 
station and the runway threshold can therefore be traded against the availability of the service. Togeth-
er with a Code-Carrier Divergence monitor in the ground station, and the airborne monitors, it was 
shown that all monitors combined can achieve effective protection of the users against ionospheric 
gradients with slopes and speeds corresponding to worst-case observations for mid-latitudes. However, 
for equatorial regions the ionospheric threat is more severe and remains to be validated for GAST D. 
While it would be desirable to have generally valid ionospheric threat models depending mainly on the 
geomagnetic latitude instead of political boundaries, current regulation requires GBAS threat models 
on a national level. They are derived based on worst-case historic measurements. This methodology, 
however, raises several questions in terms of reliability. The reliability of a model can be doubted if 
only data from a small country and/or data from only a small network are investigated. Furthermore, 
not all countries have a sufficient amount of historic data available to justify the validity of the model.  
Furthermore, even if the models are derived from a reasonably good network with sufficient historic 
data there is no guarantee that in the future more severe conditions may not arise. For that reason, any 
established threat space should be continuously monitored and the national threat space updated in 
case any observations are made which exceed the established models. Effort should also be made to 
harmonize models with respect to methodology of establishing the parameters, required network den-
sity and geomagnetic latitude. The following sections present the threat model parameters and exam-
ples of national threat models as they are currently valid at the time of writing.  
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5.3.1 The ionospheric threat model parameters 
An ionospheric threat model in the GBAS context is used to characterize and bound the error contribu-
tion in the nominal case, as well as during a worst-case ionospheric condition. Note that the values of 
all these models only refer to the delay experienced on the L1 frequency. As the ionospheric delay is a 
function of the total electron content (TEC) and the frequency of a signal, the threat models are differ-
ent when using signals in the L5 band (the delay and thus the largest gradient is inflated by a factor of 
about 1.8).  
The nominal conditions are described by the parameter vigσ . It is the expected standard deviation of 
the decorrelation of the ionospheric conditions which occurs over distance due to nominal variations in 
the ionosphere. The vigσ is used in the calculation of the total ionospheric uncertainty ionoσ  which was 
previously described in Equation (22) in Section 2.2.2.3.5. It is repeated here for convenience and 
readability and is given according to DO-253C [38] Section 2.3.12.3 as  
 ( 2 )iono vig air airPPF x vσ σ τ= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅  (64) 
The factor PPF is a vertical-to-slant obliquity factor depending on the elevation of the satellite under 
consideration, airx is the distance between the GBAS reference point and the aircraft, τ the smoothing 
filter time constant and airv the horizontal speed of the aircraft. The total ionospheric uncertainty is 
then further used to calculate the total uncertainty associated with the corrected measurement from a 
specific satellite and to calculate the protection level as error bound as described in Equation (19) in 
Section 2.2.3.1.  
The worst case decorrelation with distance introduced by an ionospheric gradient is described by the 
so-called “wedge model” which characterizes an ionospheric gradient as a linear ramp as shown in 
Figure 36. 
 
Figure 36 Model of an ionospheric ramp 
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The ionospheric gradient is characterized by three parameters: the slope g , the width w and the speed 
v at which the front is moving. These parameters are derived from networks of reference receivers and 
historical data. From these parameters the largest impact of such a disturbance on a user can be de-
rived in simulations as described e.g. by Harris and Murphy [55].The derivation of these parameters is 
the task of defining an ionospheric threat model. The results from these assessments for Germany, the 
Contiguous United States (CONUS) and Korea are described in the following sections and compared 
afterwards.  
5.3.2 CONUS ionospheric threat model 
The threat model for the ionospheric impact in the CONUS region was developed by Pullen et al. [43] 
based on data from the network of Continuously Operating Reference Stations (CORS). An automated 
process screened for apparent gradient and sorted out a large number of detected events which were 
caused by obvious receiver or data problems, such as high multipath, cycle slips or other events typi-
cally caused by a non-optimal receiver location. Further manual analysis of the remaining events was 
performed to exclude apparent errors which were not detected by the algorithms. From the remaining 
set of validated events the ionospheric threat model parameters were derived. The largest gradient 
from validated data was found in data from 20 November 2003, where a gradient of 412mm/km was 
observed. Furthermore, a dependency on the elevation el of the satellite was found resulting in a 
piecewise linear threat model with maximum gradients g given by  
 
375 / for 15°
375 ( 15) / for 15° 65
425 / for 65
mm km el
g el mm km el
mm km el
<
≤ + − ≤ < °
 > °
 (65) 
The corresponding front speeds were found to be below 750 m/s with respect to the ionospheric pierce 
points in a thin shell ionosphere model and the front width were between 25 km and 200 km.  
5.3.3 German ionospheric threat model 
The model for Germany was established in 2009 by Mayer et al. [44]. It is based on measurements 
taken over the period of one solar cycle (11 years) between the years 1998 and 2008. In a first step, a 
pre-screening of data from latitudes between 45°N and 58°N was performed to find days with high 
ionospheric activity. Next, a denser network of reference receivers within Germany only was used to 
derive the threat model parameters. In total 26 events were considered and analyzed. The observations 
also found some significant gradients, however far from the magnitude found in the CONUS region. 
The largest gradient was found to be 118 mm/km with a similar dependency on satellite elevation as in 
the US. The German threat model is thus also described by a piecewise linear model given as 
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 (66) 
The corresponding speeds of the ionospheric events were found to be up to 1200 m/s and thus larger 
than the 750 m/s found in the CONUS region. However, those high speeds were only observed for 
events with a slope below 50 mm/km. For events with a larger slope the corresponding front speeds 
remained below 400 m/s and thus well below the values found in CONUS. The potentially resulting 
errors for a GBAS GAST C user were thus found to be within an acceptable range.  
5.3.4 Korean ionospheric threat model  
For South Korea Kim et al. [45] made the assessments of the ionospheric gradient assessment. The 
largest gradient was found on October 11th 2004 with a slope of 138.5 mm/km. In contrast to the pre-
viously described models the Korean results did not show larger gradients for higher elevation satel-
lites. In fact the largest gradient was found on a satellite at just about 25° elevation. It is thus proposed 
that the threat space for Korea is not elevation dependent but flat such that 160 mm/kmg ≤ . 
5.3.5 Ionospheric threat model discussions 
Figure 37 shows a comparison of the threat models for the CONUS region, Germany and Korea. 
While all regions are located in mid geomagnetic latitudes, the threat model for CONUS shows signif-
icantly larger bounds than the ones for Germany and Korea.  
 
Figure 37 Comparison of ionospheric threat models for CONUS, Germany and Korea 
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All the events which were shaping the threat spaces were observed in solar cycle 23 after the maxi-
mum in the decaying phase in the years 2001-2004. Due to the rare occurrence of significant events 
the number of data points from which the threat spaces result is very small. In Korea events on 22 and 
in Germany only 26 days passed the pre-screening and were considered as potentially relevant for the 
threat space. In the current solar cycle 24 there were to the date of writing no events recorded which 
exceeded the previously defined boundaries. However, due to the limited knowledge about future ion-
ospheric events and their magnitudes the threat spaces should be continuously reviewed and potential-
ly updated in case new events in the future exceed the bounds of the current models. Such a monitor-
ing is implemented in the US [79]. 
The ionospheric threat models described here are, however, only based on observations of so-called 
travelling ionospheric disturbances, i.e. large scale effects typically occurring in auroral to mid-
latitudes on a very rare basis. When looking at equatorial regions even steeper gradients can be found. 
Recent studies on the ionospheric threat space in Brazil found a largest gradient of about 850 mm/km 
[80]. Gradients in these regions that are significant for GBAS occur much more frequently (on a daily 
to weekly basis) and are caused by a different phenomenon, called plasma bubble. It is currently un-
clear whether these phenomena can still be assumed to be non-nominal and how to ensure sufficient 
protection against these extreme gradients while maintaining an acceptable level of availability. Also 
studies in the Asia-Pacific region found gradients larger than the ones from CONUS. They have estab-
lished a threat space assuming gradients up to 600 mm/km [81].    
5.4 MONITORING FOR IONOSPHERIC GRADIENTS IN THE GROUND SUBSYSTEM 
As described in Section 2.2.3.3 about the integrity in GBAS, several different monitors are included in 
the GBAS architecture to address different areas of the total ionospheric threat space. Temporal gradi-
ents will be detected by either the Code-Carrier-Divergence (CCD) monitor in the ground or airborne 
subsystem or the airborne Dual Solution Ionospheric Gradient Monitoring Algorithm (DSIGMA). 
However, there is one scenario where a rising satellite is affected by an ionospheric front which travels 
in a similar direction and at a similar speed (relating to the speed of the ionospheric pierce points, i.e. 
the intersection points of the ionosphere with the line of sight vectors between aircraft and satellite) so 
that it could be potentially undetectable to the CCD and DSIGMA monitors. For that specific situation 
a non-temporal monitoring scheme for gradients is necessary which can determine if a potentially 
dangerous ionospheric condition prevails. 
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5.4.1 The Absolute Ionospheric Gradient Monitor 
The method which will be used to detect such an absolute gradient was developed by Khanafseh et al. 
[32]. It is based on forming double differences of carrier phase measurements between the GBAS ref-
erence receivers and pairs of satellites. In a first step, the single difference φ∆  is formed:  
 T Ibxe n b φφ τ λ ε∆∆ = + ∆ + ⋅∆ + ∆ +

  (67) 
In this equation e  is the unit line of sight vector from the reference receiver to the satellite, bx
  is the 
baseline vector between the two reference antennas between which the single difference is formed, 
τ∆  is the differential receiver clock bias between the two reference receivers, λ  is the wavelength of 
the carrier frequency (19 cm for L1), n∆  is the single difference of the integer ambiguities of the car-
rier phase measurements, Ib∆ the differential ionospheric delay (the parameter of interest), and φε∆ the 
single difference carrier phase noise. In order to remove the differential receiver clock bias two single 
differences for two different satellites are used to form a double difference. When rewriting the differ-
ential ionospheric delay in terms of a gradient g  multiplied with the baseline vector bx between the 
two reference receivers the carrier phase double difference 2φ∆  can be written as  
 22 2T b bxe n g x φφ λ ε∆∆ = ∆ + ⋅∆ + ⋅ +

   (68) 
With a precise knowledge of the baseline bx
  it is possible to subtract the first term on the right hand 
side of the equation. The remaining parts are now the integer ambiguities, the ionospheric error and 
the double difference phase noise. Since it is known that the integer ambiguities can only take integer 
values a test statistic s can be formed as 
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
 (69) 
This test statistic measures how well the difference between the double differenced carrier phase 
measurements and the projection of the line of sight vectors on the baseline agree with a multiple of 
the integer ambiguity. In an ideal noise and ionospheric free case the test statistic would equal zero. A 
differential ionospheric error causes the test statistic to increase. Due to the rounding periodic unde-
tectabilities occur at the integer multiples of λ . The double difference phase noise in the measurement 
impacts the monitor performance significantly. Once the test statistic is small it is impossible to decide 
if the source of the deviation from zero is due to noise or an ionospheric impact. Experimental valida-
tions of the monitor have shown that the carrier phase noise for each antenna has to remain in the 
range of 3-10 mm, depending on baseline length for the monitor to yield sufficient performance [32]. 
Note that this value includes corrections for the antenna phase center variations and movements of the 
antenna due to wind. In order to achieve a false alarm rate low enough to comply with operational 
requirements, according to the original proposal of the monitor, a prior probability on the order of 10-5 
of an ionospheric front occurring has to be assumed. After implementation in several test locations and 
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more extensive testing it was observed, however, that the monitor is very sensitive to what appears to 
be tropospheric impact. Frequent detections far beyond what’s operationally acceptable have been 
observed [82]. The most recent assumptions taken for closing the validation of the GAST D SARPS 
assume, that the IGM does not require any prior probability of occurrence and that no significant error 
can build up before the monitor triggers an alert, even if the time to detect and identify an ionospheric 
gradient from a tropospheric impact is larger than the time to alert.   
5.4.2 Proposal of a New Monitoring Architecture  
Another scientific contribution in this work is the new method for ionospheric monitoring proposed 
here. Is is based on an additional monitoring receiver and is operation in the pseudorange domain. The 
next sections detail the monitoring principle and the design parameters of the monitor. Thereafter, a 
review of the assumptions taken in the requirement derivation is given and the use of actual known 
values for the glide path angle of the approach is suggested. Furthermore, it is proposed to take into 
account knowledge about the current set of satellites for which corrections are provided, instead of 
taking the most conservative assumptions. The following Sections 5.4.2.1 to 5.4.2.3 are reproduced 
from [14]. The notation of variables and references was adjusted to conform to the notation in this 
thesis. 
5.4.2.1 Differential Range Error Monitor 
A method for ensuring a limit on the post correction range error in general, “and mitigating the iono-
spheric threat in particular, can be based on positioning an additional GNSS receiver at a surveyed 
location close to the touchdown point of the runway to which approach service is provided. This moni-
tor plays the role of a pseudo user, i.e. it receives and applies GBAS corrections received from the 
GBAS ground station to correct its own GNSS measurements. The basic idea behind this kind of moni-
toring is that if an error source, such as an ionospheric disturbance, affects an arriving aircraft in a 
potentially dangerous way, then the monitor would be affected in a similar way. This is justified since 
spatial decorrelation between the user and the monitor is minimal, data processing of the raw meas-
urements is the same and the effect does not depend on receiver implementation and airframe charac-
teristics. The smoothed and corrected pseudorange ,smt corrρ  for each satellite can be described as sum 
of the theoretical range r , an undesired residual range error rangeE , the user clock bias userc t⋅ ∆ and a 
noise term η  as 
 ,smt corr range userr E c tρ η= + + ⋅ ∆ +  (70) 
The theoretical range term can be calculated by precise knowledge of the monitor receiver location 
and is thus a known parameter. The user clock term is common to all pseudorange measurements. It 
can therefore be removed from the measurements in the same way as it is done in the calculation of the 
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pseudorange corrections in the ground systems. This process is called “smoothed clock adjust” and is 
described in chapter 3.7.1.2.8.3.5 of ED-114A [35]. After removing the geometrical range portion of 
,smt corrρ  for all satellites in view, the average residual range over all satellites is treated as receiver 
clock bias. While this is usually not exactly true, it does not influence the performance of the monitor 
since a range bias which is common to all pseudoranges is mapped into the user clock offset. The re-
maining parts are the sum of the residual range error and noise. These two cannot be separated and 
their sum shall be called testE , which can be described as 
 , ,
1
1 N
test smt corr r i
i
E r E
N
ρ
=
= − − ∑  (71) 
 with N  the number of satellites used. This quantity will be the monitored parameter.  
5.4.2.2 Monitor design 
In a next step the threshold value for the monitored parameter, i.e. the largest value for which testE is 
still considered nominal, has to be derived. This limit has to fulfill the condition that a possible threat 
is detected with the required probability of missed detection, and at the same time have a sufficiently 
low probability of false alarm. The trade-off is shown in the following plot.  
 
Figure 38 Example trade-off between probability of missed detection (red shaded) and probability of false alarm 
(blue dotted). The dashed blue curve shows the expected range error PDF while the red curve shows the ex-
pected noise and multipath of the monitoring receiver centered at the minimum detectable error (MDE) 
The properties of this monitor depend on four parameters: 
• The actual expected distribution of the post-corrected range errors is illustrated by the dashed 
blue curve in the plot above. In the case of the monitor under discussion it is represented by a 
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non-biased Gaussian distribution for each pseudorange measurement with standard deviation 
iσ  and was described in Equation (20). This model depends on geometry, satellite elevation, 
altitude difference and distance between the airborne receiver and the GBAS reference point, 
as well as speed of the aircraft and equipment classification. The parameters used in deter-
mining the uncertainty should correspond to the expected error distribution of the signal, i.e. 
for GAST D using ,30gndσ from the Type 11 GBAS message [39] and a time constant 30τ = sec-
onds to represent the residual noise from the ground system and the appropriate contribution 
to the ionospheric uncertainty.  
• The next influencing parameter is the minimum detectable error (MDE) of the monitor where 
the red curve of the monitor noise probability density function (PDF) is centered. The MDE in 
this monitoring scheme corresponds to , ,maxr iE from (50) for each satellite. As shown earlier, it 
depends on airworthiness considerations and is the largest tolerable range error which is at-
tributed to one satellite, such that the aircraft can still operate safely.  
• Next, the probability of missed detection which is attributed to the monitor has an impact on 
the overall performance. It is shown as the red shaded area in Figure 38. Since in airworthi-
ness considerations the requirement for the fault case is specified for each error with a proba-
bility of occurrence greater than 10-9, the product of a probability of occurrence and probabil-
ity of not detecting such a disturbance has to be smaller than 10-9.  
• Finally, the noise and multipath characteristics of the monitoring receiver have a significant 
impact on the overall performance of the monitor. The lower the noise and multipath charac-
teristics, the larger the monitoring threshold becomes. According to several studies which 
were performed for evaluation of the GBAS error models, the main concern for ground based 
receivers is multipath from ground reflections. Hence, strict siting criteria for GBAS reference 
antennas were developed and multipath limiting antennas are used [25].  
 
The expected error distribution is defined in Equation (20). For the derivation of the MDE from Equa-
tion (50) we propose to use the actual GPA transmitted in the GBAS message which is typically 3°. 
When taking a Gaussian noise model for the monitor performance, the detection threshold monthrE  with 
the respective mdp requirement and the standard deviation of the monitor noise monitorσ can be written as  
 monthr md monitorE MDE k σ= − ⋅  (72) 
with  
 1 1(0.5 ) 2 ( 1)md md mdk p erf p
− −= −Φ ⋅ = − −  (73) 
and ( )xΦ the standard normal distribution. According to Equation (73) the corresponding missed 
detection multiplier for  910mdp
−= is 6.1mdk = . The monitoring condition thus becomes 
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6.1v ionomonthr monitor i
vert i
E
E
s
σ< − ⋅  (74) 
for each satellite i . When allowing some credit to be taken for the fact that those events are very rare, 
a prior probability ionop can be defined such that instead of  requiring a missed detection probability
910mdp
−= , only the product of prior probability for an ionospheric event and the probability of 
missed detection has to meet the requirement 910md ionop p
−⋅ = . If a meaningful prior probability can 
be established, e.g. by external monitoring of the state of the ionosphere, we propose to use it in order 
to achieve better false alarm properties.  
For the derivation of the monitoring threshold we propose that the projection factors ,vert is  in (74) 
should be calculated for each satellite individually as described in the previous section. The resulting 
largest ,vert is at each epoch will always be smaller or equal to 4 which leads to relaxed monitoring re-
quirements since monthrE increases with decreasing ,vert is . 
For monitorσ we suggest to use a model which conforms to the Ground Accuracy Designator (GAD) C 
requirement intended for GAST-D operations. We use the same model as used in [38] which describes 
the noise as 
 /15.8min(0.24m,  0.15m 0.84m )noise e
θσ − °= + ⋅  (75) 
It is represented by an elevation dependent function which remains constant for satellite elevation 
angles below 35° to reflect the characteristics of multipath limiting antennas (MLAs) and the siting 
criteria for GBAS. Although the noise restrictions required for this kind of monitoring are the most 
stringent ones in terms of GBAS Ground Facility Classification, meeting this requirement has been 
shown to be possible by Dautermann [83] with choke-ring antennas and standard receivers in a non-
optimal environment which does not meet the GBAS siting criteria.  
5.4.2.3 Monitor performance 
In this section an analysis of the different parameters influencing the monitor performance is carried 
out. Figure 39 shows the minimum gradient which will be detected by this monitor. It is a function of 
the MDE of the monitor and the distance monitord between the GBAS reference point and the location of 
the monitoring receiver. The minimum slope ming  of a gradient which has to be detected can then be 
written as  
 , ,maxmin
,
1v iono
monitor vert i monitor
EMDE
g
d ds
= = ⋅  (76) 
with the same notation as in the previous equations. The ,vert is  are calculated according to Equation 
(18) based on a standard GBAS weighting and assuming an aircraft speed of 70 m/s, which is a typical 
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approach speed. Out of all satellites in view the ,vert is  for the most limiting satellite, i.e. the satellite 
with the largest expected test statistic, is taken for a GBAS located at Braunschweig/Wolfsburg airport 
in northern Germany. The monitor receiver is assumed to be located 5 km from the GBAS reference 
point in runway direction towards the east. Two different values for the GPA are plotted to show the 
possible relaxations of the monitoring requirement in comparison to the current 300 mm/km limit. The 
larger GPA relaxes the constraint on the largest tolerable vertical error as described in Equation (44) 
and thus enlarges the tolerable slope of an ionospheric gradient. 
 
Figure 39 Minimum size of gradients which will be detected by a monitor located 5km away from the GBAS 
reference point. The dashed blue curve shows the values for a 2.5° GPA while the red curve shows the required 
detection for a standard 3° GPA. The black line shows the current requirement. 
The minimum slope of a gradient which needs to be detected considering a 2.5° GPA increases to val-
ues typically varying between 350 and 450 mm/km over a day, while at a 3° GPA only gradients as 
large as 450 to 550 mm/km are serious enough to create a potentially dangerous vertical error. At all 
times the monitoring thresholds are significantly larger than the currently required 300 mm/km.  
Figure 40 shows the corresponding monitoring threshold over one day which was described in Equa-
tion (74) with a missed detection probability 910mdp
−= . For comparison two curves are plotted show-
ing again the different monitoring thresholds for a 2.5° or 3.0° GPA. The monitor threshold over the 
day typically varies between 0.5 m and 1 m for the 2.5° GPA and between 1 m and 1.6 m for the 3° 
GPA. The peak shortly before 14 h represents a situation where for a short time the largest possible 
,vert i
s  is as small as 2.57 and the corresponding monitor threshold increases to almost 2 m.  
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Figure 40 Monitor thresholds for Braunschweig airport over one day depending on the glide path angle of the 
approach for the most limiting satellite in view. 
It can be seen that the higher glide path angle increases the monitor threshold by a factor of roughly 
1.6 and thus reduces the false alarm probability of the system accordingly. It is therefore very benefi-
cial to consider the actual GPA for an airport, rather than a general worst approach angle for preci-
sion approaches. The false alarm probability is another important parameter since the rate of false 
alarms impacts the availability and continuity of the system. It is represented as the dotted blue sur-
face in Figure 38 and can be modeled as 
 2 monthrfa
i
E
p
σ
−
= ⋅ Φ
 
 
 
 (77) 
with the standard normal distribution Φ , the monitoring threshold monthrE from Equation (74) and the 
expected standard deviation of the smoothed, corrected pseudorange iσ  for the most critical satellite 
i . Note that Figure 38 only shows the one-sided probability. The factor 2 in Equation (77) takes into 
account the fact that the errors can be positive or negative. Figure 41 shows the false alarm probabil-
ity over a day corresponding to the monitoring thresholds from Figure 40 for a 3° GPA.  
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Figure 41 Probability of false alarm depending on prior probability Piono of occurrence of an ionospheric dis-
turbance. Both results assume a 3° GPA for the approach. 
The dashed blue curve shows the case if no prior probability for the occurrence of an ionospheric 
disturbance is defined. In this case the false alarm probability mostly stays in the range of 10-2 to 10-5. 
For an operational system these values are large, despite the fact that flagging one satellite would not 
necessarily limit the availability of the whole GBAS, since usually there are between 6 and 12 satel-
lites available for navigation. However, if some credit is taken for the fact that these storms happen 
very rarely, performance of this monitor improves significantly. Previous work on this issue, such as 
[32] or [33] used a value of 10-5 for the assumed probability of occurrence. This limits the required 
probability of missed detection to just 10-4 and reduces the k-factor in Equation (72) from 6.1 to 3.7 
and thus relaxes the monitoring problem. The results for the false alarm probability assuming this 
prior probability for an ionospheric disturbance is shown in red in Figure 41. It decreases down to 
values in the range of 10-4 to 10-6. However, a standardized way of determining such a probability has 
not yet been developed and needs to be investigated. Due to the more frequent observation of iono-
spheric storms, scintillations and plasma bubbles in the high and low latitudes as opposed to the mid-
latitudes, such a probability should be defined locally together with the ionospheric threat model or 
determined by external information, such as ionospheric parameters from a space based augmentation 
system (SBAS).  
The results shown above are an example for performance at a certain location. However, the monitor-
ing thresholds and the associated false alarm probabilities do not change substantially in different 
locations around the earth and at different latitudes. This is a result of the selection of the worst possi-
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ble geometry at any location for the derivation of a conservative monitor threshold. Figure 42 shows 
the simulated thresholds over one day for three selected airports in different regions.  
 
Figure 42 Monitor thresholds for the most limiting satellite in view over one day at different latitudes. Anchor-
age as example for a polar region airport (Latitude 61°N), Singapore for an equatorial airport (1°N) and Sydney 
as example for mid-latitude (33°S) compared to Braunschweig assuming a 3° GPA 
Anchorage is located at a northern latitude of 61°, Singapore is located very close to the equator at 1° 
North and Sydney is located at 33°S in the equatorial to mid-latitude region. Together with Braun-
schweig (at 52°N) those airports represent the typical range in which GBAS stations are expected to 
be located. The monitor thresholds tend to be the lowest in Singapore (green curve). The times when 
the monitoring threshold decreases below 1 m for the most critical satellite correspond to epochs when 
many satellites are visible (13 or 14). At these epochs it is possible to select subsets which create larg-
er values for 
vert
s than at times when there are fewer satellites available. Sydney shows a monitoring 
threshold very similar to that of Braunschweig. Only for one short period of about 20 minutes around 
2 h 30 min it drops below a value of 1 m. During this time there are also 13 satellites visible while at 
most other epochs the number is mostly between 12 and 8. For Anchorage there are four spikes visible 
between 2 h and 4 h where the threshold becomes very large. At these epochs there are 11, 9, 7 and 10 
satellites visible while most of the time there are at least 10 satellites available, sometimes up to 14. In 
a similar way as could be observed at the other locations, a smaller number of available satellites 
generally increases the monitoring threshold. However, the effect is not as visible as in the other ex-
ample sites because due the location far up north more satellite subsets are excluded in the geometry 
screening process.” [14] 
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5.4.2.4 Discussion of the monitor 
The proposed method requires either an additional reference receiver or at least one of the nominal 
reference receivers placed far away from the others. While current GBAS layouts try to keep the loca-
tions of the receivers rather close together for operational and maintenance reasons such a reference 
receiver layout may be considered in the future if the benefits in ionospheric monitoring outweigh the 
operational difficulties and help bringing the availability to operationally acceptable levels.  
Taking the actual glide path angle instead of a conservative 2.5° assumption already brings a signifi-
cant benefit and reduces the unnecessary conservatism in the monitor. When it comes to the definition 
of a monitoring threshold and the projection of the pseudorange into the position domain plays again 
an important role. As the ground station has to support all aircraft without knowing which satellites are 
actually used it has to be conservative and assume a value for ,vert is that is surely not exceeded by any 
aircraft. By evaluating all subsets it is possible to take reduce the conservatism and derive a worst case 
value for all possible subsets. This facilitates the monitoring task significantly, however, it is still a 
very conservative approach for most aircraft as they will typically use a better geometry than the worst 
case. 
Credit for the actually used geometry and thus projection factor can only be taken at the aircraft where 
the receiver is aware of the satellites in use. The concept for single frequency GBAS is standardized 
but no decision is taken how future GBAS service types using signals from two frequencies and multi-
ple constellations will look like. There it is possible to move the task of ionospheric monitoring to the 
airborne system and thus leverage the knowledge about the actual geometry in use. Such a monitoring 
scheme is developed and presented in the following section. 
The proposed ionospheric monitor would also form part of the mitigation strategy of the ionospheric 
threat and, in order to become operational, would have to undergo a more thorough validation, espe-
cially about the mitigation of the applicable threat space together with all other monitors.   
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5.5 AIRBORNE MONITORING FOR IONOSPHERIC GRADIENTS 
This section constitutes another original contribution of this work by expanding the concept of using 
available information for ionospheric monitoring and describing how this task may be achieved in 
future dual frequency GBAS. The method was first presented in [77] and expanded in [78] and [15] on 
which this section is based (numbering and references adjusted to conform with the notation in this 
work).  
In Section 5.4 a method for monitoring for ionospheric gradients in the GBAS ground station and its 
potential improvement considering knowledge about the available ranging sources was presented. This 
method was specifically designed to support GAST D users, i.e. single frequency GPS only users. In 
this service type “a significant number of different monitors in the ground and airborne systems may 
result in limited availability due to frequent trips, especially in equatorial and polar regions prone to 
high ionospheric activity. A challenge for GNSS users are ionospheric scintillations. This effect leads 
to degraded signal tracking quality in the receiver or loss of lock to several satellites and thus results 
in degraded satellite geometries. Use of signals from multiple GNSS constellations will provide signif-
icantly increased robustness against this kind of events due to the large number of satellites and thus 
low sensitivity to the loss of individual signals” [15]. The previously described threat of ionospheric 
gradients “can be addressed by means of dual frequency positioning, eliminating the ionospheric de-
lay (to a first order which is sufficient for GBAS operations) in GNSS measurements. GPS introduced 
signals on a second frequency usable for safety of life applications with the latest generation of satel-
lites (Block IIF). Galileo provides those signals on all its satellites from the beginning. Combining 
measurements from two frequencies, however, comes at the cost of significantly increasing the residual 
noise in the position solution due to the combination of the two noisy pseudorange measurements on 
L1/E1 and L5/E5a [52]. It is thus a likely scenario that even in future GBAS with dual frequency capa-
bility positioning in the nominal case will be based on single frequency measurements [53]. In that 
case an effective monitoring for ionospheric gradients is necessary. [..] 
Assuming that the ground station provides corrections for two frequencies and the aircraft receiver is 
also able to track signals on two frequencies an effective ionospheric monitoring is possible. The pro-
posed method marks a fundamental change in where the monitoring is to be performed. While in 
GAST C it is the sole responsibility of the ground station to bound the errors at the airborne receiver 
the iono monitoring task is shared between ground and airborne GBAS subsystems in GAST D. In the 
method proposed here it is the sole responsibility of the airborne systems to monitor for ionospheric 
gradients. This allows for a more realistic error bounding because the current navigation performance 
(and aircraft performance) can be exploited and less conservative assumptions have to be made. [..]  
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5.5.1 Concept of the Airborne Ionospheric Monitor 
The basic idea of the proposed monitoring is to simply compare the ionospheric delay estimate at the 
ground station with an ionospheric delay estimate at the aircraft. In the airborne system it is possible 
to directly estimate the experienced ionospheric delay ,air iI  experienced on 1,ˆL iρ  based on the 
smoothed pseudorange measurements ,ˆ f iρ  on frequency f and satellite i as” [15]  
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The ionospheric delay experienced at the ground station cannot be directly computed from the re-
ceived corrections due to the way the corrections are generated. The smooth clock adjust process (pre-
viously described in Equation (4) in Section 2.2.2.2 removes all delays common to all pseudorange 
measurements from one reference receiver, notably also the common ionospheric delay. “Nevertheless, 
a pseudo-ionospheric delay estimate ,PRC iI  for each satellite i can be formed from the GBAS correc-
tions in the same way as when estimating the actual ionospheric delay on the L1 frequency from pseu-
dorange measurements replacing the measured pseudorange with the received corrections from the 
ground station: 
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In the same way as the applied correction would contain the pseudorange correction PRC and the 
range rate correction RRC multiplied with the time difference between the current time of measure-
ment and the time of generation of the corrections t∆ , these quantities are used also in the monitor. 
The indices L1 and L5 indicate the frequency for which the corrections were formed and f the central 
frequency of the respective signals.  
In a next step these two quantities have to be made comparable. For that reason we remove the aver-
age of all N airborne iono delay estimates [for which corrections are available] per constellation to 
obtain a pseudo airborne ionospheric delay measure Iair,i  which is given by  
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 In order to account for the fact that the airborne system may use only a subset of the satellites to 
which the ground system provides corrections we repeat this process also with the pseudo delay esti-
mates from the ground station using only the set of satellites used in the airborne pseudo iono delay 
estimate. Similar to Equation (80), the pseudo iono delay from the corrections is then  
 , , ,
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I I I
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These two estimates are now comparable and can be used to form a test statistic Itest,i as  
 , ,, air i PRC itest iI I I= +  (82) 
Note that the two quantities are added (a more intuitive guess would be to subtract them and compare 
to zero) due to the fact that the pseudo delay estimate from the corrections would have opposite sign 
from the value derived from the pseudorange measurements. In the nominal case (i.e. without a signif-
icant ionospheric gradient) the test statistic is small and would mostly consist of noise. With increas-
ing decorrelation of the ionospheric delay experienced at the ground station and the airborne user this 
quantity would increase.  
The previously described test statistic is only valid if the navigation is based on signals in the L1/E1 
frequency band. It is, however, also possible to support positioning based on L5/E5a which may under 
certain circumstances be a desired mode. In that case a user would experience an ionospheric delay 
on each measurement that is 
2
1
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β = ≈ times larger than on L1/E1. Additionally, the monitoring 
threshold will be even tighter in that case. Thus, navigating based on L5/E5a is significantly more 
challenging in terms of integrity and is not considered further in this study.  
5.5.2 Monitoring threshold 
After having defined a test statistic as measure for a difference in ionospheric delay a threshold needs 
to be defined above which it is unsafe to use the signals from a certain satellite or set of satellites. A 
meaningful derivation of a monitoring threshold comes from the operation, namely the requirements 
for a safe landing. For a landing to be considered safe, the aircraft has to touch down inside the so-
called “touchdown box”, i.e. not less than 200 ft and not more than 2700 ft behind the runway thresh-
old and not less than 5 ft from either runway edge with a probability of not less than 1-10-6 in the nom-
inal case. Two more cases are defined that also have to be considered, namely the limit and the mal-
function case. In the limit case one parameter is kept at is most adverse value while all other influenc-
ing parameters vary according to their nominal distributions. In the malfunction case an undetected 
error occurs. In both cases the aircraft has to land within the touchdown box, where the land long 
limit is extended to 3000 ft behind the runway threshold.  
These requirements are defined at aircraft level and thus only part of the total error budget can be 
attributed to the navigation system. The other main question in automatic landings, apart from how 
well the navigation system can determine the position of the aircraft, is how well the autopilot can 
land the aircraft on a desired spot. As the landing performance depends on both systems there is a 
possibility to trade off autopilot and navigation system performance. Note that this tradeoff is, howev-
er, only possible if the monitoring for disturbances occurs onboard the aircraft. In the case of the cur-
rent service types the ground station plays an important role in mitigating part of the threat space. 
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Thus, it is not possible to take actual aircraft performance into account in those systems as the ground 
station has to support all aircraft types.  
In [78] we showed the derivation of the monitoring threshold considering a single satellite being af-
fected by an ionospheric gradient. This was done by starting from the requirement that the aircraft has 
to land within the touchdown box and the land short case (i.e. landing not too close to the runway 
threshold) is considered to be the driving constraint. The along track error is a function of the nominal 
touchdown point NTDP , the nominal flight technical error FTE (i.e. how well the autopilot can place 
the aircraft onto the desired landing spot), the nominal navigation system error NSE (nominal errors 
due to noise, multipath, nominal ionosphere and troposphere decorrelation) and an additional error 
caused by an undetected error in form of a bias, e.g. cause by an ionospheric gradient. It is assumed 
that a vertical position error Ev maps into an along track position error Eatrk  at touchdown by the 
simple geometric relation   
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where GPA is the glide path angle (normally 3°). In the malfunction case the aircraft has to land in the 
touchdown box with complete certainty. Taking the nominal NSE  and FTE  as Gaussian distributed 
random variables could of course never satisfy this condition. In that case they are fixed at their 95th 
percentiles [62]. The requirement for the land short case can now be formulated as  
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≤ − −  (84) 
Where NSEvert,ff,95% and FTEff,95%  are the nominal navigation and flight technical errors at the 95th 
percentile of their Gaussian distributions. This is illustrated in Figure 43 
 
Figure 43 Derivation of the largest allowable vertical error Ev,iono and illustration of the contributing error 
sources for automatic landings. 
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The NSEvert,ff,95%  is a vertical position error and can be derived from the protection level equation [38] 
as  
 , , 5.81NSE vert ff ffmd
VPL VPL
K
σ ==  (85) 
 where Kffmd is the fault free missed detection multiplier for the integrity risk of 
72 10−⋅ allocated to the 
protection level. Note that the VPL is a bound for the instantaneous nominal vertical position error 
and depends on the satellite geometry, as well as the expected ranging performance for the satellites. 
At all times it needs to remain below the so-called vertical alert limit (VAL) that is limited by a value 
of 10 m for the final approach and landing [4].  
The nominal touchdown point is usually considered to be located 1290 ft behind the runway threshold 
and 180FTE ftσ =  is assumed to be a conservative value for all aircraft using [13]. With all those as-
sumptions it is now possible to derive a limit on the largest vertical position error Ev,iono due to an ion-
ospheric anomaly from Equation (84). Assuming VPL=VAL=10m and GPA=3° the resulting condition 
would be Ev ≤ 8.4m. Taking a less conservative value of VPL=5m and leaving all other parameters 
constant, the resulting condition would already be relaxed to Ev ≤ 10.1m and for a realistic value for a 
multi-constellation case of VPL=2.5m it would be further relaxed to Ev ≤ 10.9m . 
Now this limit in the position domain needs to be translated into a limit in the pseudorange domain 
since the previously described test statistic is calculated per satellite. The pseudorange measurements 
ρ and the user position and clock estimate x are related by the weighted pseudoinverse S of the geome-
try matrix [previously described in Section 2.2.3.2] such that  
 x ρ= ⋅S  (86) 
 A weighting matrix W containing the fault-free variances of the expected residual pseudorange errors 
is used to give lower weight to satellites with larger expected uncertainties. The S-matrix is defined as  
 T -1 TS = (G WG) G W  (87) 
and the contribution of a single satellite i to the position estimate vertical to the approach track is 
given by  
 , 3, 1, tan( )vert i i is s s GPA= + ⋅  (88) 
 where sk,i denotes the entry in the kth row and ith column of the S-matrix.  
In the case of a single satellite affected by an undetected ionospheric gradient a limit on the pseudor-
ange error , ,r iono iE  on that particular satellite would thus be  
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5. NSE CONTRIBUTION AND IONOSPHERIC GRADIENT MONITORING 
 
112 
It is interesting to note that based on this equation a pseudorange error may become arbitrarily large 
as long as the weight assigned to that satellite through the ,vert is is small enough. A typical behavior of 
values for ,vert is as function of the elevation of the satellite is shown in Figure 44 where we simulated 
the geometry of a combined GPS and Galileo constellation with 31 and 27 satellites, respectively, 
during our test flight described later [..]. At about 45° elevation the verts  of two satellites become al-
most zero, leading to very large pseudorange error limits.  
 
Figure 44 S_vert as a function of the elevation of the satellites for a future combined GPS and Galileo constella-
tion with 31 and 27 satellites, respectively 
With a missed detection probability of 10-9 attributed to the monitor and assuming that the noise in the 
test statistic follows a Gaussian distribution the monitoring condition is given as 
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The test statistic ,test iI  as defined in Equation (82) contains the airborne measurement noise ,air fσ from 
the smoothed pseudorange measurements on both frequencies f , and in addition the noise contained 
in the pseudorange corrections ,gnd fσ for both frequencies. The noise in the proposed monitor can thus 
be described as 
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In [78] we showed that this monitoring condition can be fulfilled rather easily. Even with the minimum 
number of just 5 satellites and noise from our experimental system that is expected to be larger than 
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that of an operational GBAS the monitoring was possible and did not cause false alarms due to very 
low monitoring thresholds.  
Unfortunately, assuming only a single affected satellite may not sufficiently bound potential errors 
caused by ionospheric disturbances. It is possible that more than one satellite could be affected by an 
ionospheric front. For that reason a look on the scenario that two satellites are affected simultaneous-
ly is taken. In this case the error from both affected satellites would project from the pseudorange into 
the position domain according to Equation (86). A limit on the sum of both pseudorange errors of the 
affected satellites i  and k based on Equation (89) then becomes  
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Finally also the noise of both estimates needs to be considered and the monitoring condition thus can 
get much more stringent: 
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Note that in this case the test statistic can increase if the pseudo iono estimates on the two satellites 
have the same sign. At the same time the noise contribution in the monitoring condition increases. The 
sum of the verts  can either increase or decrease depending on the sign of the values as shown previous-
ly in Figure 44. The worst case would occur when the satellites with the two largest verts  with the same 
sign have constructively adding pseudo iono delays.  
This monitoring concept can of course also be expanded to assuming more affected satellites. A gen-
eralized monitoring condition for N affected satellites would then be 
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Note that the more affected satellites are considered in the monitoring, the more challenging it be-
comes. However, on the other hand, the more satellites are assumed to be affected by a gradient and 
are not excluded from the position solution, the less likely the scenario becomes. In Equation (94) no 
credit is taken for the low prior probability of such a scenario occurring but this might be considered 
for the future. Furthermore, the monitoring is conservative in the way that it does not consider the 
actual separation of satellites in terms of azimuth angle. In the case of an ionospheric front, only satel-
lites in certain azimuth regions would be affected, however we consider only the verts  values, irrespec-
tive of the azimuth.  
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In the following section an exemplary evaluation during one of our flight trials is presented. The con-
tributing factors are analyzed more in detail with the example at hand to illustrate the effects inherent 
to this monitoring scheme. 
5.5.3 Evaluation in Flight Trials  
The German Aerospace Center (DLR) is operating an experimental GBAS station consisting of four 
reference receivers tracking GPS and Galileo L1/E1 and L5/E5a signals. It is located at the Braun-
schweig research airport in northern Germany. The layout of the reference receiver locations is shown 
in Figure 45.  
 
Figure 45 Layout of the GBAS reference stations at Braunschweig Airport as used during the flight trials 
In November 2016 a flight test with a Dornier DO-228 aircraft (a twin-engine turboprop aircraft) was 
performed in the vicinity of Braunschweig. The flight lasted for about two hours and consisted of 
about one hour of maneuvering and flying the aircraft at different bank angles, followed by one hour 
of five approaches and extended traffic patterns. The ground track of the flight is shown in Figure 46. 
One of the purposes of the test was to evaluate the signal tracking performance in steep turns with 
bank angles of up to 60°. The data of that part of the flights shows frequent loss of lock events and 
very limited continuously tracked signals. That first part (shown in black in Figure 46) is therefore 
omitted in the following evaluations. Only the second half of the flight where normal maneuvering was 
performed (shown in green) is used.  
Figure 47 shows a skyplot of the GPS Block IIF and Galileo satellites as observed during the test 
flight. There were 11 different satellites visible, at most 10 of them at the same time. This number is 
somewhat typical for a single full constellation. With a fully deployed Galileo constellation and all 
GPS satellites providing also L5 signals in the future, the number of visible satellites in Braunschweig 
would vary between 18 and 21.  
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Figure 46 Ground track of the test flight around Braunschweig (ICAO identifier EDVE). The part used for the 
evaluation is shown in green 
 
Figure 47 Skyplot of the combined GPS (SV 1-32) / Galileo (SV 71-100) constellation providing L1/E1 and 
L5/E5a signals as observed during the flight trial 
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We start the evaluations with assumptions on the airσ  and gndσ  which were experimentally derived 
from our ground and airborne systems for each of the two frequencies and each of the two constella-
tions individually as previously presented in [52], [84] and [53]. For the whole flight and all satellites 
in the single affected satellite case the test statistic (the monitoring condition for 1i = in Equation (94)
) is fulfilled, except one short instance that will be discussed later.  
Figure 48 shows the number of used satellites in subplot a) and the test statistics with the correspond-
ing monitoring thresholds for L1/E1-based navigation for the three selected satellites marked in the 
skyplot in Figure 47. The drops in the number of satellites occur during turns where tracking of low 
elevation satellites is lost due to signal blockage by parts of the aircraft. Subplot b) shows the results 
for PRN 6, a satellite at elevations between 50° and 55°. In the particular geometry this satellite had a 
very small verts  leading to an extremely large monitoring threshold mostly in the range of 100 m to 
200 m (note the different scale of the y-axis for this subplot). As the satellite plays almost no role for 
the determination of the vertical position a potential error could become very large and not affect the 
user much. The threshold decreases to a value of about 3.7 m shortly before 16h at the short period of 
time when the number of used satellites went down to 7. At that moment PRN 6 became a rather im-
portant satellite leading to a small threshold. The sharp drop in the monitoring threshold for all satel-
lites at that time indicates a rather strong dependence on the number of satellites available in case 
that number is small. If many satellites are available, losing one or two of them for the position solu-
tion does not have a large impact anymore. Shortly before 15.8h and at 16h there are small spikes in 
the test statistic. They appear small due to the large scale of the y-axis but reach values of up to 7 m. 
These spikes result from excessive multipath or a cycle slip and were detected by the onboard GBAS 
monitor. However, for illustration purposes we did not exclude the data from the plot. Due to the aver-
age removal in the test statistic as described in Equation (80) an effect on one satellite would be visi-
ble in the test statistic of all other satellites as well.  
This is the case as can be seen in subplot c) showing the results for PRN 9 where spikes occur at the 
same times. PRN 9 is a very high elevation satellite between 72° and almost 90° elevation. At all times 
it is the satellite with the highest elevation. From a geometrical perspective PRN 9 is a very important 
satellite and thus has a rather large verts  According to Equation (89) this results in a small tolerable 
pseudorange error for that satellite and thus a low monitoring threshold throughout the flight. Due to 
the average removal in forming the test statistic the threshold for that satellite is exceeded twice just 
before 16h, however, that effect by a cycle slip would have been excluded by other monitors and is 
again in the data just for illustration purposes.  
The results for PRN 100, a Galileo satellite, are shown in subplot d). Note that the average removal is 
performed per constellation and thus the spikes from subplots b) and c) do not occur in subplot d). The 
elevation of the satellite varies between 35° and 40°. While it has quite a large weight in the beginning 
it quickly becomes smaller and thus the monitoring threshold increases fast to larger values.    
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Figure 48 Test statistic and monitor threshold for three example satellites 
Figure 48 showed exemplary results for the monitoring condition for a single affected satellite. The 
case of more than one affected satellites will probably have to be considered for monitoring as well. 
We therefore also considered the case of two affected satellites, i.e. 2i = in Equation (94).  
Figure 49 shows the minimum over all thresholds for all possible subsets of two affected satellites dur-
ing the flight test in red, together with the test statistic in black. The solid lines of the monitoring 
thresholds are using our own experimentally derived characterization of noise in the corrections and 
airborne measurements, while the dashed lines assume the performance that can be expected from an 
operational GBAS station with multipath limiting antennas in carefully protected sites and from air-
borne equipment with a reasonably good airborne antenna performance as presented [53]. These 
models can be considered realistic, while the performance of our own equipment is slightly worse and 
thus yields conservative results. It can be noted again that the monitoring threshold has sharp drops 
whenever we lose satellites in turns. At about 15.35h and 15.95h the monitoring threshold even be-
comes negative and thus of course makes the monitoring completely impossible assuming our own 
noise models. The black curve is the corresponding test statistic that is regularly exceeding the thresh-
old whenever a drop in the number of used satellites and thus in the monitoring threshold occurs. 
However, recall that the experimental thresholds in red were derived from the actual measurements 
during the flight with a maximum of 10 satellites. Looking into the future and simulating complete dual 
frequency GPS and Galileo constellations with 31 and 27 satellites, respectively, the situation looks 
very much different. This is shown in the same plot in green. The monitoring threshold now reaches a 
minimum of 7.8 m at about 15.75h. With two full dual frequency capable constellations the monitoring 
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thresholds will be large enough to provide sufficient margin to prevent false alarms due to noise effects 
for the case of two affected satellites.  
 
Figure 49 Monitoring thresholds for the case of two affected satellites with the constellation as seen during the 
flight trials (red) and simulated full GPS + Galileo constellation (green) 
This concept can be further extended to three and four affected satellites. This of course places a 
greater burden on the monitoring and yields again decreasing monitoring thresholds. Figure 50 shows 
simulated monitoring thresholds for the aircraft positions during the test flight assuming two, three 
and four affected satellites in black, red and green, respectively. As expected, the monitoring threshold 
keeps decreasing while more satellites are assumed to be affected.  
But even in the case of four affected satellites the threshold just reaches values of around 4m and thus 
remains above the threshold for two affected satellites and for the limited constellation we observed 
during the flight test. 
 Airborne Monitoring for Ionospheric Gradients 
119 
 
Figure 50 Monitor thresholds assuming two full dual frequency capable constellations and 2, 3 and 4 simultane-
ously affected satellites 
 
Figure 51 Monitoring threshold for Troll (Antarctica at 72° Southern Latitude) as example for a location with 
less favorable satellite geometry and the effect on the monitoring 
Now the results so far only showed an example of a short time period in mid-latitudes with a rather 
good satellite geometry. For that reason we also examined the effect of the satellite geometry in less 
favorable locations and chose as example Troll Research Station in Antarctica located at 72° southern 
latitude. The results are shown in Figure 51. Due to the lack of high elevation satellites the geometries 
become weaker in the vertical domain and thus lead to somewhat larger verts values. However, the 
monitoring for the 2 and 3 affected satellite case still seems to be possible, for the 4 affected case there 
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are times, e.g. around midnight, where the threshold is rather small. At all times the threshold remains 
positive and thus makes the monitoring possible in principle depending on the assumed noise in the 
measurement.” [15] 
5.5.4 Discussion of the monitor 
The monitor developed and presented in this section provides a robust and effective way of detecting 
the presence of ionospheric gradients in a future dual frequency GBAS. It leverages the knowledge 
about the set of used satellites and thus does not make unnecessarily conservative assumptions. This 
became possible since the monitoring was shifted to the airborne side. A downside of the monitor is 
the increase in complexity of the airborne processing and the associated increased costs for develop-
ment and certification of the airborne equipment. An alternative way of mitigating the ionospheric 
gradient threat is to remove the ionospheric delay in the positioning algorithm by means of forming an 
ionosphere free combination of the pseudorange measurements. This would result in a decreased nom-
inal positioning performance due to the combination of the noise and multipath on the two frequen-
cies. Furthermore, it would require a complete validation of the signals on the L5/E5a bands for GBAS 
positioning, while in the concept proposed here the second frequency would only be used for monitor-
ing purposes. It seems thus more likely that the single frequency positioning will be maintained also in 
the future. In that case, the proposed method will form the core of the ionospheric mitigation strategy.  
 
In this chapter, two ways of reducing the conservatism in the derivation of NSE requirements were 
developed and discussed. It was shown that by including knowledge available into the system moni-
toring conditions can be relaxed while maintaining the original level of safety. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
6.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This work was performed in the context of supporting the development and standardization of GBAS 
as primary guidance system for precision approaches and landings. In order to achieve this, the devel-
opments in this work were performed with the aim to take into account as much available knowledge 
as possible in order to not rely on conservative assumptions. As a side condition, any changes to 
standard systems should be kept as small as possible in order to maintain compatibility with existing 
systems as much as possible and ensure that standardization and certification remains possible. 
In the beginning, an overview of approach classifications and guidance systems for aircraft is given. A 
short discussion of the ILS as currently most used technology with a discussion of its issues is fol-
lowed by a description of GBAS as future guidance system. Based on satellite navigation, it has the 
potential to provide significantly more flexibility in defining approaches and reducing technical and 
operational restrictions that limit runway capacity but that are necessary for the ILS. As first original 
contribution in this thesis, an in-flight comparison of the performance of ILS and GBAS was carried 
out showing the significant performance improvement and reduction of external influences on the 
quality of the approach guidance signals.  
The next chapter summarizes the requirements for automatic landings and shows how the GBAS re-
quirements for the approach service type D (supporting CAT-III operations) were derived. The main 
concept is derived from the fact that the aircraft has to land within the predefined touchdown box on 
the runway. This has to be ensured for the nominal case, when all parameters influencing the touch-
down performance vary according to their expected distributions, for the limit case when one parame-
ter is kept at its most adverse value while all others vary nominally, and for the malfunction case when 
an undetected error occurs. As the requirement to land in the touchdown box is defined at aircraft lev-
el, this total error budged needs to be allocated between the autopilot performance and the navigation 
system performance. This summary is followed by a critical review of the assumptions taken and sug-
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gests some changes in order to take into account available knowledge about certain parameters instead 
of relying on worst-case assumptions. This leads to a potential relaxation of the current ground moni-
toring requirements and ultimately can improve the availability of GBAS. These suggested changes 
constitute another original contribution of this work.  
As the total system error needs to be allocated between the autopilot and navigation system error 
budgets, the next chapter focuses on the description and evaluation of the FTE. For the derivation of 
the current GBAS requirements one nominal touchdown point and one Gaussian distributed dispersion 
around that point are considered and deemed representative for all aircraft in all loading conditions and 
wind situations. In this work, after a brief description of the phases of an approach and the autopilot 
modes an exemplary simulation to evaluate the FTE of a given autopilot model is shown. The influ-
ence of different wind scenarios and weight and balance configurations for automatic landings is in-
vestigated. It is also shown that applying available knowledge, such as weight and loading conditions 
of the aircraft on approach, reduces the spread in the touchdown points. This can then be leveraged 
when deriving the NSE requirements from a given FTE performance. The results of the simulations 
are also in line with previous studies, showing that the FTE performance cannot in general be assumed 
to be Gaussian distributed. In the course of this work it is therefore concluded that, instead of just fit-
ting a Gaussian distribution to the data, a different modelling is required in order to not underestimate 
the risk of landing outside the touchdown box. The methods proposed here in order to achieve this are 
deriving a Gaussian overbound instead of a Gaussian fit or alternatively, to model the touchdown 
points by a Johnson distribution that is better suitable to describe skewed data that are typically ob-
served. Using the Gaussian overbound has the advantage that it allows a simple tradeoff between two 
Gaussian distributed errors (NSE and FTE), but has the disadvantage that it requires a significant 
amount of conservatism and thus results in unnecessarily stringent NSE requirements. The Johnson 
modelling has the advantage of appropriate modelling and therefore requiring less conservative as-
sumptions. On the downside, the derivation of requirements needs to be done numerically and it is not 
possible to derive simple standard requirements for the GBAS monitors. The improved modelling of 
FTE and the potential changes to the allocation between NSE and FTE budgets are another original 
contribution developed within the context of this thesis.   
The final chapter before these conclusions is dedicated to the GBAS navigation system errors. A brief 
discussion of the error sources is followed by a description of the problem of ionospheric gradients 
and the challenges they pose to a differential GNSS architecture like GBAS. For each country where a 
GBAS is placed, a GBAS threat model needs to be derived. This threat model defines the gradients 
against which the system has to be robust. For the GAST D an ionospheric gradient monitor will be 
used that is based on double differenced carrier phase measurements. This monitor faces a variety of 
challenges and is currently one of the main issues in terms of GBAS availability. In the frame of this 
work an alternative means of monitoring for ionospheric gradients was developed as another original 
contribution. The concept is based on an additional monitoring receiver and makes use of the proposed 
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relaxations due to the use of available knowledge that were identified in chapter 0. It is shown that in 
that way the monitoring performance can be significantly improved. The second part of this chapter is 
focused on future GBAS generations that will make use of multiple GNSS constellations and two nav-
igation frequencies. With the use of those dual frequency methods it is possible to estimate and elimi-
nate the ionospheric delay, however, at the price of combining the noise and multipath effects of the 
two measurements. So while offering robustness against the ionospheric threat the nominal perfor-
mance is degraded. For that reason it is likely that also in the future positioning will be based on single 
frequency methods and the second frequency is used only for ionospheric monitoring. In this context a 
monitoring algorithm for ionospheric gradients between the ground station and the aircraft was devel-
oped. The development of this monitoring scheme is the final original contribution of this thesis. It is 
suggested that the task of monitoring for ionospheric gradients is completely shifted to the airborne 
system (while for GAST C it is the ground station’s responsibility and for GAST D a shared responsi-
bility between ground and airborne systems). In that way when defining the monitoring thresholds all 
knowledge about the current NSE and potentially also FTE performance can be leveraged such that the 
monitor does not need to make overly conservative assumptions for many parameters.   
The developments in this work can potentially support the development of GBAS and improve system 
availability. They were orientated at providing solutions that are technically easy to implement and at 
the same time simple to standardize. An optimal tradeoff between NSE and FTE could be achieved 
with a tight integration of the autopilot and the GBAS board equipment. From an integration perspec-
tive this seems difficult, however, may be an option if operational benefits can be shown to outweigh 
the necessary effort and definition of interfaces. Finally, the developments for the dual frequency iono-
spheric monitor are supporting the developments ongoing in and international research effort to devel-
op GBAS to globally reach the same reliability as ILS. Reaching this goal is essential to ultimately 
replace ILS with GBAS and exploit all the benefits of GNSS-based navigation to cope with the chal-
lenge of limited airport capacity for an increasing amount of traffic. 
6.2 OUTLOOK 
GBAS is currently in an early implementation stage. Thus, there is still great potential to further im-
prove and fine-tune existing service types C and D as operational experience becomes more and more 
available and potential issues arise. Based on the contributions made in this work, the following fur-
ther studies about specific aspects are suggested:  
- As shown in the contribution described in Section 2.3, GBAS guidance is much smoother and less 
prone to errors by signal distortions due to preceding aircraft or aircraft on the ground. The smoother 
guidance on the approach can potentially be leveraged in the design of the autopilot control laws. Not 
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having to account for the same level of disturbances may result in flare laws that can potentially re-
duce the dispersion of the touchdown points. Such an improvement can then directly be used for an 
improved trade-off between the autopilot and navigation system performance.  
- In Section 3.4 a review and discussion of the requirement derivation process is given, along with 
another contribution of this thesis, namely suggestions for improvements in the requirement derivation 
process for GBAS ground monitors. It was shown that the true value of the GPA for a given approach 
and a worst projection factor verts for the set of satellites lead to relaxed monitoring requirements in the 
ground system. With more GNSS constellations becoming available, it may also be possible to further 
restrict the VAL for the final approach to smaller numbers and thus enable the ground station to lever-
age the budget that becomes available for yet less stringent requirements.  
- In Chapter 4 the modelling of touchdown performance of aircraft was discussed. In this work, only 
one aircraft type was studied exemplary. It is certainly of interest to expand this study to a variety of 
other aircraft and other aerial vehicles that may have significantly different performance characteris-
tics. Furthermore, the simulations in this work were performed based on an autopilot model that did 
not meet the touchdown requirements. It would be interesting to redo these simulations with higher 
fidelity models that are more representative of actual autopilot implementations. In order to actually 
apply the proposed method this study should be extended to obtain touchdown distributions that are 
highly realistic and cover more aspects than those studied in this work. The simulations may be im-
proved by considering different aircraft configurations and taking into account the changes in the ref-
erence approach speed with respect to aircraft mass. Furthermore, especially the radar altimeter that is 
used for vertical guidance at the final stage of the approach should be properly modeled and included 
in the simulations. Along with it, studies about the terrain just before the runway and the slope of the 
runway typically have a significant influence on the touchdown point. All these points were beyond 
the scope of the example shown in this thesis. They are, however, of great interest for further applica-
tion of the trade-off between NSE and FTE performance.  
- Section 5.4 presented a new monitoring concept for ionospheric gradients in single-frequency 
GBAS, based on an additional monitoring receiver as far as possible from the other GBAS reference 
receivers. This concept can be further expanded to use information from other receivers at larger base-
lines and potentially even external to GBAS. It may be feasible to share the measurements from sever-
al GBAS stations within a country or a geographic region. In that way a highly effective monitoring 
based on reference stations that provide excellent signal quality, are permanently monitored, and are 
located in secure areas can be achieved.  
- Section 5.5 presented the concept for monitoring for ionospheric gradients in a dual frequency 
GBAS. It was shown that monitoring gets more challenging with an increasing number of satellites 
that may be affected at the same time. Determination of a monitoring threshold requires a maximum 
number of satellites that are simultaneously affected by the same ionospheric anomaly. Further long-
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term studies about the characteristics of ionospheric anomalies, especially in equatorial regions, about 
the number of impacted satellites need to be carried out to determine this number. As this concept was 
developed theoretically and tested only in simulations, the method should then be tested under real 
ionospheric disturbance scenarios to validate the theoretical performance.  
On a more general perspective on GBAS, there still are many interesting areas and topics open for 
research, ranging from the development of a full concept of operations for dual frequency and multi 
constellation primary and fallback modes along with the required integrity concepts to the potential to 
use higher capacity and secure data transmission schemes. After the technical development, it is essen-
tial to also demonstrate and leverage operational improvements (e.g. for noise abatement, fuel savings, 
or capacity improvements) to no just create a system that provides the same service as ILS but actually 
provides benefits to its operators and users.  
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APPENDIX I – GBAS PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 
In this appendix the most important GBAS performance requirements are reproduced from the ICAO 
Annex 10 GBAS standards and recommended practices (Table 3.7.2.4-1 in [4]).  
 
 
Typical operation 
Accuracy 
horizontal 
95% 
(Notes 1 and 3) 
Accuracy 
vertical 
95% 
(Notes 1 and 3) 
Integrity 
(Note 2) 
Time-to-alert 
(Note 3) 
Continuity 
(Note 4) 
Availability 
(Note 5) 
       
En-route 3.7 km 
(2.0 NM) 
N/A 1 – 1 × 10–7/h 5 min 1 – 1 × 10–4/h  
to 1 – 1 × 10–8/h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
       
En-route, 
Terminal 
0.74 km 
(0.4 NM) 
N/A 1 – 1 × 10–7/h 15 s 1 – 1 × 10–4/h  
to 1 – 1 × 10–8/h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
       
Initial approach, 
Intermediate approach, 
Non-precision approach (NPA), 
Departure 
220 m 
(720 ft) 
N/A 1 – 1 × 10–7/h 
 
10 s 1 – 1 × 10–4/h 
to 1 – 1 × 10–8/h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
       
Approach operations with verti-
cal guidance (APV-I) 
16.0 m 
(52 ft) 
20 m 
(66 ft) 
1 – 2 × 10–7  
in any 
approach 
10 s 1 – 8 × 10–6 
per 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
       
Approach operations with verti-
cal guidance (APV-II) 
16.0 m 
(52 ft) 
8.0 m 
(26 ft) 
1 – 2 × 10–7  
in any 
approach 
6 s 1 – 8 × 10–6  
per 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
       
Category I precision approach 
(Note 7) 
16.0 m 
(52 ft) 
6.0 m to 4.0 m 
(20 ft to 13 ft) 
(Note 6) 
1 – 2 × 10–7  
in any 
approach 
6 s 1 – 8 × 10–6 
per 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
NOTES.— 
1. The 95th percentile values for GNSS position errors are those required for the intended operation at the lowest height above threshold (HAT), if applica-
ble. Detailed requirements are specified in Appendix B and guidance material is given in Attachment D, 3.2. 
2. The definition of the integrity requirement includes an alert limit against which the requirement can be assessed. For Category I precision approach, a 
vertical alert limit (VAL) greater than 10 m for a specific system design may only be used if a system-specific safety analysis has been completed. Fur-
ther guidance on the alert limits is provided in Attachment D, 3.3.6 to 3.3.10. These alert limits are: 
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Typical operation  Horizontal alert limit Vertical alert limit 
   
En-route (oceanic/continental 
low density) 
7.4 km 
(4 NM) 
N/A 
En-route (continental) 3.7 km 
(2 NM) 
N/A 
En-route, 
Terminal 
1.85 km 
(1 NM) 
N/A 
NPA 556 m 
(0.3 NM) 
N/A 
APV-I 40 m 
(130 ft) 
50 m 
(164 ft) 
APV- II 40 m 
(130 ft) 
20.0 m 
(66 ft) 
Category I precision approach 40 m 
(130 ft) 
35.0 m to 10.0 m 
(115 ft to 33 ft) 
 
3. The accuracy and time-to-alert requirements include the nominal performance of a fault-free receiver. 
4. Ranges of values are given for the continuity requirement for en-route, terminal, initial approach, NPA and departure operations, as this requirement is 
dependent upon several factors including the intended operation, traffic density, complexity of airspace and availability of alternative navigation aids. 
The lower value given is the minimum requirement for areas with low traffic density and airspace complexity. The higher value given is appropriate 
for areas with high traffic density and airspace complexity (see Attachment D, 3.4.2). Continuity requirements for APV and Category I operations ap-
ply to the average risk (over time) of loss of service, normalized to a 15-second exposure time (see Attachment D, 3.4.3). 
5. A range of values is given for the availability requirements as these requirements are dependent upon the operational need which is based upon several 
factors including the frequency of operations, weather environments, the size and duration of the outages, availability of alternate navigation aids, ra-
dar coverage, traffic density and reversionary operational procedures. The lower values given are the minimum availabilities for which a system is 
considered to be practical but are not adequate to replace non-GNSS navigation aids. For en-route navigation, the higher values given are adequate for 
GNSS to be the only navigation aid provided in an area. For approach and departure, the higher values given are based upon the availability require-
ments at airports with a large amount of traffic assuming that operations to or from multiple runways are affected but reversionary operational proce-
dures ensure the safety of the operation (see Attachment D, 3.5). 
6. A range of values is specified for Category I precision approach. The 4.0 m (13 feet) requirement is based upon ILS specifications and represents a 
conservative derivation from these specifications (see Attachment D, 3.2.7). 
7. GNSS performance requirements intended to support Category II and III precision approach operations necessitate lower level requirements in the 
technical appendix (Appendix B, section 3.6) to be applied in addition to these signal in space requirements (see Attachment D, 7.5.1). 
8. The terms APV-I and APV-II refer to two levels of GNSS approach and landing operations with vertical guidance (APV) and these terms are not 
necessarily intended to be used operationally. 
 
The following tables summarize the maximum alert limits in the final approach segment for the lateral 
(FASLAL) and vertical (FASVAL) domains. They are reproduced from the RTCA DO-253C document 
“Minimum operational performance requirements for GPS local area augmentation system airborne 
equipment” (tables 2-14 and 2-15 from [38]). 
Lateral alert limit (m) Horizontal distance of aircraft position to the 
LTP/FTP (D in m) 
FASLAL 0 ≤ D ≤ 873 
0.44∙D + FASLAL-3.85 873 < D ≤ 7500 
FASLAL+29.15 D > 7500 
 134 
 
Vertical alert limit (m) Hp (Product of sin(GPA) and the slant range dis-
tance from the aircraft position to GPIP (m) 
FASVAL Hp ≤ 60.96 
0.095965∙Hp + FASVAL – 5.85 60.96 < Hp ≤ 408.432 
FASVAL + 33.35 Hp > 408.432 
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APPENDIX II – COMMON BIAS PROJECTION INTO THE 
CLOCK 
A common bias on all measurements maps only into the receiver clock, not into the position. This can be shown 
by examining the measurement model  
x
y
H
z
t
ρ η
 
 
 = ⋅ +
 
 
 
 
where ρ is the nx1-dimensional pseudorange measurement vector, , ,x y z the 3-dimensional position and t  the 
receiver clock estimate, η  an nx1-dimensional noise and error term and H  the nx4-dimensional geometry 
matrix with the geometric unit row vectors between satellites and user position and a “1” in the fourth column 
for the receiver clock.  Now let 1ρ and 2ρ be two measurement vectors with 1 2
1
1
kρ ρ
 
 = + ⋅ 
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. Subtracting those two equations from one another yields  
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. 
 
Since H has full column rank (rk(H)=4) it is per definition impossible to make a linear combination of the first 
three columns adding up to the fourth column. Since 
1
(:, 4)
1
H
 
 =  
 
 
  it is necessary that 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0x x y y z z− = − = − =   . This implies that position [x, y, z] is not changed if a common bias on all 
measurements is added.  
 
 
